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The central aim of the research is to examine whether cross-border Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) involving Islamic financial companies in three Gulf countries and non-Islamic 
financial companies from the Western countries is influenced by Shariah Corporate 
Governance (CG). Cross-border M&A is a corporate level strategy to achieve organisational 
growth and expansion through accessing new markets and additional strategic resources 
(knowledge, technology and complementary skills).  Islamic financial companies in the Gulf 
region are keen to engage with non-Islamic financial companies beyond the Islamic world to 
benefit from the cross-border M&A.  However, for Islamic financial companies to operate at 
global scale and attract resources, investors, regulators, customers, and other stakeholders 
should trust that strong CG principles are embedded in the organisation’s core. CG theory 
suggests that good corporate governance enables corporations’ access to external financial 
resources if CG mechanisms provides a clear enforceability of stakeholders’ rights with 
complementary robust legal system.   
Existing literature suggest that both Islamic and non-Islamic financial companies operate in 
different institutional, political, cultural, religious, and regulatory environments; which 
adversely affect the extent to which these two sets of companies could mutually engage in a 
successful cross-border M&A.  In the context of Gulf countries, for example, there is no 
distinction between the state and religion and there is a stringent requirement to comply with 
the Shariah, however, the existence of conflicting opinions on Islam has resulted in varying 
views with regards to what qualifies as Islamic finance that has led to a latitude of multiple 
interpretations of Shariah principles by Shariah scholars and Shariah Supervisory Board. 
Also, Islamic financial companies are more likely to be considered as social entities than a 
commercial enterprise, which differs from the Western view.  Consistent with the above 
context-based literature and drawing on the stewardship, agency and stakeholder theories, 
this study seeks to answer the key research question ‘how Shariah corporate governance 
influences cross-border M&A between Islamic and non- Islamic financial companies? 
iii  
  
The study employs a qualitative approach to obtain and analyse data from interviews with 40 
respondents (Board of Directors members, Lawyers and Shariah Scholars) mainly selected 
from nine banks and six insurance companies in the three Gulf countries - Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. The key findings were: 1) there are variations between 
the three countries in terms of how the conventional CG model is practised, the extent to 
which Islamic CG model is adopted, and in the level of employees’ awareness of the CG 
principles; 2) Incorporating Islamic principles in business practices is primarily determined 
by the interpretation of Shariah by Shariah scholars and Board but these tend to be non-
standardised and at times problematic; 3) In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, companies tended to 
have weaker system of disclosure (in particular Zakat) and smaller Board dominated by 
family and less qualified members than the UAE; 4) Sukuk is the most widely used but 
costly, Islamic financial instrument in cross-border M&A activities as it fully complies with  
Shariah principles where as Tawarruq is considered questionable in terms of Shariah; and 5) 
there are several barriers, identified in Chapter five, which need to be addressed when 
considering cross-border M&A between these two sets of the companies. 
The study makes several contributions to theory, policy and practices. Its significant 
theoretical contributions includes: a) as far as existing literature is concerned, this study is 
the first  to examine the influence of the Islamic CG principles on cross-border M&A 
between Islamic and non-Islamic financial companies; b)  Prior research on corporate 
governance has addressed M&A in developed and emerging countries, however, this is the 
first study to develop a CG model which seeks to improve our understanding of the complex 
issues involved in the process of cross-border M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic 
financial companies; and c) very limited studies have addressed agency, stewardship and 
stakeholder theories in the context of the development of behavioural Shariah CG model in a 
critical manner. The study has policy implications, for instance, it highlights the need to 
create stronger standards of Islamic CG and more standardised interpretation of the Shariah 
in these companies to enable them to operate on a global scale. In terms of practical 
contributions, the study offers implications and recommendations for management and 
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Glossary of Arabic Terms Used 
  
Arabic terms  
Meaning in English  
Adalah  Justice  
Allah  God  
Al-Warq  Money note  
Amanah  Trust or responsibility of fulfilling one's obligations due to Allah  
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Ijma  The consensus that is, acceptance of a matter by a specified group of Shariah scholars or jurists   
Ijtihad  
The process of making a legal decision by independent 
interpretation of qualified Shariah scholar, with respect to an 
issue on which there is little or nothing in the Qur’an or the 
Sunnah.  
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Mirath  Inheritance  
Muamalat  Transactions  
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Murabahah  Contract of sale in which an asset or good is sold at a specified profit margin.   
Musharakah  Partnership contract based on profit/loss sharing in which both parties contribute capital and may form a joint management.  




Analogical deduction, which seeks to establish a similarity 
between new cases and early practices found in the Qur’an or 
Sunnah.  
Qur’an  The last revealed word of Allah to the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.a.w) by the Angel Gabriel.  
Qur’anic text  Qur’anic verse  
Rab-Almal  The capital provider  
Riba  Interest  
Shafii  It is one of the four religious Sunni Islamic schools  
Shariah  Islamic law  
Shia  A Muslim who follows the Shia branch of Islam    
Shura  The principle of consultation  
Sukuk  Islamic interest-free bonds, they represent ownership of well-defined existing and tangible assets, usufruct and services.  
Sunnah  
It is the verbally transmitted record of the teachings, deeds and 
sayings, silent permissions (or disapprovals) which are the 
transmitted reports by the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.a.w)  
Sunni  A Muslim who follows the Sunni branch of Islam    
Shuratic process  
Decision-making process by interaction, integration with all 
stakeholders to achieve a creative evolution.  
Ta’wil  Interpretation or allegorical interpretation to extract the hidden meanings  
Tafseer  Exegesis of the Qur'an  
Takaful  A Shariah compliant insurance alternative to conventional insurance in which money is pooled and invested.  
Tawarruq  
It is an Islamic instrument that facilitates converting an asset 
into money. In this contract, the seller arranges a transaction by 
selling a commodity to the client for deferred payment. The 
institution then sells the commodity, as an agent on behalf of the 
client to a third party, in the market and then credits the price to 
the account of the client.  
Tawhid  Oneness of God  















AAOIFI  The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic  
Financial Institutions  
BOD  Board of Directors  
CG  Corporate Governance  
IFI  Islamic Financial Institutions  
IFSB  The Islamic Financial Services Board  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1 Introduction  
Merger and Acquisition (M&A) occurs when an operating enterprise is involved in the 
business of some other company in the same industrial sector by completing takeover 
through acquisition or having partial control on the firm’s affairs through the merging 
process (Blackburn et al., 1990). International M&A across countries have major 
implications for firms entering new markets in terms of earning profits and increasing 
the shareholders’ dividends while enjoying the benefits of cheap labour (Reuer et al., 
2004; Rossi &Volpin, 2004). Since 1990s, there has been rapid growth in cross-border 
M&A among firms in various countries (Shimizu et al., 2004; Wang& Wong, 2009). 
Research have shown that with the increasing trend of globalisation, 
many organisations operating in both the developed and developing countries are 
expanding their business operations rapidly across international borders to exploit the 
available business opportunities (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2000).This results in increased 
economic activities that positively impacts overall economic growth and development 
(Chatterjee, 2000) and hence signifies an  increased importance of cross-border M&A 
in the present business world.  
  
However, in the context of Gulf Co-operation Council countries, M&A practices 
occurring between Islamic and non-Islamic financial business requires a distinct 
approach as paying and receiving interest is prohibited in Islam (Lewis, 2001). Major 
developments in Islamic business system are currently centred on financial institutions 
(Moore, 1997; Siddiqi, 2006; Wilson, 2013); and this provides motivation to study 
cross-border M&A in financial sector, specifically looking at banks and insurance 




The recent KPMG (2015) survey of the executives identified the motivations for cross 
border M&A, the main sectors of interest and the success factors. This survey found 
that   the need for customer growth (42%) and the need to consolidate core businesses 
or respond to competition (38%) were main motivating factors.  The sub-sectors which 
were found to be most attractive for M&A were: financial technology (26%), banking 
(21%) and insurance (17%). The key success factors considered by executives in order 
of importance were: the well-executed integration plan 39%, correct valuation/deal 
price 31%, effective due diligence (18%), and positive economic conditions 11% 
(KPMG, 2015).    
Companies look for an existing global representative in the current wave of 
globalisation to expand their customer base and businesses (Moeller & Schlingemann, 
2005). There are many factors that contribute to cross-border M&A, such as (i) the 
tendency in the emerging country businesses to invest abroad; (ii) creating synergy 
between or diversifying businesses; (iii) capitalising on growth opportunities; (iv) 
harnessing complimentary resources; (v) gaining larger market share; (vi) establishing 
economies of scale; (vii) avoiding undervaluation of target firms; (viii) obtaining 
intangible assets such as know-how and knowledgeable employees and (ix) gaining 
freedom not available in their domestic economic environment (Eckbo & Thorburn, 
2000; Altunbas & Marques, 2008).  
  
  
The long-term trend of cross-border M&A deal volumes have consistently been around  
2000 deals per year since 2009 and there has been an increasing trend of cross-border 
M&A in the emerging economies (Equiteb, 2015). This trend favours strengthening of 
the links between developed and emerging countries (Buch & DeLong, 2004; Muller, 
2006). However, Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) and Stahl & Voigt (2008) observed 
factors that work against cross-border deals such as cultural differences, high 
information asymmetry and the need for cost sharing between headquarters and 
international divisions creating agency problems. Barkema & Schijven (2008) and Oak 
& Dalbor (2009) have concluded that cultural clashes have negative impact on M&A 
transactions. The cultural differences are very difficult to be quantified in the cost of the 
integration process to derive appropriate premium for determining the target price and 
2  
  
for the purpose of due diligence.  Therefore, it is important to understand whether 
cultural differences could influence cross-border M&A between Islamic and non-
Islamic financial companies.  
  
  
Different countries, therefore, may have different principles, procedures and business 
practices, which may be explicit or implicit, depending on their cultural, religious and 
ethical frameworks (Forstmann, 1998; Georgieva et al., 2012) and these may pose 
challenges for firms’ cross-border expansion strategies (Thomas & Ely, 1996; Keong, 
2002).  Here the focus is on corporate governance, that is, the way in which a company 
executes its operations following established standards of fairness, accountability, 
transparency, disclosure and responsibility.   
  
 In this study, it is argued that cultural and religious differences influence corporate 
governance (CG) practices differently across the globe. Thus it would important to 
examine to what extent different corporate governance models influence cross-border 
M&A as the latter contributes not only to  the  growth and expansion of the firms but 
also the countries in general (Vafeas, 2005). Research also shows that increased 
economic activities in the developing countries could be helpful in improving CG 
(Gereffi et al., 2005). In any cross-border M&A deals, the target firm generally adopts 
the accounting standards, disclosure practices, and governance structure of the acquiring 
firm (Bris et al., 2008). Also, Bris & Cabolis (2008) have shown that a higher merger 
premium can be achieved when the acquirer’s country has stronger shareholder 
protection and accounting standards. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Gompers et al. (2001) and Cremers & Nair (2005) that there is high correlation between 
improvements in transparency and accountability and higher stock returns. Through 
improving the reputation and transparency, domestic institutions can create competitive 
advantage across the national borders by increasing their trustworthiness in the eyes of 
the market intermediaries who supply information globally (Luo & Tung, 2007). It, 
therefore, helps the firms in the developing world to successfully gain access to the 
markets of developed countries and increases their revenues and profitability (Moeller 
& Schlingemann, 2005). Similarly, the target firms benefit from cross-border M&A 
3  
  
through strengthening of their own governance practices to match the governance 
structure of the acquiring firm (Doidge et al., 2007).   
  
  
Corporate governance in a particular country is shaped by its culture, history and 
religion (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Licht et al., 2005). This implies that organisational 
activities in different countries are characterised and influenced by contextual 
dimension such as religion and social traditions, which in turn affect their behaviour, 
values and ethical perspectives (McGuire et al., 2011). For example, in Islamic 
countries, it is widely assumed that there is no distinction between religious and secular 
affairs (Islam & Hassain, 2003; Brammer et al., 2007) these can manifest in 
commonality between   individual and corporate morality and ethical practices. Thus, 
Gulf countries, which are Islamic, adopt a CG framework that reflects the Islamic 
values embedded within local/national culture (Baydoun et al., 2012).  Furthermore, the 
existing literature points out that out that M&A between firms in Gulf countries and 
Western countries offer considerable challenges for CG, such as: family-owned and 
managed businesses; Government intervention in private sector; political system based 
on monarchy; legal system based on Islamic law and social practices followed by 
Islamic society (Al-Nodel & Hussainey, 2010; Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007).  For instance, 
in the Western countries, a company is seen as a separate legal entity different from its 
owners and managers (Pickering, 1968), and this can pose challenges when there is any 
engagement between Islamic and non-Islamic financial companies.  In this study, for 
sake of simplicity, we may use religion as a convenient proxy for culture though this is 
likely to miss the rich cultural diversity within commonly employed religious 
classification such as ‘Protestant’ or ‘Islamic’ (Licht et al, 2005). Assumption of 
uniform CG, even across Gulf countries can be problematic and the CG, even in these 
Islamic countries may have varying practices based on varying interpretation of Shariah 
(Hameed et al., 2006). Also, the issue of CG needing to be based on principles rather 
than rules and regulations has been debated among business communities and leaders 
(OECD, 1999). A parallel situation can also exist in Shariah CG, where some scholars 
consider Islamic law literally in proclaiming their decisions instead of basing them on 
the principles. These factors can lead to diverse CG practices and transactional practices 
4  
  
even in Islamic countries.  So, it is important to examine the influence of culture and 
religion influence the CG in the context of the cross-border M&A.  
 
The companies in the Gulf region are deeply interested in seeking cross-border M&A 
with companies around the globe, primarily motivated by their developmental needs in 
terms of: finding investment avenues; access to advanced technology; technical, 
marketing and managerial expertise in different sectors of the economy (Dubey & 
Kummer, 2016). Current focus of the Western world on CG could increase transparency 
and accountability, enhances investor protection, and could decrease agency costs 
(Vafeas, 2005). With the increasing adoption of Shariah CG in the Islamic world and 
many Western companies showing interest in Islamic products, it would be useful to 
understand the differences between conventional and Shariah CG, and how this can 
affect cross-border M&A.   
  
  
1.2 The Motivation of the Study  
This study is the first of its kind to explore the influence of Shariah-based CG on cross-
border M&A between Islamic financial companies in the Gulf region and non-Islamic 
financial companies from the Western countries. CG is one of the widely-researched 
concept due to its relevance for well-functioning and sustainability of businesses 
globally (Aras & Crowther, 2008).  The issue of how the Islamic CG can be integrated 
or complement with the conventional CG in the context of cross-border M&A is rarely 
studied.  Therefore, this research seeks to fill this gap by examining how the Islamic 
approaches to good CG based on the Qur’an and Sunnah and how different 
interpretation of Shariah principles by Shariah scholars influence the cross border 
M&A of  Islamic  and non-Islamic financial companies.   
  
Adoption of good CG and practices are crucial for the success of cross-border M&A 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2008), with an added layer of compliance when dealing with 
Islamic financial companies to stand the test of compliance with the Shariah principles. 
Currently, there is an active debate on creating a better understanding of how to carry 
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out business transactions in the light of Shariah (Abuznaid, 2009; Usmani, 2007). 
Qur’an and Sunnah provide guidance for good CG and efforts have been intensified in 
the Islamic society to contribute and provide deeper and wider understanding of social, 
economic and political disciplines of Islam.   
 
Being a complete code of life for Muslims, Islam offers solutions for both business and 
society. In terms of business, for example, Shariah prohibits all transactions involving 
Riba (interest) during the conduct of any business and allows sharing of profit and loss 
including any risk associated with the business deals (Chapra, 1998) . Sharia principles 
such as these form the basis when conducting M&As   locally and internationally and 
these are very different from the conventional CG.  Thus, understanding to what extent 
such principles are deployed in financial institutions of the three Gulf countries is of 
interest to this research.  
  
Indeed, most religions have the same fundamental principles governing good CG 
practices such as fairness, accountability, transparency, truthfulness and sincerity 
(Volonte, 2015). However, the implementation of Islamic principles varies from 
country to country due to different interpretations by different Shariah scholars. The 
Shariah CG is principally based on two sources: (i) Fiqh (knowledge of the Islamic 
rulings), which would be based on the different Islamic schools of thought such as the 
Sunni schools of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali or Shia schools such as Jafari etc. 
(Reinhart, 1983); and (ii) Fatwa (a scholar’s opinion from an Islamic point of view). 
The points of possible divergences can therefore arise from the following of the 
different schools of thoughts as well as the experience, wisdom and the conservative or 
liberal outlook of individual scholars in considering issues in accord with Shariah 
principles. In fact, such differences in interpretations of the sharia law and principles 
can pose challenges in the process of   cross-border M&A between companies of 




1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study  
 
The study aim to investigate the extent and how Shariah corporate governance 
influences cross-border M&A between the Islamic financial companies in three Gulf 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE) and non-Islamic financial companies in the 
Western countries. The study pursues the following research objectives to achieve the 
aim of the research.  
 
i. To identify how the Islamic corporate governance is constituted and how it is 
different from the conventional corporate governance model? This research 
objective would help to understand to what extent the CG models are compatible. 
ii. To examine the extent Islamic CG is adopted by the Islamic financial companies. 
iii.  To investigate how the current Islamic CG mechanisms practices in the three 
countries facilitate or constrain the process of cross-border M&A and which cultural 
factors influence the Islamic CG mechanism? 
iv. To examine the extent Shariah principles are applied in business practices of Islamic 
financial companies and to identify the active player in interpretation and 
enforcement of these principles? 
v. To identify the main barriers for effective implementation of the Shariah- based 
Islamic corporate governance principles in business and in the context of cross-
border M&A. 
vi.  To examine the nature and influence of the Islamic legal corporate structure on the 
decision- making process in Islamic financial companies  








1.4 Research Questions  
 
In line with the research aim and objectives, the following research questions were 
formulated. The research questions were designed in such a way as to explore, and 
further to understand the nature of the Shariah-based CG in influencing cross-border 
M&A. Hence, essential dimensions of the Islamic CG within its context are to be 
examined through the following research questions: 
 
1. What constitutes Islamic CG and how does it differ from the conventional CG 
model?  In other words, is there compatibility between the conventional and 
Islamic CG models? 
2. To what extent the Islamic CG is adopted by the Islamic financial companies? 
3. Do the Islamic CG mechanisms facilitate or constraint in the process of cross-
border M&A?  what cultural factors influence the Islamic CG mechanisms? 
4. To what extent are Shariah principles applied in business practices of Islamic 
companies? Who are active players in interpretation and enforcement of these 
principles? 
5. What are the main obstacles for effective implementation of the Shariah- based 
Islamic CG principles in business and in the context of cross-border M&A? 
6. What form does the Islamic legal corporate structure takes and how does it shape 
the decision making in Islamic financial companies  
7. Which Islamic financial instruments are likely to be used in the context of cross-




1.5 Justification of the Chosen Industries and the Research Area 
  
This research is limited to the largest three Islamic Banks and two Insurance companies 
in each of the three Gulf counties, which are quoted in their respective stock markets. 
The financial sector involving the banking and insurance organisations were selected 
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for this study for two reasons. First, the sector provides critical cases which show, 
comparatively, strong manifestation of the Shariah CG. Second, the issues of cross-
border M&A between the Islamic and non-Islamic financial companies might be 
complicated and problematic because of the ways in which firms conduct business, such 
as engaging in interest payable and interest receivable products, and managing of risky 
transactions involving financial derivatives could be not only different but also 
prohibited in the study context.  Third, the financial sector is the second major 
contributor to the GDP after oil and gas sector, typified by concentrated ownership, 
largely domestically owned and protected but also has been growing (Al-Obaidan, 
2008; Yu &Hassan, 2008).  Fourth, Islamic financial sector has attracted investors 
worldwide, which has led to increase in its business and economic activities both 
regionally and globally (Islamic Financial Services Board, 2015). Thus, the sector and 
the chosen cases provide rich context to examine the cross-border M&A between 
Islamic and non-Islamic financial companies because of their wider significance. 
Given the context of three Gulf countries, this research was motivated to examine 
whether there are variations in which the Islamic CG model and principles being 
applied and the reasons which may explain such variations.  Further motivation for the 
study was to explore to what extent existing conventional theories such stakeholder, 
stewardship and agency, which may explain the CG practices and stakeholders’ 
behaviour, are useful to understand the Islamic CG.   
 
 
1.6 The Structure of Thesis 
 
The thesis is organised into six chapters.  
Chapter one outlines the research background, research purpose, research objectives and 
questions and justification of the choice of the financial sector and cases from both the 




Chapter two presents the review of a wide range of literatures in substantive and critical 
manner. The literature review covered issues relating the conceptualisation of the 
corporate governance, its mechanisms, corporate legal structure in the study context, 
Islamic CG, development of Islamic finance and three related theories.    
  
Chapter three presents the research methodology used in this study including the 
research paradigms, research approaches, research strategy, sample selection, data 
collection methods, data analysis and ethical issues. The empirical data   were collected 
through interviews with 40 respondents with different roles (managers, legal advisors 
and sharia scholars) from 9 banks and 6 insurance companies quoted in the stock 
markets of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. 
Chapter four discusses the findings and the analysis of the empirical data. The analysis 
follows qualitative, interpretative, approach using themes generated from the data 
gathered and from both theoretical and empirical literatures. 
 
Chapter five provides the summary of the key findings, conclusions, theoretical 
contributions, implications and recommendations for various stakeholders, limitations 
and ideas for further study as well as a final note on how the research objectives and 
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2.1 Introduction  
This chapter undertakes the review of a body of prior studies carried out within three 
main areas, which are Conventional CG, Islamic CG and Cross-Border M&A. There is 
a great deal of attention given to CG particularly since late 1980, after the collapse of 
companies in different countries such as Rothwells Ltd, Enron, WorldCom, Global 
Crossing and Adelphia etc. (Bosch, 2002; Parker, 2005; Tricker, 2015) posed a big 
challenge to business enterprises, especially those in developing countries, to adopt 
better CG practices (Chen & Findlay, 2003). In addition, the financial crisis that 
occurred in 2008 affected many countries, including the Gulf countries (Claessens et al., 
2000) and emphasised the need for good CG.  
  
  
Adoption of CG becomes an important factor for developing countries firms as it 
enables them access to the developed world via cross-border M&A and this is directly 
linked with the economic growth and development (Briset et al., 2008; Weitzel & 
Berns, 2006). Bris et al. (2008) found that there is a high correlation between good 
practices of CG adopted by a firm and cross-border M&A. Similarly, Martynova & 
Renneboog (2008) found a strong correlation between transparency and cross-border 
M&A success. The argument here is that good governance is likely to increase not only 
the value of the firms but also the industry due to increased and successful M&A 
activities. Successful M& A activities enable developing countries firms to successfully 
penetrate the markets of developed countries and increase their revenues and 
profitability (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). Besides good CG, a greater 
understanding of the following critical success factors is essential for a company to 
succeed in a cross-border M&A.  
  
  
CG is shaped by a particular country culture, history and religion (Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Licht et al., 2005), this implies that people who operate 
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organisations in different countries are characterised by different dimensions such as 
education, religion and traditions, which affect their ethical perspectives, which in turn 
affect their decisions (Ely & Thomas, 2001; Licht et al, 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
McGuire et al., 2011). Because of the different cultural background, corporations in 
Gulf countries offer challenges in adoption of the conventional CG and in any cross- 
border M&A. This is because firms in GCC countries are typified by different features 
such as predominance of family-owned businesses, Government intervention in private 
sector, political system based on monarchies, legal system based on Shariah (Davis et 
al., 2000; Rice, 2003; Al-Nodel & Hussainey, 2010; Baydoun et al., 2012). 
Understanding the principles and practices which are based on the religion and culture 
may provide better understanding how to harmonise principles of CG to facilitate cross-
border M&A.  
  
  
This chapter discusses the definition, models and mechanisms of the conventional CG, 
followed by the CG practice in Gulf countries and the underlying Shariah CG 
principles, followed by sources and principles of Shariah, CG model informed by 
Shariah and how Islamic companies are directed, controlled and operated, Islamic 
financial instruments and the overall theoretical framework consisting of Stakeholder, 
Stewardship and Agency theories.  
  
  
2.2 What is Corporate Governance?  
The practice of CG is as old as trade and the issues that this concept addresses have 
been discussed long time ago, however, it is relatively new in the academic field 
(Cadbury, 1992; OECD, 1999; Tricker, 2015). Scholars’ definitions of CG vary, based 
on (i) which CG model has been adopted in different countries; and (ii) the laws of the 
country of jurisdiction. For example, the Anglo-Saxon model of CG is prevalent in the 
countries which emphasise shareholder values. In contrast, Japanese model emphasise a 





A broader definition of CG can be characterized as a system of three dimensions: 
principles, processes and outcomes (Gunay, 2008). Furthermore, another broader 
definition of CG was presented by Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992), head of the Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of CG in the United Kingdom: as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”. Steiner & Steiner (2012) expanded on this 
definition, referring to CG as an effective control system within organizations, where 
managers effectively implement business strategies and plans to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth. CG is, thus mainly concerned with accountability, transparency, 
fairness, disclosure and responsibility, regardless of the type or nature of the business.  
  
  
In respect of CG in relation to management, situations may arise where the ownership 
of the firm is different from the management (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012); therefore, 
developing required processes and procedures through which the firm is controlled and 
governed would be important (OECD, 1999). Economic scientists such as Monks & 
Minow (2004) have defined CG as the relationship between various participants (CEO, 
management, shareholders and employees). Another perspective by Blair (1995), 
presented CG as a set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements while Freeman & 
Evan (1990) have defined CG as consisting of a framework of voluntary multi-lateral 
agreements within an organisation. These definitions, basically, focus on aligning the 
principal-agent objectives in a system with checks and balances to achieve the required 
transparency and accountability.  
  
  
A narrower concept of CG, given by Shleifer & Vishny (1997, p.737) states, “corporate 
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment”. This definition could be expanded 
to include solutions to the problems and settlement of the conflicts and clashes between 
various shareholders, for example, La Porta et al. (2000) defined CG as a group of 
mechanisms through which outside investors secure themselves from inside investors.   
  
According to Claessens & Yurtoglu (2012) there are two approaches to CG. The first 
focuses on behavioural patterns of humans in the firm, such as Boards of Directors, 
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composition of Board of Director, the roles of multiple shareholders, stakeholders and 
external auditors in relation to the firm performance and growth (Kaen, 2003; Praveen, 
2004; Monks & Minow, 2004; Cornelius, 2005; Claessens, 2006). The second focuses 
on normative framework which considers capital markets rules that lead to investors’ 
protection and creditors’ rights, such as disclosure and accounting, reporting and 
protections of minority shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 2000; Claessens, 2006; 
Hambrick et al., 2008; Bondy et al., 2008). Some authors such as Oman (2001) and 
Council (2010) have defined CG to explicitly include Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and sustainability concepts.  
  
  
Based on the above debate, firstly, Davies (2012) affirmed that CG provides guiding 
principles to manage the business organisations regardless of their type, whether 
commercial or otherwise. A well-understood principles and policies help to guide 
managers’ and employees’ behaviour in certain circumstances. Charantimath (2005, 
p.219) also asserted that “CG brings the right people together at the right time to discuss 
the right (important) things”.  
  
  
Secondly, Brooks (2004, p.33) defined CG as “the structure, which specifies the 
distribution of responsibilities and rights among different corporate participants in 
corporation, such as, the Board, the managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and 
spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs”. 
Therefore, it also offers the structure through which the organisational objectives are set 
and the ways of meeting those objectives are planned.  
  
  
Kaen (2003) defined that CG is about who manages firms and why. This definition is 
concerned with supervising and managing the organisations’ activities. These thoughts 
are mainly concerned with behaviour of corporations focusing on several measures such 
as performance, efficiency, growth and the rights of shareholders and other stakeholders 
(Classes et al., 2000). However, these vary from one country to another based on their 
orientation and the ways in which the legal systems work (Shleifer &Vishny, 1997). On 
14  
  
the other hand, a minimalist approach to CG focuses on the set of rules directing the 
corporation, which are derived from the legal and judicial systems, financial and labour 
markets. This is supported by Baker & Anderson (2010) as they stated that CG is the 
processes and systems applied to control and direct a firm to develop performance and 
accomplish sustainable value of its shareholder.   
  
  
In contrast, some Islamic scholars attempted to provide explanation of CG from an 
Islamic perspective, such as Elasrag (2014) who noted that CG concept from Islamic 
perspective does not vary much with conventional CG, except prohibition of certain 
products and practices as well as concern for all stakeholders rather than just the 
shareholders and therefore be seen as  a special case of a wider theory of decision-
making that utilizes the Islamic socio scientific epistemology, which is premised on 
divine God oneness (Choudhury & Hoque, 2006). Moreover, Sourial (2004) noted that 
Islamic law contain numerous guidelines on how to deal with economic transactions 
that includes moral conduct of Muslim.   
  
  
Considering the range of definitions on CG, a number of researchers including Aguilera 
and Jackson (2010); Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013) and Matoussi & Jardak (2012) 
debated the question whether a common, international framework of CG would be 




2.3 Corporate Governance Models  
CG models are adopted in different countries to achieve value-oriented management 
and control of companies. Comparative research has found that one size of CG would 
not equally fit all countries (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Davies & Schlitzer, 2008). As 
Shleifer &Vishny (1997) have noted, there are two distinctive patterns of CG in 
developed countries:(i) an approach which focuses on shareholders and relies on the 
free market as corrective mechanism or the “outsider system”, such that the 
management team intend to operate for the purpose of maximising the shareholders’ 
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return on investment such practice is adopted in US and UK; and (ii) an approach which 
focuses on all stakeholders or the “insider system”, such that the management takes a 
wider perspective and looks after the interests of one or more groups of stakeholders, 
such as, the employees, suppliers, lenders, public authorities and public at large. The 
first, also known as the Anglo-Saxon model is found in the Anglo-Saxon countries like 
UK, US, Canada, and Australia. The second, which can be referred to as the 
Combination model, as it combines the Anglo-Saxon model with national culture, 
values, regulations, is found in continental European countries like Germany, Holland, 
France, etc., and Japan.   
  
  
2.3.1 Anglo-Saxon Model   
Anglo-Saxon approach of CG focuses on protecting the interests of organisations’ 
shareholders (Cernat, 2004). Mueller (2006) considers shareholders or the capital 
providers as the owners of the company (principals), who appoint the managers (agents) 
to run the business on their behalf and generate wealth for the owners. Therefore, the 
interest of the owners is paramount.  
  
  
The Anglo-Saxon model was built on a strong foundation of capitalism principles. Due 
to this reason, it has been adopted by countries that have adopted original forms of 
capitalism (Lutz & Eberle, 2007).  Anglo-Saxon approach relies on free market as the 
correction mechanism as it is characterized by less regulated financial and labour 
markets (Chabal, 2013). When an organisation has weak CG, it has a high level of 
agency costs which increases over a period of time due to failure to account for these 
costs (Moerland, 1995). This affects the growth of the company and its shareholders’ 
return of investment, making the company an attractive target for takeover by another 
player in the industry, which can turn the company around by strengthening the CG. 
The market forces, therefore, provide a strong incentive for working towards strong CG 
and minimising agency costs to ensure survival and growth of the organisation (Drobetz 
et al., 2004).  But such models fail to account in the context of market imperfections 
and heavy state involvement in the business environment. Further, Kulik (2005) and 
Driver & Thompson (2002) have argued that to view an organisation’s sole purpose of 
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existence as only adding value to the shareholders is a very narrow conception and 




Cost of capital is expected to be adjusted through the market mechanism (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). High cost of capital is associated with weak system of CG and high 
agency risks. This may lead to less investments’ opportunity; reduce profitability and 
high bankruptcy costs of the organisation (Leland, 1998; Williamson, 2002). Market 
mechanisms play an important role in translating high agency costs into weak financial 
performance and this can be considered as a disadvantage of the Anglo-Saxon model.  
  
  
2.3.2 The Combination Model  
The combined approaches consist of different models that emanate from the Anglo-
Saxon approach; however, these approaches vary based on the countries culture, values, 
regulations and religion (Aguilera et al., 2008). For example, the Japanese model of CG 
pays attention to wider groups of stakeholders; therefore, it is the closest model to the 
stakeholder theory (Allen & Zhao, 2007). It is seen that the Japanese system of CG is 
based on social norms, traditions and family values as families originally ran the 
businesses where shareholders typically have a long-term investment focus (Morck et 
al., 2000). As the average shareholder tends to hold on to stock for a longer period 
(8year), managers’ decisions are supposed to be focused on adding value to these 
shareholders.   
  
  
The French CG model focuses on the welfare of the employees as much as the 
shareholders of the companies. The French model has a strong foundation on Marxist 
principles which support the strong labour laws in France (Morin, 2000). It is noted that 
the labour-oriented CG has traditionally been strong in French corporations and the 
union members might be represented on the Boards of the companies (Ahlering & 
Deakin, 2007). However, Goyer (2003) noted that in recent years, CG model in France 
has seen major movements towards the Anglo-Saxon model. This shift is attributed to 
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the fact that the American and British financial institutions are gaining growing 
dominance in the capital market in France. The author stated that that a large percentage 
of the equity of most of the top companies in France is owned by the owners of these 
financial institutions. Due to their influence also, the companies are moving towards the 
Anglo-Saxon CG model.   
  
  
Similarly, German CG model has seen major movements towards the Anglo-Saxon 
approach as the most corporations in Germany focus on shareholders rather than other 
groups of stakeholders (Lane, 2003). Initially, the German model was based on 
‘codetermination’ that involves the labour force, the management and business policies. 
In addition, emphasis was placed upon the labour or employees as the most prominent 
group of stakeholders, which required the management to make their decisions based on 
the impact to the employees (Driver & Thompson, 2002). This model consists of two 
tier system for management, which are the Board and the representatives of work 
council to supplement the Board.  
  
  
Based on the above CG models, it can be said that despite the observed similarities 
between the developed countries, CG structure and ownership are different. For 
instance, the long-term ownership orientation by shareholders in Japan and mandatory 
influence of labour representatives in Germany show some of these differences in the 
structure and ownership patterns in CG. Most of the CG debate has mainly focused on 
developed economies. But not much studies exist which focused on the CG in 
developing and emerging economies albeit with some focused in countries such as 
China, Brazil, and India.  Similar trend in research interest is emerging with the context 
of developing countries such as Arab countries, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan who adopt Islamic CG. It may be relevant to ascertain the CG practices in such 
diverse and emerging places to help in harmonising CG models. Specifically, China has 
drawn more attention on its CG based on its continued economic growth (Wortman, 
1994; Melin & Nordqvist, 2000; Berghe & Carchon, 2003). The following sections 





2.3.3 The Chinese Model  
In comparison to the other models, the Chinese model of CG is quite different from the 
West (Allen et al., 2005). Chinese CG model has gone through different stages of 
evolution (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). Initially, post 1949, the Chinese economy was 
dominated by the state-owned enterprises and the Government was responsible for 
controlling each and every aspect of the economy (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2001). In the 
second stage (mid-1980s), the Chinese Government had started implementing 
privatisation policy. At this stage, the state’s role in the business activities had 
drastically being minimised. During the third stage (1993), the modern corporate 
structure was implemented and laws and regulations were made to ensure smooth 
operations in enhancing the employee involvement and distributing authority to them 
based on their skills and capabilities. Also at this stage, the state shareholders still 
enjoyed preference over the individual investors within the country. During the final 
stage (2005), the individual investors were given particular importance and Government 
of China provided all the necessary facilities to support the investors in order to 
encourage and promote domestic and foreign direct investment within the country 
(Yong et al., 2008).   
  
  
The corporate regulations and laws have helped the Chinese Government to ensure 
continuous growth of CG within the country. Currently, the CG model in China is 
focused on balancing the power between individual shareholders within the 
organisations and state shareholders (Wang et al., 2004). In the present scenario, the 
shareholders, Board of Directors and management personnel in the Chinese companies 
are involved directly in implementation of the CG of their respective organisations 
(Glen & Singh, 2005). The present CG model in China has also helped an increased level 
of participation of shareholders in the company’s business operations. The effective 
implementation of corporate regulations, legal systems and auditing systems has also 
increased the trust and confidence of the investors, which has improved the domestic 
investment within the country and positively impacts the financial performance of the 
organisations (McDonnell, 2002). As Jomo & Folk (2003) observed, the CG in China 





Liu (2006) provided a preliminary survey to better understand the contrasting features 
of the CG practices in China. The author argued that the China CG could be described 
as a control-based model where the decision making is in line with the shareholders’ 
interest. He further stated that the dominant CG model adopted by Chinese companies 
contrasts with the market-oriented model. He argued that this kind of model is 
damaging the investors’ confidence and negatively affecting the development of China 
stock market. As the study context is typified, to some extent, by control- based model, 
it would be interesting to explore how such CG influences the cross-border M&A.  
  
  
Although China has achieved fast economic growth and this has been reflected in the 
rise of their gross domestic product as well as increased foreign reserves, it is still 
considered as an Emerging Market Economy (EME) as a result of weak institutional 
structures as well as underdeveloped and poorly regulated financial sectors (Carrasco & 
Wililams, 2012). While EMEs such as China, Brazil and India cannot be considered 
developed countries, their continued progress indicates that the CG models adopted by 
the specific countries offer some benefits for local organisations.   
  
  
2.3.4 CG System in the Gulf Countries  
Apparently, following the aftermath of 1997 financial crisis of East Asian corporations  
(Claessens et al., 2000) and the downturn of subprime in 2008-2009 in USA (Verick & 
Islam, 2010), there has been a call for regional economic development and growth of 
sound CG among the Gulf countries (Baydounet al., 2012). Local regulatory agencies 
have started considering a new framework to improve CG in Gulf countries 
(AlMalkawi et al., 2014). Bauer et al. (2004) highlighted that organisations with better 
Board and CG translate into better-governed companies. Saidi (2004) further contended 
that corporations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region must adopt the 
basic tenets of effective CG. Other factors such as becoming a financial and commercial 
centre, being the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the need to have access to 
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international capital to fund additional growth and globalization of existing business 




The businesses in Gulf region were safeguarded from financial crisis that affected most 
of the Western countries and they are yet to adopt best practices of CG as most Gulf 
institutions are undeveloped due to market imperfections and family ownership (Saidi, 
2004; Aulakh & Kotabe, 2008). According to a report by Gulf Business (2015), families 
own approximately 60-70 % of companies in the Gulf region; hence, there could be 
reluctance to disclose financial information to the public (Sophia, 2015). Further to this, 
a study done by BDI in 2013 on Board effectiveness in the Gulf revealed that the level 
of disclosure and transparency of Gulf corporations was low in areas such as 
composition and number of BOD in comparison with Western and Asian standards.   
  
  
It is commonly acknowledged that financial issues are not the only sign of weak CG, 
but rather environmental, social and human damages are also indicators of the 
soundness and sustainability of CG (Boatright, 1996; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Mitton, 2002). Researchers such as Bakhtari (1995), Saidi (2004), Haniffa & Cooke 
(2005) and Licht et al. (2001) have found that culture and religion have a negative 
impact on CG practices in MENA region including Gulf countries, which are all Islamic 
countries. Hidayah (2014) provided empirical evidence, which shows that CG practices 
rely heavily on cultural and Islamic beliefs. Shariah law has been widely used as a 
guiding principle in CG practices in Gulf countries which is subject to Shariah scholars’ 
different interpretations of Islamic principles which might present difficulties in 
practice (Beckett, 2003; Islam & Hussain, 2003; Chapra & Ahmad, 2002; Hasan 2012). 
Although Lim et al. (2007) have indicated that there is evidence of Anglo-Saxon and 
combination models of CG principles applied in this region; there has been strong 
adoption of Shariah CG, which guides the Islamic companies. Therefore, the concept of 
what is widely known as “Islamic Corporate Governance” is emerging (Chapra& 
Ahmad, 2002; Choudhury & Hoque, 2006; Lewis, 2005; Choudhury & Alam, 2013) but 
more empirical studies yet to be conducted how Islamic CG manifest and how different 
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stakeholders respond to such emergence in practice.  Perry (2011) stated that Islamic 
CG model involves two Boards management, one that is required by conventional law 
and the other required by Shariah law, which is similar to the German CG.  Also 
Japanese, Chinese, Brazilian and Indian companies have embedded their culture and 
religion in their CG in contrast to the Western countries.  But little is known to what 
extent various stakeholders such as directors, legal advisors and Shariah scholar 
perceive the influence of culture and Shariah principle on the adoption of Islamic based 
CG and in what ways and to what degree the Islamic CG mechanisms are applied in 
Islamic financial institutions. This research, in part, addresses this gap. 
  
  
Many researchers including Jones & Pollitt (2004) and Clift (2007) have observed that 
companies have been trying to develop a CG model that enables them to become an 
active player in the global market. It is noted that most of the countries with 
combination models have shown a tendency to move slowly towards the shareholder-
friendly policies and frameworks to enable better global integration in the world 
dominated by the Western companies. In fact, most of the countries have adopted the 
Anglo-Saxon model to more and less extent necessitating the Islamic companies to 
better understand the conventional CG  so that they would be able to adopt a more 
formal, standard and consistent Shariah CG (Safieddine, 2009) in order to remove 
uncertainties  and be able to integrate into the global market. Bertillo et al. (2013) noted 
that Islamic financial sectors are trying to formulate a new model of Islamic CG, yet 
they have been faced with various challenges.  This observation begs a question ‘to 
what extent are Islamic financial institutions in the Gulf countries able to incorporate 
Shariah principles in their CG system. This is one of the research questions this 









The key features of the different CG models are summarised in Table (2.1), for ready 
reference.  
  
Table 2.1: Summary of the Key Features of the Different CG Models  
Model  Anglo- 
Saxon   
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2.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Many scholars have reviewed CG mechanisms, such as Shleifer &Vishny (1997), John  
& Senbet (1998), Fan et al. (2002), Becht et al. (2003), Huse (2005) and Nikoskelainen  
& Wright (2007). They have looked at the internal mechanisms within the firm (such as 
Board effectiveness, owners, shareholders and employees) and external mechanisms 
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outside the firm (such as legal and regulatory obligations, auditing standards and quality 
of disclosure).  
  
  
Previous researchers such as Haniffa & Hudaib (2006); Bozec & Dia (2007) and Koh et 
al. (2007) have identified the important CG mechanisms as ownership structure, dual 
chair, and composition of Board and director independence, integrity in financial 





2.4.1 Ownership Structure  
There are debates on the issue of separating ownership from control in modern 
corporations, since ownership structures dominate CG models (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Lemmon & Lins, 2003).  Ownership structure is one of the main aspects of CG that 
plays an important role in cross-border M&A (Aguilera & Dencker, 2004; Eugster, 
2015). For example, Jensen & Meckling (1976) argued that ownership structures 
determine the overall control of the organisations, which can influence their 
performance.  Also, in large organisations, there may be conflict of interest between the 
owners and executive managers in terms of separation of control (Haw et al., 2004).   
  
  
There are various types of ownership structure such as the large shareholders’ 
ownership, which is common in the public organisations in Western countries and the 
family or minority ownership structure, which is common in developing countries such 
as Gulf countries (Othman & Zeghal, 2010).   
  
  
Certain families control large sets of businesses in the Gulf countries due to strong 
political, cultural, religion and historical ties with African and South Asian markets 
(Chahine, 2007; Saidi, 2004). Baydoun et al. (2012) carried out a study on governance 
practices and found that there is rarely any separation between ownership and 
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management, as friends and relatives dominate the BOD. Furthermore, Yasin & Shehab 
(2004) concluded that good CG is determined by high concentrated ownership 
structure.  
However, Eugster (2015) emphasised that with the presence of family control 
shareholder decreases the likelihood of cross-border M&A.  So, it would be interesting 
to examine how such ownership structure which typifies Gulf firms influence the 
general CG mechanisms in this region. 
  
  
2.4.2 Dual Chair  
Dual chair is one of the CG aspects, which usually acknowledges that a person could 
effectively manage a company by occupying two positions (Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and the BOD Chair) at the same time (Forker, 1992). Many firms in  
Gulf is family owned and duality is a common feature in these firms (Chahine, 2007; 
Safieddine, 2009; Al-Hassan et al., 2010). CEO is responsible in managing the 
organisation, presenting the financial reports, and alerts the Chair of any sensitive issues 
(Warther, 1998; Carver & Carver, 2009). For example, Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommends that CEO and Board Chair roles 
should be separated and that the chair must be selected from the non-executive 
directors. Moreover, the roles and responsibilities of CEO and the Chair should be 
clearly defined (OECD, 1999). Providing distinction and clear job functions may help 
to facilitate cross-border M&A.  
  
  
However, some scholars provide a counter argument based on stewardship theory 
provided by Donaldson & Davis (1990), which suggests that the separation of the two 
roles might not be essential, because if the roles are combined with clear and 
unambiguous authority and less interference then effective management can be 
achieved. In contrast, the agency theory suggests that the CEO and the Chair 
responsibilities should be separated as this will benefit the company by improving the 
Board’s independence from the management, which will lead to better monitoring 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The findings reported above thus are inconclusive regarding dual 
roles. This thesis, therefore, seeks to examine how assuming two roles (CEO and chair 
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of BOD) simultaneously compromise the effectiveness of the CG and its influence on 
organisational performance in the context of Gulf countries.   
  
  
2.4.3 Composition of Board and Director Independence  
The BOD members are key players in providing strategic direction for firms (Abidin et 
al., 2009; Ho & Williams, 2003). A wider range of expertise, skills and knowledge 
possessed by a large size BOD improve the quality of strategic decisions (Abeysekera, 
2010; Dalton et al., 1998). They can also influence the formation of cross-border M&A 
by structuring relevant strategies and policies to expand their business abroad (Brewer 
et al., 2000).   Directors’ independence has been the factor of immense importance in 
previous studies in terms of its impact on firm performance and dual chair (Brickley et 
al., 1994). Moreover, independent directors can achieve superior managerial decisions 
and long-term performance as they provide more resources, information, and legitimacy 
to firms (Hillman, et al., 2000; Ibrahim et al., 2003). Yermack (1996) found evidences 
that firm’s value is increased if directors’ independence is ensured in the firms. 
Similarly, Rechner & Dalton (1991) showed that Board composed of independent 
directors’ increase the firm’s value. This suggests that independence of the director is 
one of the important tools of CG.  
  
  
Literature also provides positive evidences on the relationship between Board 
independence and M&A. For instance, Byrd & Hickman (1992) found that firms with 
Boards composed of independent directors have better local deals and helps in cross-
border M&A. Similarly, Shivdasani (1993) also found a positive impact of Board 
independence on these deals. However, in the Gulf countries getting experienced and 
qualified independent non-executive directors is usually difficult especially in smaller 
countries (Baydoun et al., 2012). Hence, understanding Board composition, director 
independence and how to source qualified and experienced independent directors in 
respect to cross-border M&A is relevant. This will help in creating better formation of 






2.4.4 Safeguarding Integrity in Financial Reporting  
OECD recommends that all listed companies need to set up audit committee with a 
minimum of three members including the Chair and must consist of non-executive 
directors of the company (Collier & Zaman, 2005). Klein (1998) argued that the larger 
the audit committee size with various experiences, skills and knowledge combination, 
the better its impact on performance. Also, a valuable committee comprises of 
independent, committed and qualified members (Beasley & Salterio, 2001). The 
committee is responsible for reviewing and analysing financial reporting (Abbott et al., 
2003). Klein (2002) suggested that the audit committee is also responsible for liaising 
among managers, Board, and external auditors within an organisation in order to ensure 
free flow of information and discussions. Blue Ribbon Committee suggested that the 
usefulness of committee in honouring its roles and responsibilities depend, among other 
things, upon its composition and frequency of meeting (Millstein, 1999).   
  
  
There are empirical evidences that suggest the importance of an independent audit 
committee in enhancing transparency in financial reporting. For example, Bull & Sharp 
(1989) and Kalbers & Fogarty (1993) presented the importance of setting up an audit 
committee, since their activities help to enhance transparency (Koh et al., 2007; Starks 
& Wei, 2004; Rossi &Volpin (2004). Similarly, Vafeas (2005) stated that audit 
committees are instituted in order to provide mechanism for fair financial reporting and 
good CG. In addition, Karamanou & Vafeas (2005) asserted that the rationale of the 
independent committee is to ensure that the interests of shareholders are properly 
protected and to be free from management’s influence.  However, different benefits of 
setting up independent audit committee have been stated but little has been discussed 
about the cost associated with it and various challenges that they encounter. 
Understanding of the likely challenges, may lead to better transparency and integrity.  
  
  
Furthermore, there is lack of well-developed accounting and monitoring system, which 
affect the degree of disclosure in the Gulf countries, leaving open doors for fraud and 
abuses of the financial reporting and disclosure (Al Qahtani, 2005). Abdallah & Ismail 
27  
  
(2016) suggested that the Governments of the Gulf countries should either formulate or 
adopt a new international accounting standard regulation. The aim of such initiative is 
to eliminate barriers that may affect cross-border M&A activities by ensuring that Gulf 
companies’ accounts are comparable, reliable and transparent.  This research considers 
how various CG mechanisms, as seen by the relevant stakeholders who are responsible 
for its formation and implementation, perceive the possibility of implementing them in 
weak institutional environment which characterise the Gulf countries. 
  
  
2.4.5 Annual Disclosure   
In OECD companies are required to disclose all relevant financial information, whether 
good or bad, that may influence investors’ decisions (Healy & Palepu, 2001). An 
organisation should recognise its stakeholders’ information needs and how its 
performance is likely to impact upon them (McGee, 2009).  However, previous studies 
are not conclusive on the link between disclosure and organisational performance. 
Najah & Jarboui (2013), for instance, found that there is no significant relation between 
disclosure and financial performance. Many authors such as Singhvi & Desai (1971); 
Ahmed & Courtis (1999) and Zarzeski (1996) have examined the relationship between 
corporate size and disclosure in different organisation annual reports and found that 
firm size is positively correlated to the level of disclosure. Ho & Wong (2001) found a 
positive relationship between disclosure and the existence of audit committee. In 
addition, they found that the presence of family members in the BOD is negatively 
related to disclosure.  In addition, Nasser & Nuseibeh (2003) examined the level of 
disclosure and compliance in the annual reports of Saudi listed companies and found 
that they are highly compliant with the mandatory requirements for disclosure. 
Inconsistent results were found when trying to find how the level of disclosure impact 
on business opportunities due to differences in socio-economic and political 
environments between countries and organizational structures (Lee, 1999; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005). It was argued that firms with strong Boards can structure relevant 
strategies and policies, and are more likely to ensure higher financial transparency 
(Klein, 1998). However, Brickley et al. (1994) and Haniffa & Cooke (2002) argued that 
dual Chair of CEO may constrain Board independence and could hinder their ability to 
control effectively, thus, leading to lower level of disclosures and transparency. For 
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example, in Gulf countries, most of the firms lack transparency due to duality of 
position of the Chair and the CEO (Baydoun et al., 2012).   
  
 
On the other hand, independent directors are more likely to enhance firms’ disclosure 
level, therefore, support firm long-term performance (Ibrahim et al., 2003). The level of 
disclosure attained is correlated to the amount and quality of information provided to 
the investors or stakeholders. This enables the stakeholders to evaluate the company 
performance and then they can take informed decisions. The impact of countries 
regulation in terms of disclosure is important for cross-border M&A. For example, 
disclosure regulations can be different in different countries and may have serious 
implications on cross-borders M&A (Starks & Wei, 2004).  Also, most Arab countries 
cultures restrain them from boasting about their wealth, thus leading to reluctant to 
disclose their financial reports (Hossain & Hammami, 2009). Saidi (2004) argued that 
higher level of transparency would improve the CG in the Gulf. Therefore, having a 
clear regulation on disclosure and how it impacts on the company performance is 
essential to cross-border M&A.  It would be interesting thus to explore how the Gulf 
context influence the level of disclosure and the factors accounting for such disclosure.  
  
  
2.4.6 External Auditors  
There is an extensive literature on external auditing, which provides insights into the 
significant roles that external auditors play in helping to ensure quality CG. Effective 
external auditing can have a positive impact on CG, including reporting quality and 
firm performance (Schneider & Wilner, 1990; Fan & Wong, 2005). OECD recommends 
the use of guiding principles that help to authenticate and preserve financial reporting 
integrity. To serve the purpose, OECD mentions selection criteria, qualification, and 
tenure of the external auditors and states that “All listed companies are required to 
change their external auditors every five years” (OECD, 1999: 89).   
  
  
It is argued that the financial reporting integrity is dependent upon the quality and 
independence of the audit committee members (Koh et al., 2007). Existing studies such 
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as Simunic (1984) and Becker et al. (1998) have shown evidence that having five; six or 
eight external auditors improve the quality of the information and increase the level of 
transparency.   
  
  
Skinner & Srinivasan (2012) stated that high quality of financial annual audit completed 
by the experienced external auditors reduce errors in the result. In addition, independent 
auditors are more likely to enhance management decision-making process and support 
long-term performance of firms when obtaining an understanding of the firm’s internal 
control and assessing risks (Ibrahim et al., 2003). Since independent auditors are not 
tied to the economic bonds other than audit fee with the firm (OECD, 1999), it is 
unclear whether there will be conflict of interest between external and internal auditors 
in terms of decision-making. For example, Klein (2002) and Hogan & Wilkins (2008) 
suggested that increasing reliance of the auditors on non-audit service fees is harmful to 
the desired level of independence and is incompatible with the required objectivity in an 
auditor’s role.  In Gulf countries, companies are not fully transparent in their activities 
and external auditors are ineffective because of lack of professional training and 
inadequate information made available to them on the companies’ matters (AlShammari 





2.5 Corporate Legal structure in the Three Selected Gulf Countries  
  
2.5.1 Saudi Arabia  
Since Saudi Arabia is the guardian of two holy cities; Makkah and Madinah, it is 
considered as the protector of Islam (Zamani‐Farahani & Henderson, 2010). Islam is the 
fundamental source of law in Saudi Arabia as King Abdulaziz, who was the founder of 
the Kingdom, embedded the Islamic principles as the foundation for all governance and 
all administrative regulations of the State drew their authority from these principles 
(AlRasheed, 1996). So, Saudi Arabia has a unique legal structure due to a combination 
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of modern concepts with a conservative outlook of traditional Islamic principles 
(AlRasheed, 2010). In 2006, Saudi Arabia’s Capital Market Authority issued the first 
set of regulations on CG due to steep decline in the stock prices (Falgi, 2009). These 
CG focused regulations have been generally in line with the global standards. The 
regulations spelt out the provisions related to Rights of Shareholders, General 
Assembly, Disclosure and Transparency, Board of Directors (Capital Market Authority, 
2006). The section on BOD is considered the most important and it includes detailed 
provisions related to functions of the Board, responsibilities, formation, committees, 
remuneration and handling of conflicts of interests of the directors in general.  
  
There are several rules and regulations issued by other major players of CG in Saudi 
Arabia that support the implementation of CG system such as Saudi stock exchange  
(Tadawul) and Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
(AlMulhem, 1997; Lessambo, 2014). All of these have been working side by side since 
the adoption of CG in the country (Almajed, 2008; Ansary, 2008).   
  
One important thing to mention about Saudi culture is that there is a strong relationship 
between people, as people do not usually identify with institutions but rather by social 
network with the people within these institutions. As a result, the individual 
interrelationships can be a hindrance to law enforcement as people in authority feel 
constrained in objectively dealing with any situation. Moreover, when it comes to 
applying new laws, the Saudi Government is more concerned with social stability and 
pays attention to the reaction of the society, which is quite conservative and traditional 
in its way of thinking (Vogel, 2000).  Such context puts in jeopardy of implementing 
regulations aimed at aligning the countries’ CG with some classical CG globally.  
  
In 1926, the first Majlis Al-Shura (Consultative Assembly) was formed by King 
Abdulaziz, however its role was curtailed and most of its functions transferred to the 
Ministers Cabinet due to political pressure of the royal family. It was revived in 2000 
by King Fahd, who decreed a new Majlis Al-Shura Law. It has currently a speaker plus 
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150 members, of whom a fifth or 30 members are women. This law has considerably 
strengthened and enforced the Shariah principles and enabled social values, justice, 
wider consultation Shura in the decision-making process (Ammoun, 2006).  
  
Reforms are required in Saudi Arabia to improve the disclosure and transparency, 
which will enhance the investment climate (Henry & Springborg, 2010). The 
constraints on the capital markets have been relaxed to accommodate foreign investors 
who are not Saudi residents. Further changes in the CG environment will depend on the 
authorities that oversee the integration of the Saudi capital market with the other global 
financial markets. The main benefits of developing good CG are better reputation and 
easy access to international markets through M&A (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008).  
  
2.5.2 Kuwait  
Kuwait gained its independence from Britain in 1961. Shariah based code inspired by 
the Maliki Islamic school of thought along with the French civil code was the main 
source of legislations introduced in the early eighties and though a constitutional 
Emirate, its political system is based on principles of democracy (Amin, 1991). Due to 
this, it has attracted many immigrants from neighbouring countries who contributed to 
the changing cultural pattern of society by introducing new customs and perceptions. 
Open economy associated with crude oil reserves had enabled the Government to invest 
in infrastructure transformational projects (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan 2010). Kuwait 
had also encouraged domestic savings and attracted foreign capital investment by 
issuing regulations and overseeing financial reporting to protect investors (Fasano & 
Iqbal, 2003).   
  
The Central Bank is the regulator of conventional and Islamic banks and the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry has a unit that is responsible for regulating the insurance 
companies (Ali &Nisar, 2016). In 2013, The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) issued 
the rules and regulations, and enforced all listed companies to comply with the code of 
practice. The code promotes some key aspect of CG such as transparency, disclosure, 
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risk management and internal control. The CG code is based on the three main pillars in 
the society: justice, liberty and equality. It also defines the relations between employers 
and employees and it guarantees rights for all people whenever their rights are violated 
(Al-Wasmi, 2011). CMA operates under the Ministry of Finance and is responsible for 
supervising, licensing and monitoring companies operating in markets (Amico, 2014). It 
is also responsible for ensuring smooth mobilization and allocation of varied capital 
resources for financing strategic investments (Zeitun, 2014).   
  
In spite of the presence of such regulatory body, the regulatory process appears to be 
ineffective and the CG system in Kuwait is very fragile and that is evident from 
transparency and disclosures by listed companies which are feeble (Al-Saidi & 
AlShammari, 2014). This is also seen in the fact that Kuwait was ranked the lowest 
among the Gulf countries, based on the level of disclosure and how the Governments 
encouraged professionals to avoid suspicious activities and conflict of interest 
(AlShammari & Al-Sultan, 2010).   
  
  
2.5.3 UAE  
UAE gained its independence in 1971. UAE comprises of seven emirates, Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai are the richest among the emirates. It adopts a combination of French civil 
law as well as Shariah law. The legal structure of UAE consists of federal authorities 
that are united by the links of mutual destiny, history, language and religion (Al Abed, 
2001). Although the core ethics of rule in UAE had been extracted from Shariah, early 
moves towards Westernisation brought into focus the conflict between Western laws 
and the traditional Shariah (SRAIRI, 2013).  
  
The two main constituents of UAE, Dubai and Abu Dhabi have established independent 
free zones with their own regulations, for example, Dubai’s financial free zone is 
known as Dubai International Financial Centre which is regulated on the basis of 
English law. Central bank of UAE regulates Islamic banks and Insurance Authority 
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regulates Islamic insurance companies in the country (Ali & Nisar, 2016). UAE made a 
significant progress in 2006 by establishing Hawkamah (the Institute for Corporate 
Governance), in order to bridge the CG gap in the Middle East and North Africa. It 
aims to support the Governments, regulators, companies, Boards, and other CG 
stakeholders to achieve higher level of transparency in the markets and promote better 
practices (Singh & Singh, 2010). In 2008, Mudara (the Institute of Directors) was 
established as a separate institution for facilitating professional development of BOD 
members, managers and governance professionals through education, research, 
information, networking and dialogue (Pierce, 2008). These institutions have helped to 
increase the awareness of CG among Gulf countries in general and UAE in particular to 
support better integration with the globe through M&A.   
  
  
Ulrichsen (2011) emphasised that Gulf countries have been more prominent in the 
international arena in recent years, and Gulf corporations are contributing to improve 
CG in line with international best practice. The adopting of strong CG standards may 
increase the trend of M&A activities and continue integration with the global markets. 
However, Garabato (2009) noted that there are also some negative factors affecting 
M&A in gulf countries, such as low disclosure level; lack of understanding of new 
issues; lack of mature regulatory standards for Islamic companies. The cultural factors 
and religious aspects still remain an ongoing concern for the adoption of international 
perspective (Aribi & Gao, 2010).   
  
  
Despite the similarities, both in financial and political structure among Gulf countries 
and the efforts that have been made to integrate their economy like the European Union, 
differences in their legal structure can weaken the unification of Islamic CG and pose 
challenges as noted by Darrat & Al-Shamsi (2005), who found UAE and Bahrain 
having much higher standards of CG than other countries in the region. Formulating a 
unified economic region required a unifying set of regulations and standards to develop 
the capital market. According to Hasan (2009), a strong and unified system of CG is 
important to ensure a strong system of co-operation among the Gulf members. Saidi 
(2004) also suggested that the regulators in the Gulf countries might adopt better CG 
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practices and learn from stronger policies from outside the region. Legal structures in 
Gulf countries are functions of culture, religion influences, which specify the 
importance of ethical principles.   
  
  
2.6 Good Corporate Governance   
The core principles of CG are reflected in four fundamental concepts: responsibility, 
accountability, fairness and transparency (OECD, 1999). There are three organisations 
that set to improve the principles and guidelines of CG; (i) Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD);(ii) World 
Bank and (iii) International Monetary Fund (IMF) (De Nicolo et al., 2008). However, 
the principles are not legally binding, but rather they were set to serve as a reference 
point for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties that have a role in 
developing good CG (Nestor, 2001).  Some countries failed to meet the standards due to 
cultural, political and religious backgrounds (O'Sullivan, 2000). OECD (1999) 
emphasised that good CG can be obtained through a combination of efforts between 
regulatory and voluntary actions. This implies that understanding and combing the 
differences in culture, politics, religion, regulations will help to mitigate any barrier that 
may affect the unification of CG principles.  
  
  
There are numbers of key reasons for the need of good CG: (i) maximize firms’ 
contributions to the overall economy;(ii) to overcome vested interest; (iii) to achieve 
sustained productivity growth; (iv) to mitigate the amount of risk that may involve 
practices such as fraud; (v) to maintain public acceptance and image; (vi) to improve 
company performance so as to maximise profit (Oman, 2001; Aguilera & Cuervo-
cazurra, 2004).  Fan et al. (2011) stated that good governance improves corporate 
accountability and performance simultaneously as a means of attracting human and 
financial resources on the best possible terms.  Hope (2003, p.3) noted that “good 
governance in all its facets, has been demonstrated to be positively correlated with the 
achievement of better growth rates”.  Thus, it can be concluded that good CG enables 
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the formulation and implementation of policies, procedures and structure necessary to 
enhance the organisational performance.   
  
  
Furthermore, World Bank has worked closely with the OECD to encourage self-
assessment and evaluate companies’ performance in developing countries, for the 
purpose of identifying strengths and weaknesses (Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 2005). This 
helps in enhancing the CG at the national and international level by adopting best 
practices and implementing legal and regulatory reforms. This is consistent with the 
Bank's comprehensive development framework that focuses on good governance as a 
key factor in effective development (Iskander et al., 1999). In addition, IMF has 
contributed to CG by developing codes of good practices mainly for the transparency of 
Governments' financial and monetary policies. The code stresses issues such as clarity 
of roles, responsibilities of Government and public availability of information 
(Vreeland, 2003). Therefore, developing a model for continuous assessments of 
companies’ performance to identify areas of improvement is essential for good 
governance practices.   
  
  
Good governance assures an adequate return for investors, who are beginning to show 
concern about the business model, which protects their investments (Bai et al., 2004). 
The World Bank (2006) reported that good CG decreases vulnerability of emerging 
market to financial crisis, reduces costs of transaction and capital cost, and reinforces 
rights of property which leads to development of capital market. In addition, financial 
reporting, auditing standards and practices are considered as a crucial part of good 
governance (Saidi, 2004). On the other hand, weak CG decreases confidence of 
investors and can discourage outside investment. Consequently, one question that might 
need to be asked is how to provide good CG for shareholders or investors.  
  
  
Despite the proposed good CG standards and principles being acceptable in different 
countries, there seems to be challenges in terms of implementation and interpretation. 
Generally, from a cross-country perspective of CG, Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013) 
36  
  
observed it is not possible to have common global framework. Also, there will always 
be a variation in the way it is implemented and interpreted as social norms vary from 
one nation to the other (Licht et al., 2005). According to Lewis (2005) Shariah Law 
plays a significant role in the day-to-day aspects of life in Islamic countries. Therefore, 
CG may have to operate differently in Islamic countries and the conventional model 
may not necessarily work well in these economies where conformance with Shariah 
will need to be ensured.  The next section focuses on Islamic CG. 
  
  
2.7 Islamic Corporate Governance  
2.7.1 Shariah Legal Sources  
Azhar (2010) defined ‘Shariah’ as the Islamic legal system or the code of law derived 
from Qur’an and Sunnah and a Shariah scholar is a person who responsible for issuing 
legal ruling known as Fatwa (plural form Fatawa). Shariah has two main sources. The 
primary sources are the Qur’an and the Sunnah while the secondary sources are through 
Ijma, the consensus Fatwa of scholars representing the will of the community, through 
Qiyas, a Fatwa by a scholar based on analogies from the Qur’an and Sunnah (Khoury, 
2003) and through Ijtihad, the use of independent reasoning to find solutions to a 
religious question (An-Na'im, 2002).  
 
Shariah law is only applicable to Muslims and under the Islamic law there is no 
separation of religion and state (Johnson & Vriens, 2011). Shariah law is divided into 
two Jurisprudence elements: worship and interactions. The first element Ibadat, refers 
to the five pillars of Islam and it is concerned with the person‘s relationship to Allah 
while Muamalat refers to political, social and economic interactions between entities 




2.7.1.1 Primary Sources of Islamic Law  
  
The Holy Qur’an is the last revealed word of Allah to the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.a.w) 
by Angel Gabriel (Hoodbhoy, 1991). Furthermore, it is considered as the first primary 
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source of law in Islam that identifies all economic aspects as basis on which business 
community should be created (Naqvi, 2013). However, Lee & Detta (2007) argued that 
the Qur’an is not a legal document but it is a religious book based on moral principles 
and does not state regulations nor explicitly deal with every conceivable circumstance 
applicable to modern world. Therefore, Shariah scholars normally use the principle of 
Fiqh, jurisprudence as a methodology to interpret the Qur'an and Sunnah to offer 
interpretations for emerging contemporary issues (Wilson, 2008).  
  
  
The second primary Islamic law source is Sunnah (the authentic tradition), which is 
derived from Hadiths and it is a set of sayings, deeds and reports of the Prophet 
Mohammad (s.a.a.w). Hadiths are accounts of the Prophet’s life that expand on 
everything in the Qur’an (Iqbal & Llewellyn, 2002). Many verses of Qur’an (for 
example, Al-Hashr, 59:7) advise Muslims to take from the words, actions and life of the 
Prophet and abstain from doing forbidden actions. All CG principles such as 
transparency, justice, responsibility and accountability have been discussed in the 
Sunnah (Malekian & Daryaei, 2010).   
  
  
2.7.1.2 The Secondary Sources of Islamic Law  
The first secondary source of Islamic law is the Ijma, a consensus opinion of scholars 
on certain religious issues in a certain period of time (Hasan, 1975). The process of Ijma 
is encouraged by Prophet Mohammed (s.a.a.w) as a mechanism to arrive at a unified 
position when two or more equally valid opinions exist among the scholars based on 
their interpretation of Shariah (An-Na'im, 2002; Philips, 2006).  
  
The second secondary source of Islamic law is the Qiyas (analogical deduction) with 
the purpose to extend the ruling from an original case by finding a similarity between 
new cases and early practices. Thus, Shariah scholars can provide regulations for a new 
case based on same common grounds with an earlier case (Aldohni, 2015). Finally, 
Ijtihad is the use of independent juristic reasoning exercised within large groups of 
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Shariah scholars to issue a religious decision on issues where there is little or nothing in 
Qur’an and Sunnah (Al-Dihlawī & Dehlawi, 2003).  
  
  
Consequently, Ijma, Qiyas and Ijtihad have been increasingly demanded to formulate 
new laws and regulations to cope with new situations and to deal with new aspects of 
community life (Pollard & Samers, 2007). In order to accomplish Maqasid Al-Shariah 
(intent or the purpose behind the Shariah rulings), these sources can form a basis for 
Shariah compliant financial investments, financial instruments as well as notions of CG 
for Islamic companies and it is important the Shariah scholars to co-operate and jointly 
develop better Islamic CG framework to satisfy business needs (Suleiman, 2000; 
Hassan & Lewis, 2007).  
  
  
After Prophet Mohammed’s (s.a.a.w) death, four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
had emerged and founded by the Imams; Ibn Hanbal, Abu Hanifa, Malek and Shafei at 
different times as well as Jafar who is the founder of Shia school of thought (al-Dihlawī 
& Dehlawi, 2003), while the first four are equally acceptable for Sunni Muslims to 
follow. These schools are influenced by political, social, geographical and 
demographical factors, which affect their orientations and application of Shariah 
(AnNa'im, 2002). This implies that different interpretation of scholars is the cause of 
having difficulty in defining clear rules and regulation of Islamic CG (Haqqi, 2014). For 
example, extremists will interpret it to suit their own agenda while moderate Muslims 
would offer a different interpretation, which then leads to confusion and 




To help in reaching some sort of standardisation for business practices, two 
organisations have been established in Malaysia. In 1990, the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) was established to provide 
guidance for Islamic companies to follow in evaluating their practices in terms of 
Shariah compliance and to develop the Shariah governance framework (Abdullah & 
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Chee, 2010). In addition, in 2002 the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) was 
established, and is international standard-setting organisation for the Islamic financial 
services industry by issuing global standards and guiding principles (Molyneux & Iqbal, 
2006; Ahmad, 2010).  
  
2.7.2 Principles of Islamic Finance  
2.7.2.1 Prohibition of Riba  
Riba is an Arabic word that means addition or increase, and it occurs when the lender 
adds a premium along with the principal amount that must be paid by the borrower as a 
condition of loan after a given period of time (Algaoud & Lewis, 2007). Riba is one of 
the Islamic finance principles and according to all Muslim scholars and jurists Riba and 
interest are synonymous (Chapra, 1992).   
  
Globally, the application of interest has been viewed differently at different times. For 
example, Visser (2013) noted that the prohibition of interest was not limited to Islam 
only; the Christian Church at various times took a strong stand against receiving or 
paying interest. In addition, in Judaism interest on loan was also forbidden to be applied 
on loans made to Jews, but it was permissible to make loans with interest to non-Jews.  
  
In the Islamic practice, Muslims are not allowed to pay or receive interest irrespective 
of any reasons (Saeed, 1995). This suggests that Shariah prohibits a positive fixed 
return on a loan as a reward for waiting. For example, Qur’an has forbidden Riba in the 
strongest terms and its consequences in the following versus such as that in Al-Rum 
(30:39) which has meaning of increase “And whatever you give for interest to increase 
within the wealth of people will not increase with Allah”. In addition, in Al-Baqarah 
(2:278) it is mentioned that once a debt is created in any unfair dealing, any increment 
above the principal is prohibited “O you who have believed, fear Allah and give up 
what remains due to you of interest, if you should be believers”. Finally, Allah gave 
warning in Al-Baqarah (2:275) “Those who consume interest cannot stand on the Day 
of Resurrection …. Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest”. Therefore, 
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understanding the reason for the prohibition of Riba is essential for Islamic companies 
operating in the global market.  
  
The rationale behind the prohibition of Riba is: first, Shariah aims at socio-economic 
justice and equitable distribution of resources between people in society in order to 
prevent wealth being concentrated in few hands (El-Ashker, 1987; Siddiqui, 2004). 
Second, it is considered as oppression and inequitable practice when someone is 
constrained to borrow money with additional amount (Naser & Moutinho, 1997). 
Finally, it widens the gap between people in the society by shifting the risk from lenders 
to borrowers when they are unable to repay (Siddiqi, 2004). However, when return is 
given based on profit or loss sharing, justice is achieved. This means that the Islamic 
finance is based on mutual sacrifice to fulfil the basic needs and develop human life 
(Chapra, 1992).  
  
Ahmad (2009) argued that yet no Islamic country is fully applying Shariah principles as 
Riba has increasingly practiced in the Islamic world because of the serious economic 
dependence on the Western world (Baydoun & Willett, 2000). As a result of that, the 
concept of loss and profit sharing has become rare.  Some Shariah scholars argued that 
since an Islamic company must interact with global business, it is difficult to conduct its 
business strictly in accordance with Shariah (Tomkins & Karim, 1987). For example, 
Ahmad (2009) stated that an Islamic company is allowed to charge interest at simple 
rates between 4% and 8%. However, this led to more exceptions and further relaxations 
which affect Shariah CG in different ways.   
  
For this reason, Islamic companies are required to disclose transactions that involve 
Riba and provide evidences of efforts that have been taken to prevent interest practices. 
Kasri (2014) argued that if mimic practices of return on shares or deposits are found in 
the Islamic banks, then they are not purely Shariah compliant. However, Mohsin (1992) 
justifies that if the return on shares is fixed and maintained then it would not be against 
Shariah because uncertainty is not involved. Islam stands on interest is clear based on 
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Qur’an and Sunnah, however, how it can be practiced on the global markets where 
conventional practices are dominant.   The question is then ‘is the need for international 
investment and globalisation compromise the religious belief on prohibiting interest 
earning? Such issues are to be considered in this study. 
 
  
2.7.2.2 Obligation of Zakat  
Zakat means “purity” and is the third pillar of Islam that underlines the socio-economic 
development. El-Ashker (1987) defined Zakat as a religious tax payable by Muslims on 
their net worth. The objectives of Zakat as a tool of wealth-sharing are to ensure equal 
distribution of wealth, decent quality of life for poor and needy, and eradicating poverty 
among Muslims (Raimi et al., 2014). For instance, the recipients of Zakat are stated in 
Qur’an in Al Tawbah (9:60) “Collected Zakat is for: the poor, the destitute, those who 
collect it, reconciling people’s hearts, freeing slaves, those in debt, spending in the way 
of Allah, and travellers. An obligation imposed by Allah”. Therefore, it is obligatory for 
Muslims to pay Zakat.  
  
Conservative scholars argued that only Islamic Governments can collect Zakat and 
some Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have established 
Government institutions that are responsible to collect Zakat from companies (Akhyar 
Adnan et al., 2009). For the management of Zakat, Bremer (2015) suggested that there 
is need to manage Zakat collection and distribution very effectively, since it is an 
obligation payment from Islamic companies. Also, Islamic companies need to increase 
the level of transparency and accountability to ensure purposes for which Zakat can be 
used. Therefore, it is still unclear how Islamic companies manage Zakat during M&A 
due to differences in principles and practices.  
  
  
Chapra & Ahmed (2002) argued that conventional taxation system, which is 
implemented worldwide, is more likely to create deadweight losses which can be 
42  
  
minimised through the effective implementation of Zakat. This can prevent the losses 
which are caused by tax evasions because Zakat is fixed and room for tax evasions is 
very small. Further, the continuous changes in both rates and structure of the modern 
taxation system leads to greater losses as most businesses fail to understand and adjust 
their business plans according to these changes whereas the system of Zakat is simple 
and fixed and there are no changes in terms of rate and structure (Archer & Karim, 
2002).   
  
  
However, the question is, would it be possible to create enabling environment in the 
modern world for accepting Zakat based on their differences in moral and social values. 
Hasan (2010) claimed that imposing Zakat globally will overlap with the current 
international taxation system and will lead to discrimination and shift equity investors’ 
preference to the conventional banks. Similarly, Garas & Manama (2007) argued that 
Zakat creates double taxation in international deals because of the dual regulators 
(Islamic and conventional). Therefore, Zakat has great importance especially in cross-
border M&A and it needs to be considered before forming the deals.  
  
  
2.7.2.3 Islamic Inheritance Law  
Mirath is the Arabic word of succession, and it is a fixed share, of all property held by 
the deceased, allocated to various blood relatives who are clearly stated in Qur’an and 
Sunnah and give specific details of inheritance shares (Mohd Noor & Abdullah, 2009). 
Shariah clearly defines the law of inheritance based on composition and gender of 
family members. The distribution of Mirath must be after payment of legacies and debt 
of the deceased (Hussain, 2005). Qur’an mentions nine obligatory inheritors; mother, 
father, husband, widow, daughter, uterine brother, full sister, uterine sister and 
consanguine sister. Shariah scholars have added a further three inheritors by applying 
the method of Qiyas; paternal grandfather, maternal grandmother and agnatic 




There are primary and secondary successors that are entitled to a share of the 
inheritance in Islam and the division of inheritance is a separate subject with huge 
details (see Appendix 1). The inheritors with specific details of shares are stated in the 
Qur’an in Al-Nisa (4:11, 12, and 167).  The Islamic inheritance law, under which the 
business is transferable to the closest blood relations of the business owner, is quite a 
complex matter based on the relatively large family size in Gulf countries (Hamadeh et 
al., 2008). Therefore, deeper understanding of the Islamic inheritance law is important 




2.8 Philosophical Foundations of Islamic Corporate Governance  
Understanding the role of religion in the greater context within a society is important to 
determine the guiding principles behind CG in any religious society. Licht et al. (2005) 
argued that seeking religious guidance on CG appears needless because CG issues need 
public considerations whereas religion is a personal affair (Lake, 2010). However, this 
argument does not stand up when considering the role of religion in influencing 
people’s behaviour and organizing human life (Zein et al., 2008; Lelkes, 2006). When 
the religious beliefs are deeply held by a large section of society, they influence all 
interactions and transactions and therefore cannot be ignored as personal belief.   
  
  
Kettell (2011) Wilson (1997) have observed, most religions are from the same source 
and most religions highlight similar principles such as transparency, responsibility, 
accountability, trust and these concepts provide a foundation for good governance.  
There are religious principles that strongly encourage individuals to always fulfil their 
responsibilities, promises and contracts, for example, Ali & Weir (2005) explained that 
Islamic ethics in Qur’an are virtue and they establish harmony and equilibrium in a 
person’s life. It is stated in Qur’an in Al-Maidah (5:1) “O Ye who believe, fulfil your 





Islam is not a new religion but rather the continuation and comprehension of previous 
religions (Alsheha, 2012). Islam regards itself as the perfection of the previous 
religions, Judaism and Christianity (Ezzati, 2002). Although Qur’an clearly states that 
Muslims believe in the earlier revelations (Religions), however the practices of 
preceding religions have been corrupted over period of time. In fact, the most obvious 
example of such corruption is ascribing divinity to Jesus (Stark, 2003). For this reason 
and others, Islam provides guidelines and rules that cover all aspects of life and 
followers should practice them and reflect upon in their actions (Vogel & Hayes, 1998; 
Al-Zuhayli, 2005; Dusuki, 2008).  
  
  
Muslims’ central belief is the building block of Tawhid, the concept of indivisible 
oneness of God. God always exists and creates everything in the world (Schuon, 2003). 
Thus, Muslims believe that they obtained direct teaching from Allah, which provides 
absolute guidance to humans (Haron & Nursofiza, 2008) and by fulfilling these, people 
will contribute positively to society (Zein et al., 2008). Furthermore, God has not left 
any one empty-handed to fulfil his or her responsibilities but rather God provides 
physical and intellectual capabilities, knowledge and other resources (Hassan, 1982).   
  
  
However, Abuznaid (2009) argued that every individual is free to choose between an 
ethical life and a life motivated by self-interest. A'laMawdudi (2001) discussed about 
the challenges in changing people’s behaviour to the norms of a particular religion so 
that they can contribute to the growth of the society. In the contemporary society, one of 
the main challenges that Muslims encounter is in the development of a socio-cultural 
and political-economic framework that reflects Islamic principles (Norris & Inglehart, 
2012). However, there has been no remarkable progress till date due to the complexity 
involved in restructuring a modern conception to conform to Islamic principles, which 
allow mechanisms for consensus building but by implication allows space for different 





CG is a contemporary concept; however, its fundamental principles are already 
reflected in the Qur’an and Sunnah (Hassan, 2009; Hassan & Lewis, 2009). It is also 
essential to understand that Maqasid Al-Shariah or the purpose or rationale of Shariah 
encompasses the basic concepts of Amanah (trust), Adalah (justice) and Shura 
(consultation) and these can readily contribute to the development of Islamic theory of 
CG (Dusuki & Abdullah, 2007; Chapra et al., 2008). At conceptual level, the concept of 
CG for both the Islamic and non-Islamic companies can easily benefit from these 
principles, if implemented properly (Rahman, 1998). However, it is difficult to define 
an Islamic CG framework that is uniformly acceptable to a diverse range of Shariah 
scholars, who might draw their inspirations from different aspects of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah, depending on their experience and outlook.  Therefore, how such 
understanding and interpretation of Qur’an and Sunnah manifest out in the three 
countries understudy.  Do they exhibit similarity or difference?  
  
2.9 Islamization of Knowledge  
Some three decades earlier, Islamization had been introduced as a term to refer to 
integration of Muslim’s principles, ethics and morals into the modern knowledge to 
reinforce their religious identity (Kartanegara, 2007). Hashim & Rossidy (2000) 
mentioned that the two main proponents, who used the concept of Islamization of 
knowledge (IOK) were: Al-Attas (1978) who introduced this concept in his book "Islam 
and Secularism"; and Al-Faruqi (1988) in his book “Islamization of knowledge: 
problems, principles, and prospective”. Al-Faruqi (1988) defined IOK as integrating the 
new knowledge into the Islamic stream by re-interpreting and adapting its principles 
into the new concepts, while Siddiqi (1989) linked the IOK with the movement to 
restore Islam’s position in the contemporary society.   
  
  
Contemporary knowledge in Islamic society, therefore, is not obtained directly and 
solely from Islam itself, but it needs to be reframed in order to be make it Islamic 
(Ibrahim, 2014). Salleh (2011) stated that Muslims derived their ethics from Qur’an and 
Sunnah whereas ethics in Western theory, though derived from secular social values, 
have nevertheless Judaeo-Christian influence. The concept of IOK came as a reaction to 
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the failures of both the Capitalist and Socialist systems as there was disconnect with the 
social reality and even violation of ethics in Muslim societies (Tibi, 1995). 
Consequently, there were greater calls from Muslim world to revive their ethical 
standards and for Islamic scholars to create Islamic solutions (Haneef, 2005). To date 
this issue has been cardinal for discussion in various international conferences.  
  
  
Al-Faruqi (1982) developed Work Plan to revive the methods of early Muslim 
philosophy, and restore Ijtihad.  Moreover, Daud (2009) emphasised that Muslims need 
Ijtihad to apply the old dictum on the new situations and to establish the specific 
relevance of Islam to each area of modern knowledge. Ai (2010) observed that it is 
important to make efforts in the case of the Islamization of conventional CG model. 
However, al-Faruqi (1998) pointed out that it is not an easy task to reframe new 
knowledge to ensure compliance with Shariah. Nasr (1992) observed that the process of 
Islamization of knowledge might emerge to secular intellectual as a set of guidelines 
without any violations of the Shariah principle.   
  
  
Al-Attas (1978) argued that IOK is the logical consequence which seems to be a 
response to Secularization or Westernization. Therefore, the process of IOK is governed 
by Qur’an and Sunnah through Tafseer and Ta’wil (explanation and interpretation) as 
valid Islamic methods of gaining knowledge. Islam always encourage individuals to 
discover the truth but within the boundaries of Shariah.    
  
  
2.10 Spirit and Letter of Shariah Principles  
In order to comply with rules and regulations, it is important to understand the concepts 
of ‘letter of the law’ and ‘spirit of the law’ (Choudhury &Hoque, 2006). The letter of 
the Shariah law is defined as formal principles, code, rules and regulations that must be 
followed by an Islamic society, while the spirit of Shariah law is that Muslims should 
not only obey Shariah principles but also comply with the intention behind it (Chapra & 





According to Al-Shamsi (2005), the social consensus on the interpretation of Shariah 
principles cannot be developed unless the society is aware of them. Mawdudi (1976) 
noted that interpretation of letter of Shariah law can be different in different Islamic 
societies. Thus, the Shariah scholars’ Fatawa can be different according to the given 
circumstances. Understanding on how to balance the different interpretation among the 
Islamic countries can be challenging due to cultural differences and Shariah scholar 
perceptions. This begs a question about the subjective nature of interpretations by 
Shariah scholars which could be different from scholar to scholar and to what extent 
such difference in interpretations influence the effectiveness of the Islamic CG in the 
context of cross-border M&A. The answer to this question has also implications for the 
CG structure and mechanisms. 
  
  
The compliance with Shariah law can be done effectively when the business leaders 
and Shariah Board members understand spirit and letter of Shariah law which focuses 
on protecting the interest of the people living within the society (Aggarwal & Yousef, 
2000). Understanding spirit and letter of CG principles from an Islamic perspective 
could be critical for any business, as it would be helpful in providing guidelines, 
enhancing the financial liquidity and minimising the business-related risks (Akkizidis & 
Khandelwal, 2007; Ahmed, 2009).  For example, Shirazi & Amin (2010) noted that 
Zakat is obliged to create giving culture that could boost Muslims materialistically in 
the eyes of other communities, and spiritually in the eyes of Allah. Therefore, wellbeing 
of Muslims’ community relies heavily on individuals’ behaviour (Zaman et al., 2013). 
King (2007) identified that Muslims are answerable and accountable to Allah, as moral 
and spiritual facets are considered the core of Islamic CG particularly in the decision- 
making process.   
  
  
2.11 Development of Islamic Finance in the Gulf Region  
At the end of 2012, Islamic finance has expanded its operation in more than 50 
countries and the volume of assets under Islamic finance reached a growth of between 
15 to 20% per annum (Yaacob & Donglah, 2012). Middle East is the centre of Islamic 
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finance with contribution of approximately 74% while 26% share is contributed by the 
rest of the world (Hanif, 2014).  
The Islamic Financial Services Board (2015) reported that the Islamic finance industry 
has attracted investors worldwide, which has led to increase in its business and 
economic activities both regionally and globally. Also, they reported that the evidence 
was attributed to its double-digit compound annual growth rate of 17% between 2009 
and 2013. In addition, the industry’s assets are estimated to be worth USD1.87 trillion 
as at 1st Half of 2014, having grown from USD1.79 trillion as at end-2013. The Gulf 
region accounts for 37.6% of the industry assets, and a market value of US$ 564.2 
billion of the total global Islamic financial assets. This was attributed to the positive 
impact of the Shariah law principles on Islamic banks’ economic activities and on 
society as a whole (Sairally, 2007; Mansoor & Ishaq, 2008).   
  
Historically, Islamic banking has been originated in the Gulf countries since the Dubai  
Islamic Bank was set up in 1975 (Zaher & Kabir, 2001). Bahrain, Qatar and lastly Saudi 
Arabia launched their Islamic banks in 1979, 1982 and 1987 respectively. Saudi Arabia 
supported the international Islamic finance initiatives by establishing the Islamic 
Development Bank in Jeddah (Islam & Kamruzzaman, 2015). This was expected to 
positively influence the attitude of the Saudi authorities to Islamic banking; however, 
they remained surprisingly cautious (Wilson, 2009). Similarly, in 1977 Kuwait 
established Kuwait Finance House (KFH). GCC Islamic banks such as Al-Rajhi bank in 
Saudi Arabia and KFH in Kuwait have been expanding globally in Turkey, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Melbourne. In addition, Dubai Islamic bank is taking a rapid global 
perspective and has invested in Pakistan, Turkey and United Kingdom (Parashar, 2010; 
Ahmed, 2010; Wilson, 2013). Jbili et al. (1997) argued that the Islamic banks in Gulf 
countries are well developed and profitable in the region as they hold high levels of 
capital; which has enabled the banks to endure the global financial crisis.   
  
However, banks in the Gulf are relatively small and that might limit their activities 
domestically and internationally (Hassan et al., 2010). Further, Al-Muharrami et al 
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(2006) argued that Gulf banks need to merge together to be able to compete and survive 
internationally when they expand their business globally. Thus, adopting good CG code 
is essential for Islamic banks in which they plan to transform their economies into 
international scene. By doing so, Gulf countries would be prepared to face opportunities 
and challenges of cross-border M&A (Saidi & Kumar, 2008; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 
2012; Zeitun, 2014). Nevertheless, Obaidullah (2005) and Ayub (2009) argued that 
Islamic financial system is less developed in comparison with conventional financial 
system and it is still at an early stage of evolution as many problems must be addressed 
relating to theories, practices and a slow pace of innovation of Islamic financial 
instruments. Due to the absence these, conventional banking continues to exist in the 
Gulf region (Wilson, 2009).   
  
2.12 The Islamic CG Model  
Considering the size of Islamic finance, very little attention has been given to Islamic 
CG. Islamic financial institutions have been criticized for the lack of accountability and 
transparency especially after seven suspects who reportedly swindled $501 million 
involved Dubai Islamic Bank in 2009 (Za’za, 2009).  
  
There is not even as yet a unified definition of Islamic CG, Elasrag (2014) defined 
Islamic CG as a system by which firms are controlled and directed with a purpose to 
attain the objective of corporation by protecting the interests of all stakeholders. Islamic 
CG sets out the corporate structure, its process as well as administration to ensure that 
all transactions are in accordance to Shariah (Safieddine, 2009). It helps to recognize 
that the practices conform to Shariah in terms of both letter and spirit of the law 
(Akhtar, 2006).  
  
  
Choudhury & Hoque (2006) and Farook & Farooq (2011) argued that Islamic 
companies’ structure is complicated than those of conventional corporations due to 
religious and cultural factors that are involved in shaping Islamic CG, and therefore 
there is need to analyse and scrutinize Islamic CG by stakeholders across the industry 
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for more robust CG framework. Faiz (2011) argued that CG practices of Islamic 
companies around the world are diverging due to a non-prescriptive approach of the 
regulators.   
  
Islamic perspective of CG comes from Islamic epistemology to premise on the divine 
oneness of God and it supports the achievement of corporate goal without ignoring the 
duty of social welfare (Choudhury & Alam, 2013). It is a stakeholder-oriented model 
which takes a wider theory of decision-making to protect the rights of all stakeholders 
who are exposed to any risk as a result of the firm’s activities (Molyneux & Iqbal, 
2006). However, Beckett (2003) and Hasan (2009) and argued that most Islamic 
financial institutions adopt Anglo-Saxon model, this is due to the fact that majority of 
Muslims’ economic activities are inherited from the Western colonial powers. Chapra 
& Ahmed (2002) argued that, unlike the conventional companies, the depositors rather 
that shareholders in Islamic companies provide a large proportion of funds and this 
provide a completely different CG structure. Islamic banks pay depositors based on the 
bank profitability (Ariff & Iqbal, 2011), thus the Islamic depositors are exposed to 
greater risks based on profit and loss sharing and equity based contracts (Safieddine, 
2009; AlSuhaibani & Naifar, 2014). All properties are subject to Shariah law, and the 
right to enjoy a property should be balanced between all stakeholders (Iqbal & 
Mirakhor, 2004).   
  
  
There are also additional important differences in terms of enforcement, for example, 
Hasan & Dridi (2010) argued that any change in CG model in the case of Islamic 
perspective could be very difficult to achieve because the related laws and regulations 
are defined by God. However, in conventional perspective, the desired quality of CG is 
enforced through introduction of new laws and regulations. In the case of Islamic CG, it 
only requires an interpretation of the existing laws in the specific context of the 
corporation and business environment. CG involves a very high degree of subjective 
decision-making and judgement from the Islamic perspective (Al-Gamal, 2006; 
AbuTapanjeh, 2009). Vinnicombe (2010) argued that Islamic companies show high 
levels of compliance with Shariah in some respects, while low level of compliance in 
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others such as disclosure of Zakat due to the conflict of interest between the parties 
involved. Therefore, understanding these differences based on global market are 




2.13 Shariah Supervisory Board  
In 1999, AAOIFI standards have defined Shariah Supervisory Boards’ (SSB) roles and 
have provided guiding principles for Islamic financial institutions. The Board structure 
of Islamic CG adds an additional Board; this implies two Boards namely BOD and SSB 
(Hasan & LAWS, 2007). SSB is a committee consisting of a group of Islamic scholars 
who are specialist in the field of Islamic jurisprudence Fiqh Al-Muamalat. However, 
considering the complexity of Islamic business transactions, members of SSB should be 
familiar with both Islamic law and modern financial needs (Rammal & Parker, 2010). 
They should be no less than three members, whose primarily act as an advisory Board 
that direct, review and supervise Islamic companies’ activities (Grassa, 2013). The 
selection of SSB members should be done through the shareholders annual general 
meeting based on the recommendation of BOD (Paino et al., 2011).  
  
  
SSB is one of the vital elements to promote the growth and stability of the Islamic 
finance.  In addition, SSB ensures the Islamic companies are operating in conformity 
with Shariah principles and it increases the credibility of the institutions in the eyes all 
stakeholders. SSB members have a great role on the day-to-day practice and on the 
development of new procedures and products (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006). SSB members 
can be from internal or external sources and they receive salary or payments based on 
meetings attended and they have the right to be appointed in other SSB of different 
companies. However, Lewis & Algoud (2001) argued that maintaining internal SSB 
members is better to help in understanding and assessing their individual organisations, 





In the absence of a well conceptualized Islamic CG framework, practices of Islamic 
companies differ based on different countries' jurisdictions and regulations. While it can 
create additional agency problem and conflict of interest, the external SSB members 
provide a mechanism for sharing the understanding of critical issues and possible 
solutions. Therefore, understanding all sides of arguments and their impact is important 




2.14 Islamic Financial Instruments   
Islamic finance market offers various products to satisfy providers and users of funds in 
various ways. The number of Shariah compliant products is growing as Islamic finance 
is expanding globally (Wilson, 1991). Islamic mode of finance is based on prohibition 
of Riba and there are three main categories which are the building blocks for 
developing a wide range of more complex products. These three modes are based on 
Partnership (profit and loss sharing), Trade, and Rent (El Qorchi, 2005). The use of 
each mode is based on the purpose and size of transactions. In addition, there are other 
Islamic financial instruments such as Sukuk and Tawarruq. This suggests that Islamic 
financial markets have seen financial innovations and global expansions (Iqbal, 1999).  
  
  
Although Islamic banks have attracted deposits from Muslims around the world, there is 
lack of skill or ability of Islamic institutions to invest efficiently. In addition, 
conventional banks offer Islamic channels of investments; however, some of them are 
not acceptable from a strict Shariah point of view (Iqbal, 1997). Identifying non-




Based on Islamic principles, what actually transacts between the bank and the customer 
is a commodity (Khan, 2010). It is prohibited for customer to access direct cash loan 
from the bank. Rather, the bank purchases the item for the customer and resells it to the 
customer. Understanding how this practice can be integrated with the conventional 
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practice is essential to develop better integration polices on how different financial 
instruments work. However, some Shariah scholars have questioned such practices as 
they might have some element of trickeries to circumvent the prohibition of Riba (Amin 
et al., 2011).   
  
  
Islamic principles require filtration process to select appropriate types of equity shares 
(Musa & Obadi, 2009). This is to ensure that the financial product, operation, and 
capital structure of each business are within Shariah borders. However, this process 
creates problems in integration with the global market as many corporations are 
connected with some form of prohibited activities such as alcohol, gambling and some 
forms of public entertainment as well as prevalence of debt financing based capital 
structure (Ismail, 2005; Dusuki, 2008).   
  
2.14.1 Partnership Financing Mode  
The first type of Islamic mode of finance provides direct finance as capital based on 
partnership (Usmani & TaqiUs̲ mani, 2002). The basic instruments for profit and loss 
sharing transactions in foreign trade financing are Mudarabah (profit-sharing) and 
Musharakah (partnership) which provide equitable sharing of risks and profits between 
all parties (Dusuki, 2009; Gait & Worthington, 2007) as explained below.  
  
Mudarabah refers to a contract between two parties, the investor (Rab-Almal) who 
provides the capital needed and the entrepreneur (Mudarib) who offers labour and 
expertise with the objective of making and sharing profit (Gafoor, 2001; Rammal, 2003; 
Jedidia & Hamza, 2014). In order to conduct Mudarabah contract between parties, the 
entrepreneur must have full control over the business; supervision is permitted by the 
investing bank, which shares a percentage of the profit, not a lump sum payment (Iqbal 
& Llewellyn, 2002).  
  
  
If profits are made, the profit from the project is to be shared between the investor and 
the entrepreneur according to the mutually agreed ratios (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999). 
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On the other hand, if the entrepreneur made loss all parties jointly absorb the losses, by 
the investor losing in terms of money and the entrepreneur losing in terms of time and 
effort spent on the project. However, the entrepreneur is expected to work with 
diligence to avoid any unnecessary losses and any negligence or misconduct by the 
Mudarib may be liable for the financial losses (El-Qorchi, 2005).   
  
Musharakah (partnership or joint venture) is an equity-based contract between a bank 
and its customers in which the bank is not the only provider of funds (Iqbal & Khan, 
2005). Musharakah offers a significant alternative to the interest-based financial 
instruments found in conventional banks (El-Gamal, 2000). It has been used to finance 
medium- and long-term investments where two or more partners may provide the 
capital, and share profits. If the profit is generated or loss is made, they are shared based 
on each party’s ratio of participation in the financing of the project (Rosly, 2005; 
Venardos, 2005).  However, the parties may agree to share the profit on the basis of a 
pre-agreed ratio, for example, in case of Musharakah Mutanakisah (diminishing 
partnership), where the customer (the partner of the bank) eventually becomes the 
complete and sole owner of the investment for which the bank has provided the funds 
during the initial stages of the contract (Shanmugam & Zahari, 2009).  However, losses 
will be shared on the basis of equity participation (Dusuki, 2009).   
  
  
Each party has a right but not an obligation to participate in managing the project or to 
waive such right.  Firms have exploited this business opportunities available in Gulf 
countries through formal agreement like Musharakah (Gait & Worthington, 2007). This 
has led different parties with common interest in the region to come together through 
the principles of Musharakah to invest together in different countries. However, there is 
little information on how to integrate or partner with non-Islamic partners. Providing a 
clear practice on how to partner with non-Islamic companies or individual is relevant in 
achieving globalisation.   
  
  
It is argued that since the inception of the theory of Islam and its advancement into 
Islamic finance, several scholars have praised Musharakah and Mudarabah because 
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they present ideal forms of acceptable contracts in Islamic finance (Usmani & 
TaqiUsmani, 2002). Both have the capability of pooling resources as well as expertise 
from different potential partners (Akgunduz, 2009). Therefore, assessing their impact to 




2.14.2 Trade Financing Mode  
The most commonly used instruments for short-term financing based is Murabahah (El  
Qorchi, 2005). It is also termed as corporate asset support or cost plus financing 
(Mirakhor & Zaidi, 2007). In this mode, there is an agreement between a bank and the 
borrower to purchase goods or import commodities on behalf of the borrower and then 
sell it to the borrower at agreed mark-up profit (Yousef, 2004). In this type of contracts 
the borrower is given a choice to either to pay in one lump sum or by instalments 
(Ismal, 2009). Several Shariah scholars have approved the use of Murabahah as a 
financial instrument to be Halal (Mansoor & Ishaq, 2008; Ali, 2004). However, some 
authors have criticised Murabahah, for example, Usmani (2013) has argued that it is not 
a real Islamic financial instrument, rather it is just a device to escape from interest and 
the mark-up can be excessive. The author also argued that Murabahah should only be 
considered if Mudarabah and Musharakah are not applicable.   
  
There is risk associated with Murabahah due to the time of purchase and time of sale of 
the goods (Thomas et al., 2005). For example, the instruction made by borrower to the 
bank to purchase a good does not oblige it to perform immediately; the bank may delay 
or decide not to deliver the goods due to uncertainty. However, to mitigate such 
eventuality, the Shariah scholars have emphasised that all parties must agree on all 
features of the service or property to avoid future conflicts (Hassan & Lewis, 2007; 





2.14.3 Rental Financing Mode  
The most commonly used instrument among all Islamic instruments is Ijarah which 
means provide something on rent. Usmani (2006: p.2) defined Ijarah as “to transfer the 
usufruct of a particular property to another person in exchange for a rent claimed from 
him”. Shariff & Rahman (2003) defined it as leasing agreement between a bank and its 
customer whereby the banks purchases an asset such as home or car for the customer 
and then hands it over to the customer on rental basis. Some scholars argued that Ijarah 
is a business activity rather than original Islamic finance mode where both Islamic and 
conventional banks use this kind of contracts (Ahmed, 1990; Usmani, 2006). However, 
Islamic banks used it instead of long term lending on the basis of interest and the 
difference between Ijarah and leasing agreement in conventional system is that Ijarah 
can be Shariah compliant. For example, for Ijarah to be Shariah compliant all parties 
must agree in advance on the rent whether fixed or variable as well as the rent must be 





2.14.4 Sukuk  
The international market for Sukuk “a non-interest bearing investment” has grown 
tremendously in recent years within Muslims countries in terms of volume and value 
(Wilson, 2008). It is also evolving into the cross-border market of the issuing countries 
such as Malaysia, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Indonesia, the UAE and Saudi Arabia 
(Aloui et al., 2015).  In 2000, Malaysia was the first in issuing Sukuk ( Mohamed et al., 
2015), and according to Abu Sneineh (2016) Malaysia remained the largest Sukuk 
market until the first half of 2014, with a share of more than 43%  and  recently Gulf 
countries have dominated the market as Dubai Islamic Bank, the oldest Islamic 
commercial bank in the world, is currently the third-largest venue for Sukuk listings 
globally with a stellar 43% market share, followed by Saudi Arabia with 21%, 





According to Global Islamic Economy Report 2015/16, Islamic Banks managed $1.814 
trillion of assets as of 2014, and there is a potential to rise to $3.247 trillion by 
2020.The increasing pattern of Sukuk market is due to the desire to establish a 
benchmark rather than simple funding requirements and encouragement of a corporate 
Sukuk development (Aloui et al., 2015). Sukuk refer to securities, notes, papers, or 
certificates with features of liquidity and tradability (Usmani, 2007). Sukuk are issued 
for a fixed time period and can vary from three months to ten years and can take various 
forms and structures which depend on the underlying Shariah principle such as 
Musharakah, Mudharabah, Murabahah and Ijarah as discussed earlier (Aquil, 2005).   
  
  
Musharakah Sukuk can be structured in different ways, such as business plan, where the 
originator and trustee combine their resources and effort and co-ownership or where the 
originator and trustee contribute cash to buy and assist (Abdel-Khaleq & Crosby, 2009). 
Mudarabah Sukuk is structured in such a way that a certificate of Sukuk represents 
ownership unit value or activities managed in the project. Murabahah Sukuk carries 
equal value, for example; the bank procures a commodity and issues it to a client at a 
known pre-agreed profit with the intention that the client will fulfil the differed payment 
obligation (Wilson, 2008).  Furthermore, Ijarah Sukuk is a certificate issued by the 
owner as equal value of an existing asset for the purpose of leasing it against some 
rental proceeds either through the owner or intermediary. The profit from Sukuk streams 
from a sale, a rental or a combination of the two (Tariq, 2004).  
  
  
Sukuk offers the opportunity for companies to obtain fund to provide resources 
compatible with Shariah Law (Al-Amine, 2008). In principle, it is wrong to refer to 
Sukuk as Islamic bonds, Sukuk has advantage over conventional bonds, as it must be 
backed by a tangible asset such as a piece of land or building. In this case, when 
investors buy or sell Sukuk, they are not only trading the paper but also indirectly 
trading their real assets (Agha & Grainger, 2009; Afshar, 2013). A further advantage 
could be in terms of cost as argued by Vizcaino (2014), who found that the issuance of 
Sukuk could be more expensive for corporate than conventional bonds.  Sukuk is a 
nascent product and it is important to develop Sukuk structure to suit the global market 
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and to facilitate legal and regulatory framework when issuing Sukuk outside of Islamic 
markets (Jobst at al., 2008).  
  
  
2.14.5 Tawarruq  
Literally, Tawarruq is derived from the word Al-Warq which means money and it is 
developed to facilitate Islamic economic activities (Khayat, 2009). Tawarruq consists 
of two transactions; first, a buyer purchases a commodity from a seller or a bank on a 
deferred and a “cost plus” basis, and the second buyer sells the same commodity to a 
third party on a cash basis (Kahf, 2004; Ahmad et al., 2009). This scenario is called 
reversed Murabahah as the buyer has a contract for a Murabahah, and the same 
transaction is reversed in the second transaction. Furthermore, this is a “cost plus” as 
after gaining cash from the second transaction, the buyer pays the original seller on a 
deferred or cash basis (Siddiqi, 2007; Nasrun, 2014).  This mode of Islamic finance 
contracts is rapid and fixable way of gaining cash (Roudini & Karimzadeh, 2012).  
Understanding the application of Tawarruq and its effects to non-Islamic company is 
relevant for an Islamic company to expand globally.   
  
  
There are three types of Tawarruq including; real Tawarruq, organised Tawarruq and 
reversed Tawarruq (Msatfa, 2011). For organised Tawarruq the customer does not 
receive the commodity, and does not engage in the selling of it, while real Tawarruq the 
customer takes possession of the commodity for himself and can also resell it to a third 
party. For reversed Tawarruq, the bank buys the commodity and also acts as a client as 
well (Dabu, 2007; Msatfa, 2011). However, many Shariah scholars perceive some of 
these practices as against to the Islamic principles and the financial markets still witness 
some level of inconsistencies from practices in one region to another (Khayat, 2009; 





Msatfa (2011) and Mahmood & Khatun (2013) argued that Tawarruq creates confusion, 
as some scholars consider Tawarruq transactions as permissible while others argue that 
it is impermissible because it creates a charge which is similar to interest on cash loan 
which is Riba and prohibited under Shariah (Khayat, 2009; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011). 
Despite this argument, many Islamic banks use Tawarruq, including the UAE Islamic 
Bank and Bank Muaamalat of Malaysia (Baba, 2007). Therefore, it will be relevant to 
understand what rationale is used to justify the use of Tawarruq, as all mode of 
financing must be based on prohibition of Riba.  
  
  
2.15 Theoretical Framework  
This section presents the theories relating to CG that are used to carry out an 
investigation of the impact of Shariah CG on cross-border M&A. Researchers such as 
Flak, & Rose (2005); Duhnfort et al. (2008) and Yusoff & Alhaji (2012) have suggested 
that sticking to one theory is not sufficient to understand CG practices and they 
emphasised that combining two or more theories help to provide better understanding of 
CG practices. For this reason, three theories were examined namely: Stewardship 
theory; Agency theory; and Stakeholders’ theory to bridge the gap between Islamic and 
conventional CG practices on the factors that might affect cross-border M&A and 
establishing a link between theories to build a framework for this study.   
  
  
2.15.1 Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship theory is an idealistic theory as it has its roots in psychology and 
sociology, and it is a substitute model of managerial behaviour (Clark, 2004). This 
theory suggests that the business executives are seen as stewards, who are not motivated 
by individual goals; however, they are motivated to serve the principal's interests 
(Albrecht et al. 2004; Van Slyke, 2007). Donaldson & Davis (1990) were willing to 
bring in a new theoretical framework to the CG, thus, they completed an empirical 
study against the agency theory, which is discussed later. Muth & Donaldson (1998) 
highlighted that Stewardship is an alternative view of agency theory. Moreover, it 
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shows a collective not individualistic behaviour (Davis et al., 1997). In addition, this 
theory claims that if there was any conflict of interest between the principals and the 
stewards, and if they cannot solve the problem, the stewards would prefer the solution 
that is in the principal’s interest (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007).   
  
  
In the same vein, Block (1993) argued that managers believe that when they satisfy the 
owners' interests, their benefits will be more than if they favoured their individual 
interests and hence there is no conflict of interest and no need for separation of duties. 
However, Donaldson & Davis (1990) examined a combined Chair/CEO structure of 
senior management and found that there is weak evidence from stewardship theory 
perspective that dual role has any significant impact on investors’ return.   
Albrecht et al. (2004) argued from a different perspective that the managers will 
increase shareholders’ wealth as they understand the business well. Due to such 
assumptions underpinning this theory, this theory suggests less cost of governance since 
it neither requires incentives for the executives nor costs for monitoring managers 
(Pastoriza & Ariño, 2008).   
  
Choo & Tan (2007) observed that although managers are motivated to act in the best 
interest of the principals, it is essential to address the question of to what extent they are 
willing to attain a good corporate performance. Moreover, Albrecht et al. (2004) 
claimed that stewards, based on their own moral conduct may put trust in managers and 
may provide opportunities to commit fraud.  One of the critiques of this theory, 
according to Arthurs & Busenitz (2003) and Hendry (2005) is that even when goals are 
aligned, stewardship theory provides little help in shedding more light on as it is very 
difficult for individual to turn off their self-interest. In addition, Lin (2016) criticised 
this theory, as it is invalid in the real world since emotional human behaviour is not a 
valid assumption for any theory.  
  
  
This research examines stewardship theory in the context of cross-border M&A in terms 
of compliance for disclosure, transparency and managerial behaviour. Bhatti & Bhatti, 
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(2009) noted that the integration of various mechanisms and the ethical issues of 
business are important to attract the confidence of both local and foreign stakeholders. 
Islamic organisations, which are operating under Shariah, perceive the best interest of 
the group rather than the individuals. This suggests that managers are motivated to 
perform their duties in the right attitude of partnership to comply with the Islamic 
values and beliefs (Sulaiman, 2005; Bhatti & Bhatti, 2009). Islam considers that 
individuals are accountable to God and man, thus the concept of Khilafah, brotherhood 
and Tawhid constitute the foundation of stewardship theory (Sulaiman et al, 2015). 
Prophet Mohammed (s.a.a.w) stated in his Hadith “each of you is a guardian and each 
guardian is accountable to anything under his care” (Al-Bukhari, 1986).  As discussed 
in other sections above, there were evidences which point to the fact Shariah scholars 
and SSB could collide with the interests of the principals and this thesis sets to explore 
to what extent the respondents perceive these agents playing their roles in promoting the 
interests of the companies.  
  
  
Lahsasna & Hassan (2011) emphasised that Islamic companies enjoin in collective 
decision making through the Shuratic mechanism between SSB and BOD members to 
ensure that the purpose of achieving all stakeholders’ interests. The level of expertise 
and competence of the Shariah Board are relevant to ensure all the companies’ services 
and financial products are aligned with Shariah (Khan, 2007; Yaacob & Donglah, 
2012).  Thus, could the SSB and BOD be considered as stewards of the merged 
companies in the Gulf context? This study sets out to find if this is the case or not. 
  
Common distinctions between agency theory and stewardship theory, which lie in 
several factors such as motivation, identification and use of power, are presented by 
Clark (2004). There is no best way of using agency or stewardship theory alone; 
however, stewardship can be seen as complementing agency theory to in examining CG 




2.15.2 Agency Theory  
The existence of a firm is characterised by the separation between the control of a 
corporation and its owner (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Separating ownership from control 
gives rise to agency problems, which have been widely discussed by accounting, 
economics and finance scholars in different research areas (Clark, 2004). It was 
suggested by Alchian & Demsetz (1972) and further developed by Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) based on Adam Smith’s observation that it is unclear whether managers will 
anxiously watch over the company just like the owners. The CG concept has been 
emerging from the desire to describe the relationships within organizations to cater to 
frequent incidence of agency theory (Carlos & Nicholas, 1990). Primarily, this theory 
explains the relationship between the owners or principals of the company and the 
management who are given authority by the owners to perform work on their behalf 
(ICAEW, 2005). The agency problem arises when managers are not accountable for the 
risks associated with their decisions as well as when they act in their personal interest to 
maximize their own wealth (Fama, 1980; AryeBebchuk & Fried, 2003). This suggests 
that there is always conflict of interest between the principals and the agents (Hill & 
Jones, 1992; Obid & Naysary, 2014).  
  
Opportunism is possible when opportunistic individuals can exploit the circumstances. 
In this connection, Podrug et al. (2010) stated that control mechanisms are important to 
control managers’ behaviour; however, control could also cause stronger negative 
individualistic behaviour.   
  
Hill (1990) claimed that there are individuals who will give priority to cooperation and 
trust and will not initiate opportunistic behaviour and analysing only agency framework 
may lead to neglecting ethical aspects, cultural aspects, ignoring the development of 
distrust for and disrespect of the agent.   
  
The Islamic organisations have been studied in the context of the principal-agent 
relationship (Haque & Mirakhor, 1986; Bashir, 1996). However, there is an additional 
cost of agency in Islamic companies when all transactions need to be Shariah compliant 
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(Safieddine, 2009). Investors in an Islamic company can invest based on three financing 
modes: partnership, trade and rent, which all are based on the principle of profit and 
loss sharing between banks and investors. This practice adds an additional agency 
problem due to separation of cash from the control (Siddiqui, 2001; Siddiqi, 2006). In 
such cases, managers would not identify best opportunities on behalf of a customer 
through negligence or by not making sufficient effort in managing the funds of 
investors in a Shariah compliant manner, which might result in lower profit and 
increase their benefits (Dar & Presley, 2000; Grais &Pellegrini, 2006). In the same vein, 
Bashir (1999) stated that, an Islamic bank can play two roles, the role of owner when it 
lends money to its customers on the profit and loss sharing basis as well as the role of 
agent when it accepts deposits from its customers. However, the customers of Islamic 
banks get exposed to greater risk, as they are not entitled to receive fixed returns on 
their deposit and there is no guarantee that value of the deposit will be preserved. They 
might end up getting less than what they deposited. Given the conventional financial 
institutions aim to maximise shareholders’ value or profit, what would be the influence 
of Islamic financial instruments when considering or implementing the cross-border 
M&A?  This question will be explored by analysing the response of interviewees in 
organisations under study. 
An extensive control may be required to evaluate management performance in Islamic 
companies. This may encourage a change in agency behaviour and it may help to 
mitigate the issue of managers trying to satisfy their own interest (Shapiro, 2005). 
However, some scholars such as Dharwadkar et al. (2000), Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) and 
Shamsuddin & Ismail (2013) have pointed out that the strength of shared religious 
beliefs can support a culture that can counter some of the self-serving agency 
behaviour. Notwithstanding this, the role of financial rewards for Shariah scholars 
needs to be carefully examined.  
  
  
Management in Islamic companies experience different kind of work in terms of: 
dealing with different financial instruments; different obligations to the depositors and 
different types of capital financing. Thus, they experience different relationships with 
the concerned parties in order to comply with Shariah (Aggarwal & Yousef, 2000; 
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Chapra & Ahmed, 2002). This extends the agency problem beyond the normal 
separation of ownership and control. In Islamic companies, SSB strongly influences the 
outcome of any strategic decision-making; therefore, additional layers of internal and 
external Shariah auditing are required to mitigate possible opportunistic behaviour and 
to reduce information asymmetry in financial reporting (Abdul Rahman & Haneem, 
2006).   
Managers in Islamic companies should be accountable not only to the company, its 
shareholders and all stakeholders, but also to the Almighty Allah with the aim of 
creating better welfare and development to the society (Siddiqui, 2008; Abu-Tapanjeh, 
2009). Islamic perspective with the special notion of Tawhid (Unity of Allah) educates 
company’s members to put into practice aspects of Ikhlas (sincerity), Itqan 
(wellinformed), Amanah (truthfulness) and Shura (consultation), not only in the 
financial reward/outcome but also in religious rewards (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Iqbal 
&Lewis, 2009). However, the moral relativism argues that the entire ethical values are 
mainly derived from Government regulations or communal surroundings and there 
might be no complete decency or complete evil in a relativist culture (Rice, 1999; 
RagabRizk, 2008).  
 
Agency theory has been criticized by Donaldson & Davis (1990) on the grounds of its 
methodology, individualism, narrow-definition, disregard for other research, 
organizational economics, CG defensiveness and ideological framework, such that it 
focuses only on individual rather than organisational behaviour. Noreen (1988) also 
criticised agency theory because it focusses on opportunistic behaviour of the minority 
and not the majority.  So, to what extent the agency theory relevant in the context of the 
Islamic CG where it displays an additional layer compared to the conventional CG? 
Does it have any explanatory powers of the behaviours and actions of BOD, SSB and 
Shariah scholars? Do these agents possess relevant business knowledge, expertise, and 
behaviour which promote the interest of the business owners such as shareholders and 
customers as the latter were also found to be the main source of funding for the Islamic 




There is also a structural problem commonly found in Islamic companies as they tend to 
be family owned companies. The ownership structure is one of the agency theory 
concerns and has influence on the CG practices as it can increase the cost when firms 
have complicated highly concentrated ownership structure (Gogineni et al., 2010). 
Kapopoulos & Lazaretou (2007) observed that when family members exist in the top 
management, there is an additional layer of agency behaviour and the opportunity for 




2.15.3 Stakeholders’ Theory  
The concept of stakeholders has been embedded in management discipline and 
managers' thinking since 1970 (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Several scholars such as 
Freeman (1984); Harrison & John (1994); Clarkson (1995) and Rowley & Berman 
(2000) have developed and reviewed stakeholders’ theory. Stakeholders’ theory has 
pushed the boundaries beyond the vision of profit maximization to include the welfare 
of all stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). This theory attempts to understand the 
relationship that exists between corporations and its stakeholders. It also tries to address 
a fundamental question: which group of stakeholders deserves and requires 
management’s attention (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009).  
  
Freeman (1984) initially suggested that the firm is accountable for creating wealth for 
owners. Later, the author developed the theory to address the interest of a wider range 
of stakeholders and for protecting the interest of other non-financial stakeholders. The 
theory takes into cognisance the relationship between an organisation, people and other 
organisations in the environment and this affects the decision- making process and the 
outcomes of the firm. Clarkson (1995) proposed that the purpose of the firm is to build 
stakeholders’ wealth. Berman (1999) provided empirical evidence that good 






Stakeholders have been defined by Freedman (1984: 46) as “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”. 
Moreover, Alkhafaji (1989: 36) defined stakeholders as “groups to whom the 
corporation is responsible”. Greenwood (2007) defined stakeholders as those who are 
located in the community and have power to affect corporate activities or can be 
affected by corporate operations. In contrast, there are some scholars who take a 
narrower view of stakeholders such as Clarkson (1994: 5) who stated that “voluntary 
stakeholders bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital, 
human or financial, something of value, in a firm”.   
  
  
Based on those definitions, stakeholder identification includes external and internal 
stakeholders. Internal stakeholders are employees, managers and owners, while external 
stakeholders are customers, shareholders, suppliers, creditors, Government and the 
society (de Chernatony & Harris, 2000). All stakeholders have a network within the 
organisation to serve the business goals (Freeman, 1999). Post et al (2002) asserted that 
the traditional role of organization is to create wealth for all stakeholders. Maak (2007) 
and Du et al. (2010) have agreed with the idea of broader set of stakeholders, all being 
important and no group of interests can be dominated by others.  
  
  
However, Wheeler et al. (2002) argued that stakeholder’s theory incorporates the 
sociological and organizational disciplines. In that landmark, stakeholders’ theory is 
more of a broad theory derived from a combination of many subjects such as 
philosophy, ethics, politics, economics and law (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009).   
  
Some scholars such as Andriof et al. (2002); Burchell & Cook (2006) and Cooper & 
Owen (2007) have extensively reviewed and supported this theory in order to explain 
organisational behaviour towards its stakeholders. However, there are also other 
scholars such as Sundaram & Inkpen (2004), who argued that stakeholders require 
management’s attention. Whereas, Donaldson & Preston (1995) assumed that all groups 
of stakeholders are involved in the business activities to obtain benefits. Stieb (2009) 
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criticised this theory and argued that Freeman’s (1984) propositions focuses on the 
protection of interests of all stakeholders and aimed at a careless transfer of decision-
making power and wealth.  
  
The propositions of the stakeholder theory can be divided into three main approaches 
which are descriptive, normative and instrumental (Freeman, 1999; Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001; Hendry, 2001). The descriptive approach plays more informative 
role as it is concerned about the real corporate actions with respect to its stakeholder 
and it reports what is actually happening in the organisation. Donaldson & Preston 
(1995) argued that the descriptive aspect can be used as a guide by managers in order to 
achieve corporations’ operations in a way that all stakeholders benefit from the entity. 
The normative approach is supported by Freeman (1994) and it is the central and 
foundational of stakeholders’ theory and goes a long way in determining the ideas of 
different groups of stakeholders, corporate activities and interest of all stakeholders. 
This approach, considers ethical issues of an entity that should be considered and what 
is morally right or wrong. The development of the other two aspects relies on the 
decisions involved in the normative stage (Introna & Pouloudi, 1999). The instrumental 
approach is more predictive and practical as it integrates and evaluates other aspects. It 
attempts to assess management decisions and tries to link the reality with the outcomes. 
In addition, it suggests that in order to avoid or accomplish a specific response from the 
stakeholders, community involvement activities are required (Pesqueux & 
DamakAyadi, 2005).  In this study context, the researcher believes that both the 
normative and instrumental dimensions of the stakeholder theory to have potential to 
explain the behaviour of agents such as managers, BOD, SSB, Shariah scholars and 
hence to be used in this study. 
  
Neville & Menguc (2006) argued that stakeholders’ reaction is affected by management 
decisions of specific organisation behaviour which can be viewed as either 
instrumentally or normatively motivated. Jones (1995) noted that stakeholders’ theory is 
helpful for predictions of stakeholders’ actions as well as reactions. In addition, 
Mitchell et al. (1997) suggested that this theory is concerned with which groups of 
stakeholders deserves or require managerial attention.   
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In terms of cross-border M&A deals, organisations may be exposed to different 
stakeholders’ responses. Hitt et al. (2001) explored the key issue of M&A that impact 
all stakeholders. They argued that the reaction of stakeholders is often negative as there 
have been several poorly performed cross-border M&A, mainly due to the complexity 
of the process and the challenges involved. Wood & Jones (1995) argued that 
evaluation and expectations of stakeholders’ reactions would provide a better 
understanding of all stakeholders, thus, reduce the gap between stakeholders and 
management through better disclosure. Employing the stakeholder theory in this study 
provides useful information in order to explain the impact of wider groups of Islamic 
organisations’ stakeholders on such business deals based on their values and beliefs.   
 
  
Despite the popularity of Stakeholders’ theory in many fields such as business and law, 
it has been criticised as not being a coherent theory having been developed by a number 
of different scholars, beginning with Freeman (1984). Another issue is that although 
Freeman identified both internal and external stakeholders, the almost limitless linkages 
between these groups and between the individuals have not been fully mapped out and 
therefore the theory lacks a real conceptual basis for explaining a firm (Key, 1999). 
Similarly, Donaldson & Preston (1995) argued that stakeholders should be identified by 
their interests but they emphasised the difficulty in defining them and what actually 
constitutes their interest. Agle et al. (2008) argued that the theory faces some 
challenges. One of the challenges is that the theory is unable to provide a distinct 
standard to measure managers’ performances and environmental assessment (Sacconi, 
2006). Sternberg (1997) criticised the idea of directors and managers having to accept 
everybody as stakeholders. Mitchell et al. (1997) argued that it is not fully developed 
and more work is needed.  
  
 In its current form, the conventional stakeholder theory may lack explanatory power to 
explain what is happening in the study context. This is because the Islamic perspective 
of the stakeholder goes beyond the conventional perspective.  It arises not only in the 
69  
  
business practices but also above all, the values which guide Islamic organisations to be 
expressed in the transactions and social roles (Dusuki, 2008). The objective of Shariah 
is to promote social and economic objectives, however, some scholars such as El-
Gamal (2006); Dusuki & Dar (2007) and Azid, et al. (2007) claim that no fundamental 
differences between Islamic and conventional organisations as social roles of Islamic 
practices are similar to the social welfare goals of the conventional practices.   
Azhar & Afandi (2003) argued that previous literature focuses on economic aspects of 
the Islamic firms whereas social values of Islamic perspective are excluded to the 
backseat in the discussion.  Essentially, many Islamic economists including Chapra 
(1985), Ghosh et al. (1996), Haase, (2014), Farooq & Zaheer (2015) and Siddiqui 
(2001) emphasised that the Islamic philosophy of business offers a more stable and 
balanced as well as solid society as it prohibits interest, gambling and excessive risk to 
protect all stakeholders. Islamic objective of any business entity is to seek balance 
between earnings and spending in order to achieve a socio-economic benefit for all 
parties in the society (Haron & Hisham, 2003; Dusuki & Bouheraoua; 2011).  
 
In the light of conventional perspective, the aim of the management is to maximize the 
profit of shareholders and their financial interest while other stakeholders should 
safeguard themselves by the law (Blair & Stout, 2001). However, the Islamic system of 
businesses are based on a principle of no-injury “Maslahah”, therefore, they are not 
supposed to maximize profit for shareholders at the expense of social responsibility and 
commitments to brotherhood and justice (Bashir, 2001). Furthermore, based on Islamic 
property right and contractual agreement, the right of an individual is guaranteed as 
long as such right is not in disagreement with the interest and wellbeing of the society 
(Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2004; Obid & Naysary, 2014).    
The discussion in the above two paragraphs showed how some CG values and 
principles could be perceived and interpreted in different lenses due to cultural and 
religious influence. Whilst businesses in the Western context exist to maximise the 
shareholder values and to make profit, the intake from the Shariah- based CG is 
different as it advocates fairness, well-being, and social responsibility for the 
community and society in general. Therefore, the context in which these three countries 
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firms found themselves could provide rich insights into the strengths and limitations of 
the taken granted views of the stakeholder theory’s explanatory power when 
considering the cross-border M&A between the Islamic financial companies in the three 
Gulf countries  and non-Islamic countries from the West.   
  
2.16 Chapter Summary   
This chapter reviewed relevant contextual and empirical literatures, and theories.  The 
literature review covered and compared both Islamic and conventional CG, various CG 
models adopted in different parts of the world, CG mechanisms, and the corporate legal 
structures of the three countries under study. Then it went on reviewing the underlying 
philosophical assumptions and the spirit and letter of Shariah principles followed by the 
Islamic CG model, shariah compliance, Islamic financial instruments and three theories 
underpinning the CG. In the process, the literature review identified the merits and 
limitations of the reviewed concepts, approaches, and issues and identified gaps for this 
study.  As a summary, the literature review found: 
• Similarities and difference between the Islamic and conventional CG. 
• The emergent nature of the Islamic CG and how it is grounded in Shariah law 
and principles, and how such grounding influence the Islamic financial 
companies’ motivation and behaviour when seeking to engage in the cross- 
border M&A. 
• The distinctiveness of the Islamic corporate mechanisms (ownership structure, 
composition and selection of BOD, SSB, Shariah-based disclosure and 
transparency) and its potential on enabling or constraining the cross-border 
M&A. 
• The likely influences of the subjective interpretations of the Shariah Scholars on 
managing practices of Islamic financial companies 
• The development of Islamic finance and, in particular, the Islamic financial 
instruments and whether these could positively or negatively impact on the 
potential cross-border M&A. 
• The limitations of the taken granted view of the stewardship, agency and 
stakeholder theories in understanding the behaviour of various agents in the 
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context of Gulf countries and how the study context would help to extend and 
enrich these theories. 
As far as this researcher’s knowledge, no previous research studied the influence of 
Shariah principle on cross-border M&A between Islamic financial companies and no-
Islamic companies. Previous studies, for example, focused on Board effectiveness in the 
level of disclosure and transparency of Gulf corporations (BDI, 2013), cultural and 
Islamic beliefs on CG practices (Bakhtari, 1995; Saidi, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005;  
Hidayah, 2014), to what extent Anglo-Saxon and combination models of CG principles 
applied in the Gulf region (Lim et al. 2007).  In their studies of governance practices, 
Baydoun et al. (2012) also found that there is rarely any separation between ownership 
and management, as friends and relatives dominate the BOD. Haque & Mirakhor (1986) 
Bashir (1996) studied the principal-agent relationship in the Islamic organisations. The 
literature review thus showed that no previous studies examined the influence of 
Shariah CG principles on the cross-border M&A in a holistic manner. The researcher 
believes that this study is the first of its kind to examine this issue rigorously taking the 
case of three Gulf countries, multiple case study organisations, and tapping into the 
understanding, interpretations, of various stakeholders. 
 
However, a common method of growing the business by expanding into different 
markets and benefit from globalisation is through cross-border M&A. The move 
towards Shariah compliance in such a case creates a fundamentally divergent financing 
situation due to prohibition of interest or Riba in and also limits the sectors of growth 
due to prohibited activities such as gambling, alcohol and certain types of entertainment 
etc. Therefore, not surprisingly the literature has reported low success in M&A between 
Islamic and non-Islamic companies.   In terms of theoretical underpinning, this chapter 
contains an overview of three theories which are the dominant theories of CG, including 
agency theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory. Each of these theories are 
briefly explained along with their critique and discussed in the context of both the 
conventional and Shariah CG. The next chapter explains the research design, 






CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
  
3.1 Introduction  
The last two chapters provided sufficient background to choose an appropriate research 
methodology in order to deal with the research aims and questions. The chapter is 
organised into several sections. The first four subsections deal with general issues 
relating to philosophical and epistemological assumptions and the research approaches.  
This is followed, in several sub-sections, by research methodology to provide 
discussion and then rationales and justification for the chosen research strategy, 
sampling and sample selection, data collection methods, data analysis and consideration 
of the research ethics along with a brief summary sub-section.  
  
In order to properly address all the appropriate methodological aspects of this study, the 
research onion (Figure 3.1 below) introduced by Saunders et al. (2009) will be used as a 
guide, as it provides a well-defined guide for the complete research process. The 
researcher should peel away several layers of the research onion in order to complete 
the research process. This chapter focuses on the six layers of the onion, and the 
discussion starts from the research philosophy to the techniques applied for data 
collection and analysis.  
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Figure 3.1: Research Onion  
  
Source: Saunders et al. (2009)  
  
 3.2 Assumption about Social Research  
This research looks at an important aspect of socialisation or the ways of life in a 
particular setting; hence, it is a social research on one hand. Social research is most 
often conducted by social scientists to reflect the current situation of modern life and 
examines a society’s attitudes and beliefs toward the changes within it, thus, questions 
are asked to provide insights on how to approach such issues (Ragin & Amoroso, 2010; 
Firebaugh, 2008; Bryman, 2012). Social research topics include conceptual and 
theoretical areas such as politics, criminology, economics and the study of business 
(Becker et al., 2012). In order to explore and analyse human life, social research finds 
out the relationship between variables, though it is difficult to understand and predict 
human behaviour because people are not alike in feelings or emotions (Babbie, 2015). 
This can be attributed to various factors that might have an effect on the behaviour of 
human beings such as biological, psychological, socio-cultural and environmental 
factors (Kangai, 2012).   
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The influence of Shariah principles of CG on cross-border M&A is an aspect of social 
research. Shariah principles of CG were shaped by the influence of Holy Scriptures in 
Qur’an and Sunnah teachings (Hameed et al., 2006; Alsanosi, 2009). The Shariah law 
embodies the way of life, and some countries follow the law obediently (Suleiman, 
2000). These laws are not limited to spirituality, but also have a great impact on the 
economy, political, and medical systems (Rice, 1999). Social practices were developed 
after interpretation of these laws, and quality of life was found to be maintained among 
Islamic countries (Ibrahim et al., 2011). Shariah scholars, in accordance with the 
Islamic scriptures, and traditions, laid the economic principles of companies working 
under the Islamic umbrella. The research of this subject further underlines the fact that 
there are many aspects to consider in designing these robust Islamic economies. The 
mind-set of the financial institutions and business people in the Gulf countries are quite 
different from the developed countries (Davis et al., 2000). The strings that pull the CG 
structure of the Islamic financial companies in the Gulf region rely on the Qur’an and 
Sunnah for having a standardized and accepted way of doing business; these sometimes 
contrast with the Western systems (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Hasan, 2009; Aribi & Gao, 
2010). The social values in these countries typically vary from their counterparts in the 
West, and such differences stand in between them in forming strategic partnerships or 
M&A (Farook et al., 2011; Baydoun et al., 2012). This subject of social research aspect 
of understanding the human behaviour of the population inclined towards an economic 
system that not only integrates their religious beliefs, but also acts as a moral pillar to 
lean against, was really an interesting topic for further research.      
  
The theory in social research is instrumental in the development of methodology for 
research purposes. Ragin & Amoroso (2010, p.8) defined social research as “one among 
many ways of constructing representation of social life - of telling about society, it is 
the product of the efforts of an individual or group of individuals that addresses socially 
significant phenomena”. Ragin, (1994) argued that researchers use evidence to test 
ideas with help of the interaction between ideas and evidence to make sense. Therefore, 
Social research is mainly concerned about social and cultural dimensions based on logic 
and observation to reach a valid conclusion.   
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 According to Kangai (2012), there are three reasons that motivate social scientists to 
devote their lives to develop new knowledge; which includes the desire to improve 
people's lives and sustain economic growth. There is a lot of emphasis on how human 
behaviour is melded with new information and development of culture over the years 
(Bandura, 2002; Rogoff, 2003). In the last three decades, the principles of Islamic 
finance have been emerged as a form of Islamic legal system and have been practiced 
by Gulf countries (Babai, 1997). Rice (1999) found that Muslims grew with the 
foundations of the Islamic economic ideals, and they are ingrained since their inception. 
However, the behavioural change happened through intrinsic exposure to the new ways 
of doing business. Muslims should share their business ethics to help managers of the 
West countries to understand Muslims’ perspectives, which is an aspect that this study 
is interested in exploring.    
  
However, considering that social scientists such as Blanche et al. (2006); Berg et al., 
(2004) and Bryman (2015) conduct social research by following a systematic plan, 
including the choice between quantitative and qualitative methods used for this kind of 
research, these are explained in detail in subsequent sections. The relationship between 
social research and theory can be noted at early stage of research when the research 
problem and question are identified (Bernard & Bernard, 2012).  
  
This study is intended to investigate how Shariah principles influence cross-border 
M&A between Islamic financial companies (banks and insurance) in Gulf countries 
namely; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE and non-Islamic companies in the Western 
countries, in effect; the research question is looking at how the complex conventional 
issues relating to various leadership styles; managing organisational and people’s 
cultural differences as well as managing financial and legal risk, to which are added the 
Shariah related issues can affect the formulation of cross-border M&A with non-






 3.3 Philosophical Assumptions  
Research means different things to different people; therefore, they bring their personal 
worldviews and perspectives to whatever study they are undertaking by moving towards 
their subject via explicit or implicit assumptions that end up shaping the direction of 
their research (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Collis & Hussey 2009). Burrell & Morgan 
(1979) suggested that such perceptions underpinning different approaches to research 
are influenced by epistemology, ontology and axiology. Although philosophical ideas 
are hidden, these perceptions influence the different stages of conducting a research, 
from data collection to the actual findings of a study (Slife& Williams, 1995; Ryan et 
al., 2002; Creswell, 2013). The practice of research involves philosophical assumptions, 
ideas combined with strategies and implemented with specific methods. However, it is 
noteworthy to point that the intention here is not to decide the best philosophical 
reasoning that suits social research, rather to clarify the philosophical stance of this 
study (Sutrisna, 2009).   
  
There is a general agreement on research framework being a combination of three 
elements. These elements are; philosophical assumptions, general procedure 
“strategies” and detailed procedure “data collections” (Creswell et al., 2003; Collis & 
Hussey, 2009). The discussion of the above should be followed by the justifications for 
choosing an approach over another in designing research.  
  
Researchers including Sayer (1984); Creswell (2009) and Jonker & Pennink (2010) 
believed that in undertaking research, investigators also bring their own perspectives of 
the world to their research. The philosophy adopted by researchers contains important 
presuppositions about the way in which researchers view the world (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
These presuppositions will underpin the research and work as under-labourer and drive 
the research strategy and the methods (Bryman, 2011; Bryman & Bell, 2015). In 
contrast, the research philosophy that is adopted by a researcher will be influenced by 
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how the researcher’s view (Bryman, 2012). In this section, three different ways of 
thoughts about research philosophy will be discussed namely: epistemology, ontology, 
methodology and methods, and they all will influence the research process.  
  
 These assumptions guide the research process from collecting data to interpretation of 
the results (Ryan et al., 2002; Creswell, 2009). It is argued that the central idea of social 
research is how the researcher understands and interprets data to address whether social 
entities exist separate from social actors (Johnson & Turner, 2003; Bailey, 2008). In 
addition, a researcher reflects the research position by the conduct and reporting of their 
work based on the philosophical assumption (Walsham, 1995). Subsequently, the 
development of methodology by researchers is influenced by the different 
epistemologies, ontologies and human nature (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  
  
  
3.3.1 Epistemology  
Epistemology is the acceptable knowledge and justificed of beliefs (Hofer&Pintrich, 
1997; Gray, 2009). Epistemology means knowledge and how we create knowledge in 
an intelligible way (Tellis, 1997; Silverman, 2010). Baptiste (2001) stated that 
epistemology is the process of knowledge and knowing. Likewise, Cope (2002, p34) 
stated that “Epistemology is a theory of knowledge with specific reference to the limits 
and validity of knowledge”. It deals with the question of what is the truth, what is the 
criterion of justified or acceptable knowledge and how individuals understand the world 
around them. There are different ways to create knowledge: positivist, interpretative, 
post-positivism and pragmatism epistemology (Creswell, 1998; Ryan et al., 2002; 
Creswell, 2003).  
From the perspective of positivism, the researchers need to act as objectivist; which 
means they should avoid the involvement of any personal bias influencing the outcome 
of the research. This approach is only valid for the controlled experiments or 
quantification of a certain phenomenon. This is very rarely used in the qualitative 




Similarly, the epistemology of the interpretative approach involves the method of 
focusing on the participant/researcher dialogue to uncover the subjugated knowledge 
and link it to the social behaviours, thereby creating the knowledge through standpoints 
of the researcher who mediates reflectively about the given research problem (Agger, 
2007; Carter& Little, 2007). Likewise, post-positivism epistemology is the changed 
version of the objectivist in which the researcher believes that existence of pure 
objectivity is not possible within the real world; and the outcomes of the research may 
be true or ‘probably true’ (Creswell, 2009). In contrast to foregoing epistemologies, the 
pragmatism epistemology takes the pluralistic approach to reconcile the different 
viewpoints/works with what is known to the researcher (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; 
Sprague&Kobrynowicz, 2006).    
  
From the above discussion of epistemology, it is obvious that epistemology of each 
paradigm varies from each other. Furthermore, it can be said that the positivist, 
interpretivists, post-positivist and pragmatist paradigms have been enormously 
influential in the development of quantitative and qualitative approaches to social 
research.  
  
3.3.1.1 Positivism  
In the view of positivism, the researcher builds knowledge on an acceptable theory and 
rationale foundation as the way to get at truth (Schrag, 1992; Baker, 2000; Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In addition, researchers conduct research to test hypotheses using 
empirical approaches and objectively analyse data by using structured research 
methods, therefore, a neutral process is followed to discover the truth and this will lead 
to development of a theory which may be used to do further research (Bryman, 2001). 
However, based on the findings of any research, positivists may argue that the theory is 
not valid and there is need to revise it for better prediction of the reality. Positivist 
believes that experiment is the key method for scientific research and the measurement 
is essential method that helps to identify features of natural laws (Stahl, 2007). In 
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general, the social researcher disagrees with this form of research. Positivist is more 
likely to use well-structured methods in order to enable reproduction (Amaratunga et 
al., 2002). Knowledge generated by positivist is confirmed by using measurable 
observation method that offers them with statistical analysis (Merriam, 1991; Guba& 
Lincoln, 1994; Giddings& Grant, 2007).  
  
 3.3.1.2 Realism or post-positivism  
Some scholars such as Comte, Durkheim and Locke came up in the 19th century with 
the realism or post-positivism as a scientific method (Smith, 1983). It is another 
epistemological position and it refers to the thinking after positivism (Phillips & 
Burbules, 2000). Post-positivism observes that the way of thinking of different 
scientists is not distinctly different (Devitt, 1984). It reflects a deterministic philosophy 
where every action causes a reaction, and every reaction, in turn, becomes the cause of 
subsequent reactions (Creswell et al., 2003). The knowledge that develops through 
realism is related directly to the theory of truth which asserts that there is an objective 
reality that is possible to know based on observation and measurement (House, 1991). 
Therefore, scientists follow specific methods and measures to guide in the process of 
uncovering truth about the social world and assure that observations are valid (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Phillips &Burbules, 2000).   
  
3.3.1.3 Interpretative or constructivism  
In addition to the above, another process of knowledge creation that became widely 
known from Mannheim & Berger in 1967 is interpretativism or constructivism. In this 
position, the researcher discovers new knowledge from a side existing knowledge 
(constructivism) (Karaffa, 2015). Based on this approach, knowledge can be obtained 
by studying the social phenomena in different ways, by undertaking an interpretive 





The collation of facts that create basis for laws leads to the generation of knowledge, as 
Morgan (2007, p.52) suggests that “positivism and constructivism influence how 
research questions are asked and answered”. As a result, positivism and constructivism 
perceive epistemological issues in different ways. Constructionists stated that truth does 
not exist, knowledge is achieved by construction in other words, and the existence of 
truth or meaning varies with facts or realities in our changing world (Speed, 1991). 
Meanings are not discovered, but constructed over a period of time, which is needed in 
order to improve the understanding of issues (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). The 
construction of meanings also needs to be considered in order to ensure that the truth 
can be discovered and understood within the wider perspective and this has to be taken 
into account by the researcher (Giddings & Grant, 2007, Henneberg et al., 2010).  
  
  
  3.3.1.4 Pragmatism  
Another philosophy about knowledge creation is pragmatism. It came from the work of 
some writers such as Peirce and James (Cherryholmes, 1992). Here, the choice of one 
philosophical position or the other is impracticable as researchers in this kind of 
research may need to use different approaches to better understand the problem 
(Rossman& Wilson, 1985). In this case, method is not important, but rather, the 
problem is the most important. Research under this philosophy does not clearly identify 
the research question either as positivist or interpretivist; therefore, it works with both 
positions. Subsequently, both “qualitative and quantitative” are highly appropriate for 
such studies in social research (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).  
  
  
3.3.2 Ontology  
Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being real and related to how the 
researcher views reality. It is concerned with whether reality exists by itself or 
individual produces it (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Sayer, 2000; Ryan et al., 2002; Bahari, 
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2012). In addition, ontology deals with the question of what is real. Further, it refers to 
particular rules of behaviour about the nature of humans and their experiences 
(Patterson & Williams, 1998). Bryman (2001) made a distinction between two main 
ontological positions, objectivism and constructionism.   
  
Objectivism is closely linked to positivism and the natural sciences, as it describes 
logical relationships between variables and asserts that a social phenomenon can be 
seen as a tangible object and independent of social actors (Maxwell, 1992; Bernstein, 
2011). On the other hand, constructionism is closely linked to interpretative approach 
that seeks to understand the meanings of people attach to social realities. It believes that 
social actors have an active role in constructing social phenomena (Bryman, 2001; 
Bryman, 2008).   
  
However, Silverman (2001) argued that in practice, such a clear difference between 
these two ontological positions rarely exists and some researchers combine elements of 
both approaches.  
  
  
3.4 Philosophical Assumptions Underpinning this Study  
The above mentioned epistemological and ontological assumptions have direct 
implications for the methodology adopted in this research (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; 
Hopper & Powell, 1985; Laughlin, 1995; Collis & Hussey, 2009). As well as the 
outlined primary purpose of this study as mentioned in Chapter One, the researcher is 
interested in studying the impact of such, rather than trying to change the current 
situation, as this study is to investigate the influence of Shariah CG principles on cross-
border M&A between Islamic financial companies in Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and UAE), and non-Islamic companies in Western countries. Studying 
organisational and human behaviour, culture, history and situations in which people live 
and interact can be examined in different contexts through a multiplicity of methods. 
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Therefore, there are varied and multiple truths that can be found and may not be aligned 
with the positivist and post-positivist approaches.   
  
  
Considering this, the research will be hinged on the interpretivist perspective as the 
researcher would provide some insights that could have policy implications for 
changing the current practice of Islamic CG as adopted by Islamic organisations. As 
this research adopts the interpretative perspective, it aligns with the ontological position 
of constructionism, especially knowing that humans can have an impact on the social 
world. This would help to find out whether Islamic principles that are implemented 
within Islamic organisations have an impact on cross-border M&A between Islamic and 
non-Islamic companies.  
  
  
3.5 Research Methodology  
In the social sciences, there is an ongoing debate among scholars on how research 
should be conducted (Bulmer, 1979; Marshall & Rossman, 1989; Silverman, 2006, 
Bryman, 2008). Also, researchers are believed to introduce their own perspectives to 
their research (Jonker & Pennink, 2010), which then makes a clear statement of the 
chosen methodology or methods. The research methodology provides a clear overview 
about the methods used for gathering data and techniques used to analyse data which 
are the focus of the methodological assumptions.   
  
3.5.1 Research Approaches and Techniques  
  
3.5.1.1 Deductive and Inductive Reasoning  
In this section, two approaches of reasoning and their implications will be explained. 
Punch, (2013) stated that there are two ways of developing research questions: 
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deductive approach, which means that the researcher starts by moving from general 
ideas on the selected topic to develop particular research questions. On the other hand, 
working inductively starts with a specific question and move from these back to 
develop more general questions on the topic. Both approaches can be used in listing the 
research questions, based on the scope of conducting the research (Hyde, 2000; Goel & 
Dolan, 2004; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).  
  
The deductive or “top down” approach involves developing a hypothesis based on an 
existing theory and then the hypothesis is subjected to empirical study (Ali &Birley, 
1999). Furthermore, this approach follows conclusion logically as the researcher starts 
with particular to general questions (Pelissier et al., 2009; Babbie, 2010). In other 
words, it is started with thinking up a theory then finding new hypotheses to be able to 
test them by confronting it with observations and finally reaching a conclusion (Snieder 
& Larner, 2009).   
  
This approach has been discussed by many authors such as Punch (2005, p.38) who 
contended that ‘we should only have hypotheses when it is appropriate to do so’ and 
that is only ‘when we have an explanation [a theory] in mind behind our hypotheses’.  
This means that the researcher undertakes a good literature review on the selected topic, 
then based on thorough understanding of the subject, proceeds to build hypotheses. 
Based on such, the hypothesis will be tested based on the empirical observation of data 
collected from the primary research and the results analysed accordingly. The deductive 
approach is used in quantitative research, in which hypothesized relationships are 
developed and tested. When using a deductive approach, an understanding of the facts 
being established as well as a detached and objective view of the phenomenon is needed 
(Carr, 1994).  
  
On the contrary, inductive approach generates the theory as the outcome of the research. 
This approach is often termed as “Bottom-top”, where the research starts with specific 
applications or findings, which are then used to move and to draw a broader or general 
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idea of the phenomenon under investigation (Goddard & Melville, 2004). The research 
starts with narrow focus, and moves to generalise the finding to a broad segment or 
subject (Porter & Miikkulainen, 2003; Lodico et al, 2010; Bernard, 2011). In this 
approach, no theories and hypotheses would be applied at the initial stage of the 
research process, thus findings will be obtained when the study is completed (Lancaster, 
2005).   
  
The inductive research adopts methods such as surveys, interviews, focus and group 
studies to collect research data (Yin, 2015). A researcher will further analyse the data to 
reach common insights on the subject accordingly. Based on the insights, the researcher 
will develop a universal theory based on the findings from the sample population 
accordingly. The next step would be comparing and analysing the newly grounded 
theory with the existing practices and frameworks. If the new theory forces drastic 
change in the existing protocols, the researcher has heralded a paradigm shift (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005).  
  
  
3.5.1.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques  
When considering a suitable research technique for a specific study, researchers usually 
consider the choice between qualitative and quantitative techniques, and even the use of 
both, when applicable (Maxwell et al., 1998; Thomas, 2003). The selecting a suitable 
research technique to be employed in a study is important to identify the meaning of the 
collected data (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Myers, 2013). It is therefore important to 
differentiate qualitative and quantitative research techniques from each other before 
discussing which is best suitable for this research. Researchers such as Maxwell et al. 
(1998) and Bickman et al. (1998) suggested the process of qualitative research design 






Qualitative research methods are interpretative and aim to reveal a target audience’s 
range of behaviour and perceptions. Furthermore, De Vaus (2002) noted that these 
methods provide in-depth data about people’s life and help to make sense of their 
behaviour. It was developed when it was recognised that quantitative methods were 
unable to deal with human feelings. It uses in-depth investigation of small groups of 
people and it is based on their words, perceptions, feelings and others, rather than 
numbers. However, it has been criticized by some authors such as Mishler (1990); 
Denzin & Lincoln (1994) and Lincoln (1995) as lacking ‘scientific’ rigour and 
credibility. In addition, it has been criticised as it is depending on the subjective 
interpretations of researchers (De Vaus, 2002). Qualitative research is designed to 
include instruments such as interviews, case studies and focus groups to help in guiding 
the construction of hypotheses (Bergman, 2008; Creswell, 2012).   
  
Monette et al. (2013) considered that qualitative methods deal with ideas; however, 
Polonsky & Waller (2005) classified tools such as images, printed word and recorded 
sound into qualitative methods. The process of qualitative research shows the 
Figure 3.2: Research Design  
  
Source: Bickman et al .  (1998)  
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relationship between theory and social practices (Bryman et al., 2005), which tends to 
make it popular in the social sciences as it aids applicability of theory to social issues.  
  
On the other hand, quantitative research methods refer to a type of data that is based on 
numerical data and dealing with measurement processes. The analysis of the numerical 
data can be generalised to some larger population (Jick, 1979). It is often a deductive 
type of research, and the data collection is through surveys, experiments, and 
longitudinal studies (Teddlie et al., 2008). In social sciences, quantitative research is 
widely used in fields such as psychology, economics, health and human development. 
The strength of quantitative research lies in its reliability since it aims to control 
external variables within a study’s internal structure (Carr, 1994). Furthermore, standard 
testing can assess the data with the use of quantitative technique. This reliability as the 
strength of quantitative research is a weakness in qualitative research since the latter 
does not use measurement or quantification to assess data objectively (Gallaire et al., 
1984; Teddlie et al., 2008).  
  
However, qualitative research finds strength in validity, whereby fewer threats to 
external validity are present with regard to this research technique (Kirk & Miller, 
1986). This strength could be attributed to the fact that natural setting and controlling 
factors are fewer compared to conditions in quantitative research, which has to be 
considered (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The strength of qualitative research is seen in 
the characteristic of researchers being immersed in the context and subjective nature of 
the participants, enabling the researcher to provide an assurance that the data are 
representative of the subjects (Carr, 1994).  
  
Quantitative method would be preferred when there is a need for objective way to find 
the solution to the research problem (Punch, 2013). This process often takes short 
duration of time, and based on the sample size population (Neuman, 2005). This 
method does not mandate the researcher to be in close proximity with the research 
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participants unlike the qualitative research methods. The online surveys can help the 
researcher to collect data from participants from various geographic locations. There are 
many tools used in quantitative research like the cross tabulation and pie charts to help 
the researcher to analyse the research data (Patton, 2005). The objective of the 
quantitative research is usually to test the existing hypotheses, by using appropriate 
research tools to collect the respective data and further analyse the data to draw 
inferences which aid confirming, extending and refuting underlying theories 
(Amaratunga et al., 2002; Sale et al., 2002; Delport, 2005).   
  
3.5.1.3 Relevant Approach and Techniques to the Study  
The choice of the best approach and techniques for this study is challenging as each 
method has positive and negative features, thus, one cannot be deemed superior to the 
other. However, scholars such as Creswell & Clark (2007) and Bell & Bryman (2007) 
have argued that the links between positivism, deductive and quantitative methods on 
one hand and that between interpretivism, inductive and qualitative techniques on the 
other are not absolute. Punch (2005) stated that there is no necessary connection 
between aim of a study and approach as the two strategies can be used for both theory 
verification and generation.  
  
  
Since this study focuses on CG across countries with a unique societal attitude due to 
the practice of Shariah law, which has an impact on the development of the Islamic 
companies and might have effect on foreign transactions, including cross-border M&A, 
it might be therefore difficult to employ deductive approach as Shariah law cannot be 
objective. This research tends to rely on a high level of qualitative research method to 
study how the Shariah principles such as the prohibition of Riba, Islamic inheritance 
law, limited Islamic financial instruments and the existence of Shariah supervisory 
Board in the Islamic companies might affect cross-border M&A. This could imply the 
appropriateness of an inductive approach, however, there are chances that data could 
also be analysed quantitatively, which will strike a balance between deductive and 
inductive approaches. This is supported by Saunders et al. (2007) view that there exists 
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a certain overlap in how these two methods are to be deployed based on the scope and 
objective of the research.  
  
  
Social scientists often use a mix of these two approaches to identify the best solution to 
study human behaviours, and how these behaviours are affected by soft religious 
principles in doing business. This study adopts the inductive approach as it begins with 
specific findings of cross-border M&A and CG from an Islamic perspective, which 
serves as basis for drawing a general idea of such phenomenon.   
  
The inapplicability of qualitative technique to this study is evidently seen in its 
necessity to tackle the research problem in-depth, which requires no element of 
quantification or measurement. Although, this study cannot rely on a quantitative 
approach, it is believed that the combination of the two techniques will give this study a 
good representation (Charmaz, 2001; Saldana, 2015; Davies & Hughes, 2014). There 
are benefits for using both types of research techniques, and researchers select the 
appropriate process based on the scope and objectives of the research, and this helps the 
researcher to understand wider perspective of the participants (Fontana & Frey, 1994; 
Jankowski & Jensen, 2002; Silverman, 2010).  
  
The researcher used Mono method (qualitative) technique, which was initially 
developed in the field of social science, with the aim of aiding researchers to tackle 
social and cultural phenomena, as also identified in the literature (Corti & Bishop, 2005, 
Curry et al., 2009). Primary data was collected through semi-structure interviews from 
the sample population and was analysed to investigate the influence of Shariah on 
cross-border M&A in the selected Gulf countries. The available secondary data was 
used to gather information about Islamic CG including published articles, journals, CG 
manuals and any statutory publications based on Shariah Law.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of this Research Paradigm  
Paradigm  Interpretivism (constructivism).  
Approach  Inductive  
Epistemology  Subjective  
Ontology  Relativism  
Methods  Qualitative  
  
  
3.5.2 Research Strategy  
In addition to the research approach, the type of question that the research project 
attempts to answer impacts the research strategy (Denscombe, 2010). Research strategy 
is defined by Saunders et al. (2007) as the development of a plan on how the researcher 
will achieve the research aim. In the same vein, Lewis (2009) posited that choosing a 
research strategy provides overall direction to the study under investigation and lead to 
the decision which is followed by selection of research approach. While choosing a 
research strategy, three significant factors need to be considered namely, the research 
questions that need to be answered, the researcher’s control over actual behavioural 
events and the degree to which the research focus on current against past events (Yin, 
2013).  
  
Yin (2003b), Creswell et al. (2003), Saunders et al (2009) and Collis & Hussey (2009) 
argued that while several research strategies exist in business and management 
including survey, case study, action research, grounded theory, ethnography, cross 
sectional and longitudinal studies, it is important to select the appropriate strategy for a 
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particular research study. Case study and grounded theory were adapted as research 
strategies in this research.  
   
3.5.2.1 Case Study  
Many researchers adopt case study as one of the preferred research strategies (Remenyi, 
2002). Fridlund (1997) defined case study as research strategy in which an empirical 
investigation in details is carried out on a particular subject, which might be a single 
person or community, family, team or an organization. The author also stated that it is 
considered to be the most preferred method of undertaking a research when question 
like ‘How’ and ‘Why’ needs to be answered, therefore, in this role it can be used for 
exploratory, descriptive or explanatory research. Generally, according to Simons (2009) 
such a method is adopted in circumstances when survey or experimental approaches 
cannot be adopted or fail to fit in with the requirements of the research. Case study 
presents many advantages such as obtaining in-depth data with regard to a specific 
phenomenon by using various methods and offer better understandings that might not 
be achieved with other strategies. In contrast, there are scepticisms of using case study 
research such as difficulty in conducting and producing a massive amount of 
documentation (Baxter & Jack, 2008). However, Fellows & Liu (2008) argued that this 
can be avoided by organising and managing the data systematically. Another criticism 
is that it is difficult to reach a general conclusion when using case study strategy due to 
limited sampling cases (Tellis, 1997).   
  
Bryman (2008) stated that there is a link between the qualitative researches and case 
study; however, such an association is not absolute as it can be used for both qualitative 
and quantitative research. Similarly, Dul & Hak (2008) stated that case study should be 
analysed in a qualitative method. Selection of a research strategy is based on the type of 
research question (Berg et al., 2004; Saunders et al., 2009). Yin (2013) stated that case 
study approach is one of the best approaches for presenting evidences in linear format.  
Further, in such an approach, the researcher is directly involved in collection of data 





3.5.2.2 Rational for adopting case study in this research  
Case study was adopted in this research to develop answers to the research questions 
that this research intended to investigate (see 1.4 in chapter one). The vast majority of 
the interview questions were objective about what the (managers, lawyers and Shariah 
scholars) knew about the influence of Shariah principles on cross-border M&A between 




The research questions are mostly consist of how and why type that favouring a case 
study research. Adopting case study strategy allows the researcher to answer the 
questions that are investigated in this study, which favoured qualitative method (Yin, 
2003b). In-depth knowledge was gained from semi-structured interviews which allow 




Furthermore, choosing case study was due to a number of reasons. The researcher was 
seeking to compare three Islamic banks and two insurance companies in each of the 
selected Gulf countries to provide better understanding of Islamic CG and to see 
whether there are any variations in the implementation of Shariah principles. In 
addition, according to Yin (2003b) another reason to adopt case study as a research 
strategy is that when the researcher control over actual behavioural events cannot be 
manipulated. In this research, the researcher was an observer outside the case and did 
not have control over the behaviour of management of Islamic financial companies. In 
addition, case study is adopted when studying a contemporary phenomenon as opposed 
to historical. This study is to improve the current Gulf countries CG practices and cross-
border M&A as contemporary phenomenon, and to investigate cultural and religious 
influences affecting cross-border M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic financial 
companies. Moreover, based on the philosophical underpinning of this study which was 
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positioned with an interpretive perspective as well as the nature of the research 
questions, the researcher decided to use case study as it is often associated with 
interpretivism (Gerring, 2007).  
  
  
3.5.2.3 Grounded Theory  
Grounded theory is used along with case study in this research to analyse the 
qualitative data collected through interviews. It is defined as “the theory derived 
from data, systematically gathered and analysed through the research process” 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 12). The adoption of grounded theory in this study was 
due to the existence of only limited studies in the subject area and several questions 
about CG to develop a perception of the influence of Shariah CG principles on 
cross-border M&A in Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE). This 
strategy provides a clear direction from collecting data to conclusion (Suddaby, 
2006).  
  
Although significant literature related to Shariah CG exists, this research is not based 
on previous literature as no research focuses on the influence of Shariah CG principles 
in the cross-border M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic financial companies. 
Therefore, this study extends the current literature by identifying barriers to M&A deals 
between the Islamic and non-Islamic financial companies and provides a critical 
perspective, while most of the literature tends to be uncritical but promotional. This 
exceptional situation motivated the researcher to study what are the obstacles to the 
success of cross-border M&A of these companies.  
  
In order to analyse interview data, Strauss & Corbin (1998) proposed the following 
steps: the process involves several stages of data collection and modification of 
information in order to address the questions of when, where, why and how from 
explanation of phenomena under study. In this case, the researcher seeks a set of 
concepts thorough a process of grouping as categories and subcategories. This study 
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identified seven major themes and twenty-three sub-themes from the interviews 
identified in Chapter Five: Finally, the researcher identified the whole story integrated 
from the themes and sub-themes and produced the theory about the research problem 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990).   
  
  
3.5.2.4 Rational for not Choosing other Research Strategies [ may need to 
tightening] 
There are many reasons due to inapplicability of other strategies such as experiment, 
survey and ethnography. In this study, the researcher control over the phenomena 
cannot be manipulated, thus, experiment as compared with case study and grounded 
theory was considered less applicable to this study as the experiment is to investigate a 
situation in a laboratory or experimental setting and the experimenter manipulates 
independent variables to observe its effect on the dependent variables in order to better 
understand the phenomena (Keppel, 1991; Collis & Hussey, 2009).  
  
  
Moreover, as compared to a survey as a research strategy, this study used less number 
of samples than in a survey but with greater details (Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2011). 
In addition, data was collected from limited organisations to explore different issues by 
comparing them with the intent to generalising, to all other organisations of the same 
type (Babbie, 1990; Creswell, 2003).  
  
  
Furthermore, the ethnographic research is usually done due to the ease of doing the 
research, and proximity of the research participants, which can save the time and 
resources of the researcher (Spradley, 1979, LeCompte et al., 1993). Ethnographic 
research can also examine the circumstances which often dictate that the researcher 
does quantitative research if the research scope is deductive to a specific narrow focus 
based on the responses from the sample population, and this can help in examining the 
different issues. Ethnography requires the researcher to be immersed in a setting as a 
participant observer (Atkinson et al., 2001; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). As the 
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researcher was outside to the context in this research, ethnography did not seem to be an 
appropriate strategy for this research.  
   
3.6 Data Collection  
The collection and interpretation of qualitative data must be undertaken in a systematic 
way (Saunders et al., 2007). This section presents the procedures used to gather data 
from the prospective interviewee and the way the researcher analysed the data.  
  
The process of data collection is important to explore the issue under investigation and 
the awareness of individuals of circumstances surrounding and how they shape peoples’ 
experience (Polkinghorne, 2005). As a result, it influences people’s behaviour of 
creating meaning. There are many qualitative methods to collect data, and interview 
method has been widely used by researchers to gain participants point of view regarding 
research problem (Kothari, 2004; DiCicco‐Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). There are three 
types of interviews, which are structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). These interviews can be administered face-to-face, by 
telephone or online (Hair et al, 2007).  
  
In the case of structured interviews, all respondents are asked the same questions. List 
of questions will be pre-planned to help the interviewer to gather a greater depth of 
information about the research topic under study. However, in order to get sufficient 
information, high quality questions are required to examine the level of understanding a 
respondent has about a particular topic (Johnson, Turner, 2003).  
  
In contrast, unstructured interview does not require any predetermined questions and it 
does not reflect any theories or ideas (Polkinghorne, 2005). This kind of interviews may 
be used where particular depth is needed. There are many disadvantages of this 
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technique such as time-consuming, difficulties in managing data and the lack of 
guidance for the questions (Gill et al., 2008).  
  
Semi-structured interview involves several key questions that help to guide and explore 
the research issues (Longhurst, 2003). It allows the interviewer to pursue an idea or 
response in more detail. In comparison with the structured interviews, this approach is 
more flexible due to the possibility to discover more information by asking prompt 
questions that not have previously been thought of (Louise &While 1994; Gill et al., 
2008).  
To fulfil the purpose of the current research, it is essential to use method that allows 
participants to express themselves and their understanding, views, experiences and 
motivations freely. In addition, conducting interview could bring unconsidered factors 
that might affect the research and, thus, provides unexpected insights by a range of 




In this study, the researcher adopted the semi-structured interview and these were 
conducted face to face as well as over the phone. There are many factors impacted on 
conducting interviews such as time, accessibility, costs and duration (Hair et al., 2007; 
Rubin & Rubin, 2011). When this type of interview is conducted face to face, it 
supports eliciting the in-depth responses from the participants of the study. 
Furthermore, it also helps respondents to understand the question clearly (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2010). The potential limitations of this process involve the ‘probable influence’ 
of the researcher on the responses of the interviewees through impressive exchange of 
words/opinions during conversation, that may lead to development of element of 
biasness in the derivation of findings from the data (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). On the 
other hand, with the telephone interview there is a freedom to talk freely and it can 
minimise costs associated with time and finances, especially travelling and maintenance 
(Holbrook et al., 2003). However, the limitation in the case of telephone interview is 





3.6.1 Research Population  
 
The research population of this study comprises all banks and insurance companies in 
Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirate- the three GCC countries under study. 
The financial sector in the GCC though comparable to that of developed economies, is 
characterised by the dominance of the banks, monopolistic competition and large 
presence of domestic players and state-owned banks (Al ‐Hassan et    
and Calice, 2016) 
The number of commercial banks operating in the Kingdom reached 25 (23 licenced and 
fully operational and 2 are licensed but have not yet started operation) at the end of 
2015, including branches of foreign banks. Islamic banking asset represent about 50 per 
cent of all the banking assets in the country as of 2016. Up to the end of 2015, the 
number of insurance and reinsurance companies that have already been approved by the 
Council of Ministers reached 35, in addition to 213 insurance service providers to 
support insurance services.  
According to the Central Bank of Kuwait (2015) Financial Stability Report, the banking 
sector dominates the financial sector of the country accounting for around 82% of the 
domestic financial sector. Domestic banking sector consists of five conventional, five 
Islamic and one specialized bank. There are also 12 foreign -owned banks operating in 
the country of which 5 appear to be conventional, some of them with Islamic windows. 
The report shows that with 60.7% share as of December 2015, the conventional banking 
dominates the banking sector followed by Islamic banks, with 38.3% share in 
consolidated banking system. This makes Kuwait the country with one of the most 
significant presence of Islamic banks in any country across the globe with a dual 
banking system. Investment companies are the second major player in the domestic 
financial system with around 14% share as of December 2015. Investment funds, 
insurance companies, and exchange companies constitute the rest.  
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In the UAE, according to the Central bank of UAE, there are 21 domestic and 28 foreign 
banks operating in the country. Though greater in number, the latter tend to have a very 
few branches when compared to the national banks. The Islamic banking however 
account for only 19.6 percent in the market share in 2016 (IFBS, 2017), the rest being 
accounted by the conventional banking system. The total of 19 banks operate in the 
UAE of which 11 are Islamic and 8 are conventional banks with Islamic windows. In 
terms of insurance, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are the Gulf’s two major insurance 
markets, accounting for more than 70.0% of the total premium collected in 2014 (Alpen, 
2015).  As of 2012, the UAE   had the biggest insurance market in the Gulf, with over 
60 firms offering conventional and Islamic insurance (Takaful). It is important to remind 
a reader here the difficulty of getting accurate figures on breakdown of   Islamic and 
non-Islamic insurance companies   in Gulf as the numbers of firms changes over time 
due to some firms being closed and others taken over. Issues such as family ownership 
of firms and restriction on the entry and ownership share of foreign companies also 
limits the ways in which insurance firms operate in these countries and is likely to 
increase a number of Islamic insurance companies as compared to non-Islamic though 
the latter may have better share in the market.  
Table 3.1 – Population of the study 
 KSA Kuwait United Arab Emirates 
 Islamic conventional Total Islamic Conventional Total  Islamic  Conventional Total 
Banks 19 6 25 12 11 23 30 21 51 
Insurance  26 9 35 11  11   60 




As this study seeks to examine the variations, if any, in awareness, adoption, 
mechanisms of Shariah CG principles, legal structure, and M& A between conventional 
and Islamic financial companies in the three Gulf countries, the researcher purposively 
selected 15 financial institutions from the many described above.  The key criteria for 
selecting banks and insurance companies is that they should be operating in M&A 
context. So, all the chosen 9 banks and 6 insurance companies from the three Gulf 
countries are those involved in M&A activities. The choice of these countries is 
underpinned by similarity in religion, culture, resource context and degree of exposure 
to the Western influence and hence it would be interesting to examine similarities and 
differences in the main issues this thesis set to study. The research context of Gulf also 
typified by an increasing level of interest and application of Shariah law in business and 
management practices. There is also an increasing interest by firms and managers of the 
Gulf countries to seek to acquire modern, up-to-date knowledge, processes, best 
practices and procedure which align with advances in globalisation and to attract 
investment to these countries. One of ways of achieving this objective would be 
engaging in M&A activities with firms of foreign origin.  This study thus seeks to 
examine the influence of sharia CG principles on cross-border M&A between Islamic 






3.6.2 Research Sample Selection  
 
As explained above the total of 15 financial institutions – 9 banks and 6 insurance 
companies - were chosen using multiple case study approach. As the three selected 
countries have robust and dynamic financial sector, it was decided that three banks and 




Research sample normally consists of individuals, organisations or specific cases of 
research interest (Ruane, 2005). Non-probability sampling approach is widely used in 
business research if the research objectives and questions are likely to be addressed 
using qualitative research approaches (Zikmund et al., 2012). According to Schreuder et 
al. (2001) and Kothari (2004) in non-probability technique, there is no equal chance for 
population to be selected and random selection is not necessary given the nature of 
specific purposes of research. There are four main types of non-probability sampling: 
convenience, quota, snowball and judgmental (Bryman; 2012). It is important to bear in 
mind that sampling is determined by the nature of the study purpose, research aims and 
research questions (Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
It is worth to discuss in brief each type of non-probability sampling techniques so as to 
make a case on how one or more of these techniques were used in this study. Although 
the techniques of non-probability sampling are critiqued because they do not allow the 
generalisability of the study findings (Buckingham & Saunders, 2004; Bryman, 2008). 
In addition, they may lack ‘scientific rigour’, however, they provide rich descriptions 
and invaluable insights into the issues under investigation. 
Purposeful sampling was deployed in this qualitative research for the identification and 
choice of information-rich, typical, cases (organisations and interviewees within these 
organisations) in order to address the research objectives and research questions. The 
purposive sampling method requires the researcher to choose the most appropriate 
objects based on their knowledge and ability to answer the research questions to meet 
the research objectives (Saunders et al., 2007). Therefore, the choice of the respective 
Islamic companies was based on some characteristics such as their size in the industry, 
insider experience, and activeness in dealing with cross-border M&A. In terms of 
approach used to select interviewees within the purposively selected 15 financial 
companies, the researcher searched contact information from the organisations’ website 
and other appropriate sources and then sent an email to the prospective interviewee in 
the respective positions/roles to request their participation in the research. The email 
sent outlined the purpose of the research, the time it takes, the relevance of the research 
and then requested their participation in the research. It did not contain the exact 
100  
  
interview questions, however, where it is impossible to meet them or arrange interview 
but the interview questions were sent in to some of them who wished to have them 
before the interview took place.  
 
Snowball technique has attracted qualitative researchers’ attention over the years. It is 
argued that snowball is a form of convenience but is different as the researcher makes 
initial contact with a small number of subjects to participate in the study (Goodman, 
1961; David & Sutton, 2004; Ruane, 2005; Bryman, 2008).  For this research, following  
snowball sampling technique, some participants were referred to the researcher by 
business and academics contacts, friends and family. At the first week, trying to reach 
the referrers through phone number was unsuccessful, an email was sent through and 
effort was made to contact the intermediate person that helped to facilitate the 
arrangement of the interviews. In addition, the researcher asked for assistance from the 
initial subjects to help to get others with a similar trait of interest that was interviewed 
for this study. The researcher personally approached the target participants and 
scheduled appointments for the interviews. Due to the religion connection with this 
research that made it difficult to reach some participants easily such as Shariah 
scholars.  
Snowball technique that employed in this study helped to identify the individuals 
mentioned above (Bryman, 2008). However, there are disadvantages of this method 
such as the first selected participants have strong impact on the sample and thus the 
results. It is heavily reliant on the skills of the researcher to identify the appropriate 
participants (Saunders et al., 2009). To overcome the limitation of the snowball 
sampling, the researcher selected subjects based on their knowledge and professional 
judgment as well as from different positions and professional backgrounds.  
  
Convenience sampling is where the subjects of the study are selected due to their 
accessibility and availability to researchers (Bryman, 2008).  Another non-probability 
sampling technique is quota sampling. It is rarely employed in social research and 
commonly used in commercial and political research. It divides the population into 
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categories such as gender, age groups and region of resident. This type of sampling 
aims to reflect people in terms of relative proportion in each category. In this case, the 
selection of individuals is not random as it depends on the researcher decision to choose 
the people who fit the research purpose.  Whilst quota sampling was not used in this 
study, convenience sampling of interviewees was used in a few cases but the chosen 




Given the focus and the objectives of the thesis, it was imperative to follow credible and 
trustworthy techniques in selecting respondents from the purposively selected 15 
companies. The combination of purposive, snowballing and convenience sampling 
techniques were used to approach interviewees from the selected companies.  As issues 
under investigation required tapping into knowledge, experience and perception of 
respondents on Shariah CG principles and how they were understood and practised as 
well as the legal structure and the use of Shariah complaint financial instruments in the 
process of M&A, three types of respondents were identified (Hair et al., 2007; Sekaran 
& Bougie, 2010). Overall, 40 interviewees were conducted with the three group of 
respondents: Shariah board members/scholars (15), legal advisors (12) and senior 
managers (13) (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below for details).  
 
Table 3.2 Profile of Respondents 
Companies  Saudi Arabi UAE Kuwait  Total 
Banks 10 7 5 22 
Insurance  7 6 5 18 
Total 17 13 10 40 
 
Of the 40 interviewees, 22 work for the 9 banks and 18 for insurance companies 
selected for this study. The above table also shows that 17 respondents were 






Table 3.3 The Participants of the Interviews  
 
S/No  Participants  
ID  
Organization  Responsibilities  Experience  
1  P1-Ins-SA  Insurance   Director of Legal Department  8 years  
2  P2-Ins-SA  Insurance   Director of Compliance  
Department  
7 years  
3  P3-B-SA  Bank  Lawyer & Councillor for  
Commercial & Financial field  
20 years  
4  P4-B-SA  Bank  Consultant for Governance  6 years  
5  P5-Ins-SA  Insurance  Legal Advisor   9 years  
6  P6-Ins-SA  Insurance  Shariah Board Member  13 years  
7  P7-B-SA  Bank  Head of Legal Affairs  11 years  
8  P8-B-SA  Bank  Head of Law Department  3 years  
9  P9-B-SA  Bank  Lawyer Managing M&A  7 years  
10  P10-B-SA  Bank  Lawyer for Managing M&A  10 years  
11  P11-B-SA  Bank  Manager for External Deals  21 years  
12  P12-Ins-SA  Insurance  Lawyer of M&A Deals  6 years  
13  P13-Ins-SA  Insurance  Shariah Board Member  10 years  
14  P14-B-SA  Bank   Shariah Board Member  12 years  
15  P15-B-SA  Bank   Shariah Board Member  20 years  
16  P16-Ins-SA  Insurance  Manger of M&A  9 years  
17  P17-B-SA  Bank   Manager of M&A  11 years  
18  P1-B-UAE  Bank  Regional Manager  14 years  
19  P2-Ins-UAE  Insurance   Shariah Compliance Manger  3 Years   
20  P3-Ins-UEA  Insurance   Legal Councillor   14 years  
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21  P4-Ins-UAE  Insurance   Manager of M&A  10 years  
22  P5-Ins-UAE  Insurance   Shariah Compliance Manger  9 years  
23  P6-B-UAE  Bank  Manager of  M&A  6 years  
24  P7-B-UAE  Bank  Shariah Scholar    15 year  
25  P8-B-UAE  Bank   Manager of M&A  13 years  
26  P9-B-UAE  Bank   Shariah Board Member  15 years  
27  P10-Ins-UAE  Insurance   Shariah Board Member  10 years  
28  P11-Ins-UAE  Insurance   Shariah Scholar  8 years  
29  P12-B-UAE  Bank  Shariah Compliance Manger  6 years  
30  P13-B-UAE  Bank   Shariah Scholar  11 years  
31  P1-Ins-KW  Insurance   Manager of M&A  6 years  
32  P2-Ins-KW  Insurance   External Deals Manager  30 years  
33  P3-B-KW  Bank  Compliance Manager  6 years  
34  P4-B-KW  Bank  Shariah Board Member  6 years  
35  P5-Ins-KW  Insurance   Shariah Compliance Manager  20 years  
36  P6-B-KW  Bank  Manager for M&A  10 years  
37  P7-B-KW  Bank  Shariah Compliance Manager  8 years  
38  P8-Ins-KW  Insurance   External Deals Manager  10 years  
39  P9-Ins-KW  Insurance   Shariah Board Member   12 years  
40  P10-B-KW  Bank  Managers for M&A  10 years  
  
  
Key Guide:  
  
P-B-SA:      Participant from Banking sector of Saudi Arabia.  
P-Ins-SA:    Participant from Insurance Sector of Saudi Arabia.  
P-B-UAE:    Participant from Banking sector of the United Arab Emirates.  
P-Ins-UAE:  Participant from Insurance sector of the United Arab Emirates.  
P-B-KW:     Participant from Banking sector of Kuwait.  





These selected respondents play key roles in organisational decision-making, oversight, 
in interpreting business environment and the context in which these firms operate. For 
example, legal advisors entrusted with advising business organisations on issues 
regarding laws, rules and regulations, including Shariah law and principles, which have 
impacts on the business organisations. Shariah board members and Shariah scholars, for 
example, act as interpreters of sharia law and ensure whether the business organisations 
comply with them. Senior managers in these organisations are responsible in leading 
and managing these financial institutions to achieve organisational goals. Hence, the 
three groups of interviewees selected for this study were appropriate to address the 
research issues under investigation. The diversity of roles and positions of these 
interviewees meant that the study was able to uncover contrasting and complementary 
perspectives on the issues under investigation and this in turn enhanced the credibility, 
trustworthiness of the findings. The above table also shows that all the sample 
respondents had rich work experience, thorough knowledge of the context, and relevant 
role and these features combined helped the gathering of appropriate data. 
 
 
Each research participant was interviewed on 25-30 questions about the impact of 
Shariah principles and cultural influences on the formation of cross-border M&A.   The 
total of 40 respondents were interviewed from the three Gulf region countries (see 
Table 3.2 and 3.3 above. Two categories of participants were interviewed - internal and 
external participants - the same questions to compare the responses in order to increase 
the validity of the research outcomes.  
 
The sample size ensured the researcher had a sufficient number of companies and 
interviewees from different countries within the region. The research outcomes can be 
used to draw implications on how different Islamic countries which are not culturally 
too diverse can have variations in the implementation of Shariah principles in their 




3.6.3 Process of Data Collection  
Since there is need to coordinate with companies located in multiple locations, the 
researcher expectedly had delays in the research process. The data collection lasted for 
9 months, between December 2013 and August 2014. As part of this process, the 
researcher had to explain and provide clarifications about the purpose of this study as 
well as ensuring the participants’ names was changed to maintain confidentiality 
(Sieber, 1992; Gullemin & Gillam, 2004).  
Following their selection and their agreement to participate in the research, a phone call 
was made to provide brief information about this research and what they will be 
expecting during the interview. The interviews were conducted in the respective 
countries, and in the organisation’s office or anywhere else as agreed a prior, except if 
otherwise requested by the interviewee. The option of language was kept open between 
Arabic and English, the interviewee was given the chance for them to choose which 
language they are comfortable with, but many liked Arabic except some managers who 
have a good grip of English language. The interviews lasted for not more than one hour 
each. Before the beginning of the interview, the researcher explained the objectives of 
the research, and the rights of the participants and that the data will be used for research 
purpose only (Wiles et al., 2008).    
  
A small portable device was used for recording in order to prevent any loss of valuable 
information or any change in the actual interview (Saunders et al., 2007). The 
researcher used the phone numbers and emails provided by the interviewees to keep in 
touch in case of any further information or any clarifications are needed. The data 
collection process ensured the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewees to 
comply with research ethics.  All records protected to ensure that the true identities of 
the participants were not shared in the research to protect research participants from 
harm; instead codes were used to represent the opinions of the research participants 





The interviews were transcribed verbatim by playing the recorded interview and putting 
it in a print, some interviews recorded in Arabic and then translated to English and 
effort were made to ensure that all the transcription error had been corrected and the 
accuracy in the translation.  These were done by using transcribers which were 
proficient in both English and Arabic languages to ensure the accuracy of translation.  
  
3.7 Designing Interview  
Malhotra & Birks (2000) stated that data should be collected based on specific needs of 
the research purposes. In addition, it is important to have a plan for data collection 
based on the areas of interest (Saunders et al., 2007; Ritchie et al., 2013). The 
researcher designed three sets of questions for each category; managers, lawyers and 
Shariah Board members of the target companies in order to investigate the impact of 
Shariah principles on M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic countries. The questions 
were constructed in such a way as to enable the collection of relevant and appropriate 
responses from the interviewees.  All the respondents were asked similar demographic 
profile and common questions. However, depending on the type of audience, the 
questions were designed to know the influence of the Shariah law on their job 
responsibilities when dealing with cross-border M&A on a regular basis.  
  
Further questions were asked to help address issue relating to various leadership styles; 
managing organisational and people’s cultural differences as well as managing financial 
and legal risk. The interview questions followed by prompt questions provided an in-
depth investigation of the research issues that might be relevant to the study (Hair et al., 
2007; Bryman, 2008). The questions extracted from the literature review and were 
flexible to work with different participants (Saunders et al., 2007).   
  
The table (3.2) below indicates the major themes from literature review and how they 
were used to develop the semi-structured interviews. In addition, the researcher further 
explained the rationale behind the interview questions for each of the categories, and 
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how each question has a specific outcome that was used to achieve the research 
objectives.    
Table 3.2: Major Themes from Literature Review  
Theme  Remarks  Existing   Literature  
Corporate  
Governance  
To find out information on 
the adoption of CG code of 
practice in Islamic companies 
in the Gulf countries.  
Shleifer & Vishny,1997; Becht et 
al., 2003;Huse, 2005; Haniffa& 
Hudaib,2006;Claessens, 2006; 
Grais& Pellegrini,2006; Baydoun et 
al., 2012; Al-Musalli& Ismail,2012.  
Corporate  
Governance  
Mechanisms   
To examine the difference 
between Islamic companies in 
the Gulf and non-Islamic 
companies in Western 
countries in terms of CG 
mechanisms in respect to 
cross-border M&A including 
disclosure and transparency, 
Board size and  
characteristics, ownership 
structure, dual chair and 
internal and external auditors.  
Ho& Williams, 2003; Abbott et al.,  
2003; Naser&Nuseibeh 2003; 
Aguilera & Dencker, 2004; 
Chahine,  
2007; Fan & Wong, 2005.  
Incorporating  
Islamic  
Principles in the  
Business  
To examines whether the 
adoption of Islamic principles 
of CG can restrict business  
expansion through 
international M&A  
Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Iqbal&  
Mirakhor,2004; Lewis,2005;  
Choudhury &Hoque, 2006; 
ElGamal, 2008; Safieddine,2009;  
Hasan,2009; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; 







To explore the variations in 
the culture which can be a 
deciding factor in the 
expansion of the businesses 
from the local border to the 
international borders. The 
country to country cultural 
variations would result in 
different business policies, 
leadership styles and 
management practices of the 
companies.  
Khanna et al.,2000; Zollo& Singh  
2004; Stahl & Voigt, 2008;  
Haniffa & Cooke,2002  
Licht et al., 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005.  
Sabi, 2015.  
  
Need for  
Shariah  
Compliance   
To explore the  
implementation of Shariah 
law in Islamic companies 
within the selected Gulf 
countries and the impact of 
different interpretation of 
Shariah by scholars. Also, to 
investigatethe status of the 
compliance and how likely 
they follow all the regulations 
set forth by the Qur’an, 
Sunnah and if not why they 
do not follow these rules in 
their line of business.  
Sundararajan & Errico, 2002; Sole,  
2007;  Hasan& Laws,  2007; 
Choudhury & Alam,2013;   
Paino et al., 2011; Khalid, 2013;  
Maswadeh, 2014; Derigs  
& Marzban, 2008; Rezaee, 2011.  
Islamic  
Corporate legal  
Structure  
To find out how the legal 
structure of the Islamic 
companies is influenced by 
the national legal system, 
which in case of Gulf  
Ararat & Ugur, 2003; Angell, 2006;  
Alkhamees, 2013; Grassa, 2013;  
Grassa & Matoussi, 2014; Bhatti &  
Bhatti, 2010.Elasrag,  
2014;Shafii & Salleh,  
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 countries is quite complicated 
as it reflects history, religion 
and traditions of each 
country. It also manifests the 
principles and codes the 
company is bound to follow 
in the conduct of their 
business.  
2010; Matoussi &Grassa, 2012.  
Islamic Financial 
instruments  
To find out the Islamic 
alternatives for the investors 
to either expand their 
businesses through the M&A 
or to start new business. How 
the Islamic financial 
instruments affect the 
business decisions, and the 
challenges they faced in the 
negotiations with their 
counterparts.  
Usmani, 2002; El-Gamal, 2000;  
Jaffer et al., 2012; Ayub, 2009;  
Saeed & Salah, 2014; Al-Amine,  
2008  
Ahmad et al., 2009; Msatfa, 2011  
  
  
3.8 Pilot Study Details  
The researcher conducted a pilot study in order to test effectiveness/feasibility of the 
data collection instruments before using them. This helped the researcher to identify 
areas for clarity and to minimise the misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the 
questions during the actual data collection process (Denscombe, 2010).   
  
According to Bryman (2008) it is always beneficial to conduct a pilot study before 
proceeding to the actual interview. After receiving responses, it is usually difficult to 
resend the questions to respondent or get them to clarify their response in case they do 
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not understand the question (Berg et al., 2004). In addition, because it comes at the 
early stage of the research to test the research objectives or interview questions, it might 
mislead the research if the respondents do not understand the question very well or do 
not have enough experience in the area. However, there are advantages attached to it, as 
it could provide prospective area of research on the chosen topic and help prevent 
deadlock/dead end research (Christensen et al., 2011). So, doing a pilot with similar 
population provided this researcher with opportunity to modify and change some 
questions before administering them during data collection. The possible rebuttal 
questions can also be found, and having these answers ready in hand, will show the 
researcher preparedness on this subject when the interviews are done with target people 
of the suggested firms. Pilot study helped the researcher to be prepared for the big day 
(Van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2002).    
  
Questions were discussed with the different categories of interviewees and their 
responses provided the researcher with an opportunity to practice, using it to spot any 
problems that emerged in potential interviews; which led to more sense of confidence. 
The researcher came up with the final interview questions based on the iterations 
through pilot study done in 2012. The key insights and feedback received from the pilot 
study helped the researcher to formulate the right interview question set for each 
category accordingly.  
  
In addition, it also helped the researcher to identify areas that respondents were not very 
comfortable with. During the pilot study, the researcher attended two conferences, one 
in Saudi Arabia (The Islamic finance news conference 12&13 November 2012), and the 
other in UAE (KPMG’S 2012 Masa tax conference 26th of November 2012). These two 
conferences witnessed a large convergence of industry personnel from different Gulf 
countries, sharing knowledge on Islamic CG and M&A and other financial updates on 
CG. The researcher noticed that a number of experts attended the conference and 
interviewed nine experts in total for the pilot study. The participants who voluntarily 




Table 3.3: Pilot Study Participants  
Participants ID  Position  
P1-UAE- Audit Firm.  Assistant Manager- Shariah Audit  
P2-SA- Audit Firm  Director, Zakat & Tax   
P3- SA- Audit Firm  Director, corporate Tax  
P3-SA- Islamic Research & Training  
Institute  
Research Assistant  
P4-SA- Audit Firm  Director, Zakat& Tax  
P5-UAE-Bank  Regional Head  
P6-Bahrain- Law Firm   Legal Advisor  
P7-SA- University  Scholar and Expert in Islamic Finance   
P8- Oman-University   Professor in Islamic Economics and  
Finance  
P9-KW- Investment Co  Vice Chairman   
  
    
  
At the conference location, quick interviews were conducted which included lawyers, 
academics and managers, some of the manager respondents indicated that there is little 
or no effect of Zakat on cross-border M&A. On the other hand, they added that there 
could be some issues which might not yet be in the limelight because cross-border deals 
have not yet been practiced there for a long time, implying that it is an emerging area, 
pointing out that Zakat is not a CG issue but a financial issue. Some lawyers said there 
could be issue but because of limited exposure and experience, they were still trying to 
learn from other developed countries. The academics agreed that it is an issue but no 
one has really researched into this area and the Islamic finance has not been built to this 
level because the Government did not build the financial institution and Islamic finance 
research institutions that could look at this area. The respondents’ views were taken into 





The outcome of the pilot study is that the variation in the interview questions for each 
category ensured that the research subjects were exposed to the right questions. The 
researcher considered the pilot study responses and made adjustments on the initial aim 
of this study, which was looking at the impact of Zakat (Islamic tax) as a part of Islamic 
principles on cross-border M&A. Zakat is an Islamic instrument of law, which is 
localized in Gulf countries, as such it could reduce the scope of this research since it 
would require much more extended study which might not be available in academic 
format, particularly when the Muslim world never thought of such policy-theoretic idea, 
except for banks to have collected and disbursed Zakat out of their Zakat fund. 
However, there are hardly any academic developments on Islamic CG and cross-border 
M&A.   
  
Formalizing such an interrelated study between Zakat and cross-border M&A in Gulf 
countries is an interesting project, however at this time only the theoretical part can be 
done, neither data can be found nor any programs in action that can be given academic 
attention, also, there are not enough evidence of failed transaction due to Zakat. 
Therefore, the research scope was broaden, finding out instruments of CG that plays 
important role in cross-border M&A to make a comprehensive study in Islamic finance. 
This process reduced the costs and time that could arise by identifying the issues that 
mitigated before the actual data collection.  
  
3.9 Interview Confidentiality  
With regard to collecting primary data, which was undertaken for this study, the access 
issues involved were whether the researcher will be permitted to carry out data 
collection in the selected target companies in which Shariah CG have taken place and 
whether the target participants will adhere to a focus interview with the researcher. The 




There is no compensation for the participants involved in the qualitative research. The 
responses of the research participants are the property of the researcher for a period of 
time, and henceforth the data will be public, and accessible to anyone. The responses of 
the research participants are used anonymously without any real names in the research 
for confidentially. Names of the participants were coded in order to maintain the 
anonymity of participants and make it difficult for anyone to identify them in the 
research data analysis part (Kaiser, 2009).  
  
With regards to the collection of secondary data, access issues are not much involved 
compared to primary data. However, since corporate documents on cross-border M&A 
and CG are needed, the researcher wrote a formal letter addressed to specific personnel 
concerned (i.e. Manager, Lawyer etc.), requesting for access to these documents. The 
participation of well-known industry experts in the qualitative research gave greater 
authenticity and credibility to the study (Bryman, 2012). All the confidential documents 
received from the participant were not shared with anyone without written permission 
from the participant for its use. No access issues are involved in collecting online 
sources, unless the data are available only upon purchase, of which the researcher may 
decide to find another similar source or purchase it online (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004).  
  
3.10 Interview Trustworthiness  
Qualitative research use key methods such as credibility and dependability to achieve 
the trustworthiness of interviews (Guba & Lincoln, 1995; Shenton, 2004; Graneheim & 
Lundman, 2004). Credibility is defined as the maintaining consistency of the 
participants’ perspectives during the interview process to achieve transparent outcomes 
(Morrow, 2005). Researcher’s understanding of the phenomena under investigation 
should be of interest from the participant’s perspective (Patton, 1999).  
  
Dependability is concerned with whether the findings are accurate and aligned with the 
research aims, the interviewees and readers. This can be achieved by avoiding any 
tendency or prejudice toward participants and equal and fair presentation of the aim of 
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the research to the interviewees (Golafshani, 2003). The researcher developed an early 
familiarity and understanding about the organisations under study before collecting data 
from participants to establish a relationship of trust between the parties (Silverman, 
2001). The researcher contacted the participants and they share some documents and 
sources before the interviews and they invited the researcher to conferences.  
  
  
This study ensured that the data collected are reliable and accurate as each participant 
was given opportunities to refuse not to provide data freely. In addition, credibility was 
achieved through further clarification and interpretation in the data analysis chapter 
when the responses remained vague. However, the researcher’s and the respondents’ 
interpretations were separated. The outcomes of the research have key insights 
highlighted from the experiences of participants and can be a trusted source of 
information. The researcher used the raw data from the interviews, which also became 
the researcher’s property for further analysis in the future.   
  
Furthermore, the participants’ background, qualifications and experience of the research 
topic are key factors that ensure reliability of the data collected (Shenton, 2004). The 
researcher proposes the use of triangulation that involves interviewing different people 
from different categories differently. This framework is used to shortlist the key 
behavior traits of three target groups towards the cross-border M&A and Islamic 
principles on these strategic relationships with non-Islamic countries, which are to be 
considered in order to understand the ways in which participants have to ensure an 
understanding of the problems (Johnson et al., 2007; Creswell et al., 2011).  
  
3.11 Data Analysis  
The analysis step is a continuous process of data collection; however, collecting data by 
itself will not achieve the research objectives without analysing and interpreting the 




Qualitative data analysis such as interviews analysis follows a step-by-step procedure 
that involves preparing data by going through the process of transcription and writing 
word by word of the recorded interviews (McLellan et al., 2003; Halcomb & Davidson, 
2006). Powell & Renner (2003) suggest three steps to qualitative data analysis. First, 
familiarization with data; second, generating initial codes, identify themes capturing 
codes, reviewing themes, category formation; third, establishing patterns and 
relationship between themes through formation of core categories for an overarching 
analysis. Similar suggestion also made by Attride-Stirling (2001) who outlined data 
reduction strategy for meaningful analysis. The procedure involved developing codes 
and themes from the empirical data which lead to constructing sub-categories and core 
categories in order to properly analyse data (Hair, 2007; Sekaran&Bougie, 2010).   
  
First stage of the process is reading and reviewing of the interview transcripts to group 
the content into codes and this can be focused on repeated words phrases, cases and 
concoction to gain evidence for the research question from literature review and 
interview transcripts (Bryman, 2008; Grbich, 2013). An example of the first order codes 
and related description of the code from the interview transcripts are shown in Table 3.4 
below. Second, from the codes, the researcher develops themes which consist of two or 
more codes and associated supporting texts (Welsh, 2002).  Thirdly, the sub categories 
were grouped into core categories for ultimate write up and analysis. This approach 
enabled the researcher to understand the findings from all three categories by mapping 
concepts and themes identified (Attride-Stirling, 2001; HesseBiber & Leavy, 2010).   
  
The codification process of themes and codes can be developed from the literature or 
can be generated from the data collected (Glaser, 1965; Saunders et al., 2007; Saldaña, 
2015). However, the researcher identified them iteratively between the literature and the 
data collected. The process of qualitative analysis in this study was done inductively as 
the researcher started with huge data collected (interviews) and from the content, the 
researcher determined any pattern (themes, concepts) by using emergent framework and 
then find relationships. This tactic was based on creating a table of themes and codes 




Table 3.4: Main Themes and Codes Transcription  
Themes  Codes  
Obstacles  Cultural differences  
  Control on decision making   
  Complex procedures & regulations  
  Lack of transparency   
  Quality of information  
  Conflict of interest  
Key Drivers  Large profits  
  Business opportunities and experience  
  Competition in home country  
  Economic boost of home country  
  Culture and values reinforcement  
  
  
NVivo has been designed to aid the analysis of huge-text used in qualitative research, as 
it allows deeper analysis and provides more developed tools to visualise data (Patton, 
2002; Gibbs, 2002).  
NVivo software thus was used in the process of constructing code, themes and 
categories (Strauss, 1987; Joffe& Yardley, 2004). NVivo used in coding, theory 
building, analysis of data which helped the understanding of the research problems 
(Denardo, 2002, Bazeley& Jackson, 2013). It allowed the researcher to replace ‘paper 
and pen’ technique by data management and analysis tool.  
  
  
NVivo was used in this study as it provides many advantages. First, it provides more 
flexibility in the ways in which to categorise rich-text data and improves the quality the 
generated results. Second, it helps to reduce the time and efforts that are used to analyse 
data manually. It also helps to identify trends and cross-examine information to 
discover the most important and relevant themes to the study to produce better 
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conclusion (Wong, 2008).  Furthermore, it has a capacity to analyse, classify and 
categorise massive data derived from interview transcripts, surveys, notes and published 
documents (Welsh, 2002).  Finally, it also helps to create stunning graphs and models to 
present the explored relationships between concepts (Bazeley & Jackson, 2007). Before 
using NVivo, the researcher participated in appropriate workshops and training courses 
to gain the required skills to use the software. This software has been selected because it 
enabled the researcher to control large amounts of data and to create model for themes 
and sub-themes (Gibbs, 2002).  
  
There are many approaches under qualitative research that can be adopted for analysing 
qualitative data. Some of these qualitative data analysis approaches include thematic 
analysis, content analysis, framework analysis, grounded theory analysis and thematic 
discourse analysis (Saunders et al., 2007; Bell & Bryman, 2007; Sekaran & Bougie, 
2010).  
  
The transcribed data were analysed using thematic analysis. According to Smith & Firth 
(2011), thematic analysis is generally adopted in circumstances where the research 
plans to determine themes from the data that has been collected. These themes primarily 
refer to blueprint of data that outlines a phenomenon that is related to the research 
question. Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) specified grounded theory as an approach in 
which the research is highly flexible and research design is moulded in accordance to 
collected data and continuing analysis of data.  They also outlined framework analysis 
as an approach in which the researcher resorts to an extremely focused strategy to 
determine the blueprint of data. Such research analysis is generally commissioned. 
According to Krippendorff (2012) Content analysis approach is primarily adopted in 
circumstances where the research seeks to compare and contrast answers from 
respondents in order to meet research objectives.   
  
However, thematic analysis was chosen for the analysis of the data gathered as a way to 
aid the understanding of the context of the data, and draw out inter links between data 
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from a number of sources to discover in-depth meaning of the participants (Bennett & 
Elman, 2006; Ritchie et al., 2013). This is in particular needed in order to ensure that 
the data analysis can be improved over time (King et al., 2004). Further, this approach 
provides an opportunity to interpret themes from data which other approaches fail to do. 
In addition, it provides researchers with greater flexibility and provides options to 
enlarge the scope of study of individuals’ understanding (Smith & Firth, 2011).  The 
researcher used the label thematic analysis that follows a process sequentially used in 
qualitative research, to gather insights on the research interview data or focus group 
sessions (Tesch, 2013).  
The use of NVivo software in the analysis generated sub-themes and main themes which 
were used for the analysis of the interview data in well- organise manner. Overall, seven 
core themes and 23 sub-themes were identified through the process of coding and 
thematising as shown in Figure 3.1 below. Example of core themes included ‘corporate 
governance mechanism’ with sub-themes ‘board size and characteristics, disclosure and 
transparency and ensuring Shariah compliance and transparency’. Detailed analysis and 
interpretation of the core themes and sub-themes are presented in Chapter Four. 
 












However, thematic analysis has a few limitations. By using thematic analysis, the 
research undertaking research in higher phases becomes difficult as it provides high 
degree of flexibility. Further, it restricts power of elucidation of the researcher, thus 
having adverse impact on research analysis and findings (Joffe & Yardley, 2004).   
  
3.12 Ethical Considerations  
Cohen et al. (2013) stated that appropriateness of topic, methods, design, 
confidentiality, examination and distribution of findings should be discussed with 
relative sincerity, sensitivity, integrity, precision and impartiality in order to improve 
the ethical approach of research. It is important for a researcher to consider the 
following areas: any potential harm to participants; any lack of consent; any invasion of 




important to ascertain that any research work has been undertaken within the confines 
of the rules and regulations guiding research activities in any given environment.  
  
In order to ensure the authenticity and ethical consideration of the research participants, 
the researcher interviewed only people who are above eighteen years of age, and have 
the ability to express their thoughts as guaranteed by the prevailing laws. Also, because 
this study was closely related to religious practices, sufficient caution was applied in 
conducting interviews in order not to hurt the interviewers’ sentiments about their 
religious beliefs. To ensure consent to participation prior permission was sought from 
the participants. Furthermore, the researcher obtained permission to record the 
interviews from the different participants to avoid a betrayal of trust, so only recorded 
after due permission was secured from participants. No real names and only codes are 
used in this research; this ensured confidentiality of the research participants. Moreover, 
the researcher abided by the rules governing research within DMU.  
  
  
3.13 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presented and justified systematically the research methodology used in 
conducting this study. The ‘Research Onion’ of Saunders et al. (2007) was used as a 
guide to structure the presentation but more importantly several relevant and credible 
sources were used to justify the chosen research methods and research design. Given 
the research purpose and research objectives, an interpretivist research philosophy and 
an inductive approach informed this research.  Empirical data was collected from the 
multiple case studies comprising nine banks and six insurance companies in the three 
Gulf countries and semi-structured interviews with 40 respondents to address the 
research question regarding the influence of the Shariah principles on cross-border 
M&A. The data was analysed using NVivo software following thematic analysis 
procedure.  All the research ethical considerations were observed.  The next chapter 





CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
  
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the results and analysis of qualitative data gathered through semi-
structured interviews.  The results and analysis are presented in such a way as they 
enable to answer the research questions. The thematic data analysis produced seven 
core themes anchored by both the empirical data and the reviewed literatures and the 
chapter is organised accordingly. Following this introduction, results on corporate 
governance is presented. This is followed by corporate governance mechanisms in 
section three. Section four and five present findings regarding incorporating Islamic 
principles in the business and cultural influences, respectively.  Results on need for 
Shariah compliance, Islamic corporate legal structure and Islamic financial instruments 




4.2 Corporate Governance   
 One of the key themes emerged from the data analysis was corporate governance. This 
core theme is captured by the sub-themes including the adoption of CG models, code of 
practice, awareness of CG principles, and applicability of conventional model. This 
section analyses similarities and differences in the perspectives of respondents regarding 






4.2.1 The Adoption of CG Model 
The concept of CG has been elaborated in these themes with respect to emphasis on the 
similarities and differences between the conventional and Islamic CG. This sub-theme 
emerged from the qualitative analysis of managers’ responses to interview question 11, 
from appendix 3 and questions 4, 5, and 8 from appendix 5. This study provides 
information on the adoption of CG code of practice in various Islamic companies, 
especially in banking and insurance sectors. The CG of non-Islamic companies in terms 
of CG does not have many differences with the Islamic CG. One of the respondents 
from insurance sector reported that:  
  
“CG concept is not a totally new concept in my opinion, most of the rules 
and regulations we used to operate our business in SA followed the Anglo-
American model of CG both the Islamic and non-Islamic companies, 
however, the Islamic companies ensure that the Islamic principles are 
enshrined in the model. The introduction of the CG code in Saudi 
companies have even led to Islamic scholars discussing about the 
adjustment or modification in the Anglo-American model whether it is in 
line with Islamic principles or not”. [P1-Ins-SA]  
  
The common consensus among the many respondents is that in all the   three selected 
Gulf countries, are willing to adopt any model of CG as long as they can make 
adjustments. Evidence shows that the SA company act was derived mainly from British 
company Act (Hussainey& Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Matari et al., 2012) with implications 
for nature of the CG being adopted.  As discussed in the literature review, the Anglo-
Saxon model has its origin in the UK, US, Canada, Australia and many countries have 
adopted the model (Davis, 2002; Garcia‐Meca& Sanchez‐Ballesta, 2009). This suggests 
that the conventional CG have relevant principles such as accountability, transparency, 
responsibility that support the successful implementation and sustainability of CG 
(Abdul-Rahman &Bukair, 2013).  The implication is that the three selected Gulf 
countries are likely to adopt the conventional CG as principles are to a greater extent 
similar to Islamic principles. Furthermore, the Gulf companies have no CG index model 
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in the whole region (AL-Malkawi et al., 2014). Also many researchers have emphasised 
the need of operating Shariah principles in Islamic companies as Hasan (2011, p.1) 
noted “Shariah governance is peculiarly exclusive and unique to the Islamic system of 
financial management while affirming the need for a sound and efficient Shariah 
governance system as a crucial portion of CG in Islamic financial institution”. This 
indicates that the Islamic companies will be enshrined Islamic principles in 
conventional CG models.  
  
 Despite the similarities of the practices of the conventional and the Islamic CG, 
however, there are contextual differences such as social norms and religion, which may 
have some negative impacts on the selected Gulf countries CG practices that may lead 
to ineffectiveness of CG code of practice (ROSC, 2009; Baydoun et al., 2012). This 
could suggest why the three selected countries are willing to make an adjustment in any 
CG model, as they recognised that the conventional CG code principles are not 
informed by the Islamic principles. This indicates that one of the main objectives of the 
Islamic countries and companies is to examine the differences that are hidden or 
noticeable in the conventional model and propose for an adjustment. They may affect 
the way non-Islamic companies’ deals with Islamic companies in the cross-border 
M&A. However, from the learning theory perspective, firms that interact or enter into 
business activities in foreign markets, can improve on new learning skills, which is a 
strong capability that can improve the ability of company innovation, take risk and 
develop multiple sources of income (Zahra et al., 2002) This could suggest what there 
should be some sort of flexibility in the adoption of CG models.  
  
In the three selected Gulf countries, the adoption of any CG model is based on the 
extent to which it enshrines Shariah principles due to the strong belief in the Islamic 
way of life but also due to benefits that will come from morally sound corporate and 
social practices. However, dealing with the cross-border M&A, this may pose a serious 





4.2.2 Code of Practice  
This section provides information on code of practices of Islamic CG by Islamic 
financial companies. The researcher asked the existence of written Islamic CG rules and 
regulations (Interview question 16, Appendix 3). The consistent response from the many 
interviewees is that the non-existence of written Islamic rules and regulation on Islamic 
CG. So, the code of conduct of Islamic companies is influenced rather by the cultural 
and religious considerations which emphasise philanthropic approach, the well-being of 
community, the distribution of the wealth through charity and other humanistic actions. 
For example, one respondent from the banking sector in SA reported that:  
“There are no written codes of Islamic CG; it is mostly derived from the 
fundamental principles of the Islamic business laws described by the scholars on 
how to run their business within Islamic boundaries. The advent of conventional 
CG, shared so many similarities with Islamic business principle such as 
philanthropic approach, the well-being of community, the distribution of the 
wealth through charity and other humanistic actions”. [P3-B-SA]  
  
This indicates that there is no written Islamic rules and regulation as regards to CG; 
everything is evaluated based on Islamic principles. This observation accords with that 
of  Badah (2014), who noted that there is lack of unified and well-structured CG 
guiding principles for Islamic financial institutions in the Gulf region. A survey on 
Shariah governance practices in Malaysia, Gulf countries and the UK shows that most 
of the Gulf countries are not even aware of the existence of the exposure draft of 
Islamic Financial Services Board guiding principles which is based in Kuala Lumpur, 
on Shariah governance system (Hasan, 2011). The author also noted that Gulf countries 
prefer less regulatory interference on the market. This could suggest why the selected 




Despite there are no written code of practices by the Islamic companies in the selected 
Gulf countries, their practices clearly show features of Islamic principles, as the Islamic 
Shariah provides a common starting point for code of conduct, to reflect the cultural 
and religious characteristics of the region (Islam& Hussain, 2003). The Islamic 
practices of Islamic CG have shown much similarity with the conventional CG such as 
accountability, honesty (Mollah & Zaman, 2015). However, there are also an indication 
of differences emphasise by researchers. For example, the Shariah governance structure 
differs from the conventional CG such that in Shariah the accountability is not only to 
stakeholders but also to God “Allah” (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Widiyanti et al., 2011). 
Also the proliferation of the business within the community needs to be based on the 
criteria of the amount of the benefits taken by the local and international community. 
Islam does not permit the expansion of business activities solely for the benefit of 
individuals, but it considers the benefit of the whole community.  Hence, Islamic 
financial institutions do not support any type of business exploitation that is unfair to 
the people or damage the environment. They are required to deal with the society and 
the environment justly with their stakeholders.  
  
4.2.3 The Degree of Awareness of CG Principles  
One of the research questions was to understand to what extent the Islamic financial 
institutions are aware of, and adopt, CG principles. The empirical finding from 
interview questions 6 and 26 from appendix 5 showed inadequate level of awareness 
and adoption of CG principles with some level of variations across the three countries.  
The interviews analysis showed how the employee of Islamic banking and insurance 
companies are aware of the practice of CG in the three selected Gulf countries. It also 
emphasises whether the CEO’s and managers commit to the code of conduct or they do 
to create awareness to the employees. Respondent in SA reported that:  
“Most of the Saudi Companies believe that they are doing quite well in 
terms of implementing the modified versions of codes of CG, but still they 
need more regulations. In fact, some people do not understand the CG 
concept and there is no any known effort or initiative from the  




Also, in contrast to respondents from SA, the respondents from Kuwait showed 
unawareness to the concept of the CG and its code of conduct in Kuwait companies. 
One of the experts from Kuwait was of the view:  
  
“The concept of the CG in the Kuwaiti Islamic companies is new, and 
most of the people working in the industry are not aware of the concept of 
CG. The latest I can remember, the concept has been talked about from 
2012-2013, which means we are not fully aware either Islamic or 
conventional CG”. [P1-Ins-KW]  
  
Another respondent showed the agreement with the view of the above respondent by 
commenting that:  
“As far as the practice and implementation of the code of practices 
derived from international CG is concerned, I will rate the Kuwaiti 
companies the lowest ranked companies among the list of companies 
doing business in the Gulf countries. The debate about the conventional or 
Islamic CG did not attract the attention of the business people working in  
 Kuwait”. [P10-B-KW]    
  
The above comments suggest that most companies are aware of the practice of CG in 
SA and Kuwait but suggest that most of the employees are not fully aware of the 
concept of CG. This finding is similar to DCCI (2006, p.10), which stated that 
“awareness of corporate responsibility at management levels is high […] however; it 
becomes increasingly apparent that companies are saying one thing and doing another”. 
This shows that Islamic companies in SA do not fully understand the concept of CG and 
how it impacts on their organisation performances. For example, Baydoun et al. (2012) 
stressed there is need for the Gulf countries to access the international capital to fund 
growth among the region with the aim of becoming the financial and regional 
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development centre and as a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which 
will lead the local regulatory agencies to collaborate with international agencies to 
consequently design new regulatory schemes to improve on CG. In order to fully 
understand the concept of CG and for its application, there is a need to upskill 
employees through regular training.    
  
The unawareness of the SA companies' employees may have negative impact on the 
companies. This is an indication that it is unclear what policy Government has on 
ground to enforce organisations to create awareness due to enormous benefit that 
effective CG has. The problems in creating awareness among their employees about the 
importance of CG could be due to the poor rules and regulations. In comparative survey 
of CG in the Gulf countries, Hirst (2010) pointed out that the weakness in the law 
system among the various companies in the Gulf countries need to be addressed if the 
countries want to become major player in the Middle East and the world.  In practice, 
some Gulf countries have started integrating into the world economic through trade and 
M&A, thus leading to change in companies’ structures and conception. For example, 
some companies in UAE have engaged in one form of economic or business activities 
with the global organisations.  
  
A respondent from UAE banking sector was of the view:  
“There is a growing awareness of corporate governance in the UAE and 
many companies take it as a periodic appraisal exercise to improve their 
corporate governance practices”. [P2-B-UAE]  
  
However, it is not clear why the UAE CG framework is not better off compared to SA 
or Kuwait which have lesser business interactions with the global economy (Saidi & 
Kumar, 2008). Consequently, based on the CG measurement scale among the Gulf 
countries, Baydoun et al. (2012) emphasised that in some aspects Kuwait and SA are 
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better than UAE such as transparency and internal process, while in some aspect UAE 
is better than Kuwait or SA such as in shareholders right and obligations.  
However, from the analyses it was found that the selected countries of the Gulf are not 
aware of either the conventional or Islamic CG. This unawareness could have a 
negative effect on the Islamic companies and it could be caused by lack of professional 
training, lack of commitment by the Government and adequate payment of sufficiently 
qualified staff (Al-Shammari, 2008).  For cross-border M&A this is a very important 
element for successful engagement with the global economy. However, there are 
indications that some countries in the Gulf region such as UAE have started merging 
and acquiring companies. This is an indication that there is possible cross-border M&A 
between the Islamic companies in the Gulf and non-Islamic companies in the West. To 
be fully integrated there is need for general awareness and training to understand the 
importance of CG for easier integration with non-Islamic companies.   
  
  
4.2.4 Applicability of Conventional CG Model  
This section explains the aspect of the conventional code of practices, which are of 
greater concern to the Islamic companies. Majority of respondents to interview question 
5 from appendix 5, believed that the conventional CG code of practices require some 
modifications to be sensitive to Gulf countries cultural values and Islamic religion. They 
argued that conventional CG principles should be evaluated on the Islamic Shariah 
principles and culture and this may pose challenges in cross-border M& A activities. 
Such views were, for example, expressed by many respondents from the UAE’s banking 
sector.   
“The CG models adopt by the Western countries and the USA cannot be 
applied directly to the companies working in the UAE. This is due to the 
fact that these models do not take into account the geographical and 
demographic features including the culture and religion practiced by the 




Another respondent from insurance sector seems to support the above-mentioned views: 
“I think that there is a real need of improvement in the structure of codes of the 
practices adopted by the companies running their businesses in the UAE. The practice 
of good CG cannot be implemented by the UAE based companies with making good 
allowances for the codes of practice provided the religion and culture of this region. 
With these modifications and inclusion of key codes of practice from the conventional 
CG, the Islamic CG can be fully complied with the regional and international 
standards”. [P3-Ins-UAE]  
  
Moreover, one of the experts from the UAE viewed the level of implementation of the 
good CG as:  
“I believe that good CG practices are aligned with the most of the 
regulations from internationally applied conventional CG practices; the 
establishment of the CG is very well rooted in the culture of the companies 
in the UAE. However, the new Government regulations are being 
introduced to introduce the good religious and culture practices of the 
UAE to give more stability and soundness to practices in the UAE-based 
companies”. [P10-Ins-UAE]  
  
The comments suggest that Islamic companies are willing to adopt conventional CG 
code of practice but it will be evaluated based on Islamic fundamental principles and 
culture. The modification is not to sub-standardise the conventional CG but to adjust it 
so it accommodates the Islamic companies. Similar to this view, Black et al. (2010) 
emphasised that there is preconceived assumption that “one size fits all” which implies 
that fair Government practices are universal and any company in any country of the 
world should be able to apply it. However, Bhatti & Bhatti (2010) saw the need for the 
Islamic companies to benefit from the advantages brought by the conventional CG, and 
proposed an Islamic CG that will fit the OECD principles but highlighted some issues 
of Shariah compliance. This suggests that universal standards should be designed to 
allow some degree of flexibility and still capture the core values of CG. This is similar 
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to Davies & Schlitzer (2008) in his work showed some highlights on structure of CG, 
legal frameworks and financial systems as the major causes of the different adjustment 
or modification of the universal principles of CG of countries and companies. They also 
pointed out the conception of the “one size fit all” is not suitable for the international 
design of CG.  
  
Furthermore, trust and honesty are key elements that influences governance framework 
of any nation or organisation (OECD, 1999). Religious and cultural features of the 
societies may influence these elements. These characteristics are main practices in the 
Islamic society such as in Gulf countries where they are perceived as the promoters of 
Islamic religion (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). This could be the reason why the respondents 
were concerned about their religious and cultural aspect of the conventional CG. As 
Islam & Hussain (2003) emphasised that in the Gulf countries, the Shariah is used as 
the main starting point of any code of conduct, to reflect on the belief and moral 
standards that is in line with the cultural and religious features of their countries. These 
are due to some identifiable differences such as the conventional moral standards with 
the Islamic moral standards such that every Islamic believer must conform to Islamic 
law and observe ethical standards derived from Islamic sources Qur’an and Sunnah 
(Lewis, 2005).   
  
For example, various principles of good governance and best practices code of conduct 
had been seen as only to maximise profit, economic efficiency and fair dealings but are 
also about endeavouring to direct management and control companies to adhere to 
moral standards acceptable to a society (Gooden, 2001). Despite the best practices of 
code of CG, it seems to be difficult for the Islamic countries to adopt it because the 
Western foundation is predominately derived from socially “secular humanist” values 
rather than deriving it from the religion perspectives (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Again, 
the Western culture beliefs and values are strongly rooted in self-interest rather than 
taking wider society interest, even if modified and, finally, in the Western culture the 
main theoretical framework is based on agency theory rather than stewardship in the 




Therefore, from the analysis it was found that the selected Gulf countries could not 
adopt any conventional code of practice without evaluating it on the Islamic Shariah 
principles and culture. For, cross-border M&A, this may pose serious disagreement 
between the CG of non-Islamic and the Islamic companies such as the introduction of 
Riba by the Islamic companies based on their fundamental principles (Iqbal & 
Mirakhor, 2011). For example, the blue chip companies in the West may find it very 
challenging to start building the CG belief and value to adapt to the Islamic principles. 
However, they can easily modify their CG code of practice than the Islamic companies 
that tend to be rigid in their implementation. Also, it is nearly impossible for the Islamic 
companies to adopt conventional CG without consideration of their Islamic principles 
and culture.   
  
4.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
  
4.3.1 Disclosure and Transparency  
This section provides an insight into what kind of information the listed and quoted 
Islamic companies are likely to disclose to the public in the selected countries’ stock 
market (see question 12 and 17, appendix 3 and 12 and 27, appendix 5).  The existing 
literature suggest that disclosure and transparency are key aspects of CG which need to 
be implemented to enable successful cross-border M&A with non-Islamic companies. 
The analysis of interviews of this study showed differences in the degree of 
implementation across the sectors and the countries. Most respondents from the Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait thought that the disclosure and transparency in reporting is higher in 
banks than in  insurance companies and that the enforcement mechanisms was weak. In 
comparison, firms in UAE experienced better level of disclosure and transparency due 
to international involvement and this was considered as conducive for cross-border 
M&A activities. Extant literature emphasise the importance of level of agreement 
between the two companies relating to the composition of BOD and financial reporting 
can determine the success or failure of the cross-border M&A  on the issues of  






It is found that the financial reporting and disclosure of related information is quite 
similar between conventional and Islamic principles. Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) supported 
the view by comparing the OECD principle with the Islamic principles, and found that 
both are compatible in terms of disclosure and transparency. Also, Koldertsova (2011) 
report on corporate governance frameworks in Middle East and North African 
suggested that they adopted the OECD principles but were not fully in compliance. 
However, the study found that it is expected of the Islamic companies to disclose all 
their financial information to the public based on Shariah interpretation but in reality, 
there is a degree of reluctance, possibly due to some bad practices. For example, one of 
the respondents from Saudi insurance sector has commented that:  
  
“Islamic firms are obliged to disclose fairly not only about the financial 
conditions but also about management of trust money, this goes beyond 
the disclosure to participation of stakeholders effective control”. [P5-
InsSA]  
  
Also, some of the respondents emphasised that there are degrees of disclosure and 
transparency among various sectors. For example, some of the respondents reported that 
the disclosure level of banks in Saudi is higher than the insurance sector, however in 
case of Zakat the (Islamic tax), both sectors had weaknesses. Some of the insurance 
sector decisions about determining and paying accurate Zakat, were not made clear and 
fully disclosed to the stakeholders. Similarly, there was inadequate compliance of 
banking sector with the transparency policy, as stated by a respondent:  
  
“Islamic Banks in SA have much more common with conventional sector, 
as the CG structure is quite similar; for example, they disclose 
information regarding debtors and CG to the stakeholders. However, it 
does not follow the full disclosure policy regarding the ethical 
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responsibilities and achievements of goals relating to the betterment of 
society. Although they have higher level of disclosure than insurance 
sector, the features of Islamic banks in SA are not compatible to the spirit 
of Islamic companies. They disclose very little information about Zakat”. 
[P9-B-SA]  
  
Another expert from Kuwait suggested that the inadequate disclosure could be due to 
insufficient knowledge within the Islamic banks and this can hinder achievement of the 
corporate objective of full disclosure and transparency. He said:  
  
Shariah based organisations have obligation to disclose information on 
Zakat and transactions involving interest “Riba”; and this can be better 
done by employing the highly qualified and experienced SSB. [P4-B-KW]  
  
These suggest that there is no clear code of practice in the selected Gulf countries. This 
can be linked to bad practices and the reluctance to disclose information. This 
reluctance could also be linked to culture. Piesse et al. (2012) noted that in Arab 
countries, their culture refrain them from boasting about their wealth, so both private 
and listed companies do not wish to publish their financial data and preferred not to 
comply with disclosure and transparency rules. They also emphasised that despite the 
requirement in most Arab countries for disclosure of their financial information, most of 
the companies are reluctant to do so, especially as there was no punishment linked to 
such violation. Furthermore, it was emphasised by Hassan (2011) that the Shariah 
governance practices in Islamic financial institutions were not fully transparent in their 
activities and were not granting easy access to the documents of the Shariah Boards.  
  
The degree of disclosure could also be linked to the requirements of Islamic principles 
on the banking sectors, leading to the inclusion of Zakat on their balance sheet and the 
necessity of establishing the Islamic Shariah Board, thus adding more structure to the 
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companies (Alnasser & Muhammed, 2012). Accountability in the Islamic world is two 
dimensional, one that emphasises corporate accountability to the stakeholders and the 
other that emphasises individual accountability to Allah, creating dual perspectives, 
which leads to discrepancies in disclosure (Maali et al., 2006). Furthermore, it is in the 
Islamic principle for all Muslim to pay Zakat as a religious obligation; however, there 
the requirement for disclosure is unclear (Abdul Rahman & Bukair, 2013). 
Furthermore, it was suggested that education plays an important role in the level of 
disclosure and transparency. It was found that the variation in the degree of disclosure 
was as a result of low education and under-developed conception of CG practices 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).   
Furthermore, the companies in the UAE viewed the disclosure and transparency as very 
important to carry out the M&A activities. The experts participating in the study viewed 
the M&A as an instrument to achieve higher level of transparency. For example, one 
expert from UAE banking sector gave his views:  
  
“I have observed that banks have cross-border subsidiaries to which they 
disclose greater level of information because they are in international 
environment, and this requires them to do so in compliance with 
regulations”. [P8-B-UAE]  
  
This shows that Islamic financial institutions do allow disclosure of information to the 
stakeholder like the conventional ones. Nevertheless, the Islamic financial institutions 
do not fully comply with the business code of conduct either approved by Islamic or 
conventional CG. This issue may put hurdles in the way of cross-border M&A as the 
foreign companies operating in conventional sectors intend to reveal the information to 
stakeholders regarding every aspect of the company’s operations. Also, since it is 
required by Shariah principles to pay Zakat; establish Shariah Board and not engage in 
any conventional practices that require paying or receiving interest, these may hinder 




4.3.2 Board Size and Characteristics  
This section provides, based on the responses to questions 8, 22, 23, 28 (Appendix 5), 
provides analysis on the board size and its characteristics. The results show the 
existence of  various Boards’ composition and the members that form the various 
Boards. It also explains how this composition and members of the Board may influence  
the success of cross-border M&A. It was found that two Boards (SSB and BOD) exist 
among Islamic companies compared to non-Islamic companies, and it is solely in the 
hand of the managers to appoint the members of SSB. Also, the BOD in Saudi 
companies is usually small in size. One of the respondents expressed his view:   
  
“In a society like SA, we have small size of BOD due to the relationships 
between families. Many members of the family are serving in the Board or 
are in the sub-committees of the Board, which is mostly due to the fact that 
the families own the various companies, and they do not want to disclose 
much information to the external agents”. [P2-Ins-SA]  
  
The respondents also stated that the BOD in SA has some weaknesses due to lack of 
business competencies and experience:  
“The BOD normally comes from family lineage apart from the level of 
their experience, background and required competencies to run the 
business. This indicates that members of Board are without the proper 
qualification, experience, business knowledge and background. It is good 
to have large Board of directors with mix of experience and 
qualification”. [P4-B-SA]  
  
The above accounts are in accord with Hawkamah (2006) finding which  reported that 
in Gulf countries, private companies are preserved  by controlling families, which 
appoint members of the family or friends to serve as independent directors, thus 
creating room for conflict of interest. Even in the state own companies they include 
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senior Government officials as Board members which is in line with Al-Hassan et al. 
(2010), which emphasised that total family ownership is a unique feature of Gulf 
financial institutions. It is noted that only family member based BOD structure suffers 
from significant drawbacks arising from possible mismanagement (Saleh et al., 2009), 
as the composition of the Board would require an acceptable degree of experience and 
appropriate education, which may affect the decision-making and be detrimental to the 
cross-border M&A for the Saudi companies. Also resource dependency theory suggests 
that larger Boards are more likely to pool various experts with diverse industrial 
experience and educational backgrounds that provide better skills set required by the 
Boards to have better informed capabilities (Al-Musalli& Ismail, 2012), thus, mitigating 
individual deficiencies in business skills through their collective decision-making to 
improve the quality of strategic decision and planning (Abeyseker, 2010).  
  
In the context of the UAE companies, the BOD is much more sophisticated and 
involved various experienced members. The members of their BOD come from various 
background and foreign nationalities. This means that they can provide more experience 
and knowledge for performing cross-border M&A effectively. This view is similar to 
Weir et al. (2002), noted that the Board size and composition have an influence on the 
firm and its financial performance. This is in line with Abeyseker (2010) comment 
above. For example, the view of one of the respondents in the context of composition of 
BOD:  
“The UAE has a more open environment in contrast to SA, which is more 
conservative. The composition of the BOD involves foreign experts, 
women, educated and experienced members in order to make sure that 
BOD is rich with various people who can contribute positively towards 
expanding the boundaries of the business”. [P6-B-UAE]  
  
This indicates that BOD in companies from the UAE also involves women, which are 
rare in Saudi environment. This also indicates how flexible and open BOD composition 
and has better integration with various ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, they can have 
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a beneficial mixture and gain from their experiences, which can provide the edge for 
expansion and making the deals with foreign companies in insurance and banking 
sector. In addition, the BOD reveals a greater deal of information to the external parties’ 
relating their responsibilities towards the shareholders of the company, which can be a 
contributor to make the cross-border M&A effectively compared to the Saudi 
companies. The participants viewed that open environment in the Gulf countries can 
overall increase the efficiencies of the local companies to fulfil their ambitions of 
business expansion. One of the respondents from Kuwait was of the view that:   
  
“BOD members in Kuwait are not independent and are influenced by the 
management or a controlling shareholder. Most of them are qualified and 
experts to work in Kuwait or within the Gulf region, however, they are yet to 
be efficient enough to cross-border”. [P8-Ins-KW]  
  
The Board size and family ownership likely affect the ability for the Board members to 
control and influence all transaction of the Islamic financial institution and to ensure 
their operations are in compliance with the rules and principles of Shariah. However it 
may be a concern for cross-border M&A from non-Islamic companies in terms of the 
controlling structure and may generate conflict of interest.  
 In summary, the analysis of the empirical data showed the existence of dual BOD 
structure (SSB and BOD) in Islamic companies and that company managers have a great 
latitude in appointing the SSB. In addition, the majority of the respondent perceived the 
difference in composition and the functioning of the two boards between Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, and UAE. They analysis showed that family control and family 
membership, without having relevant business competence and experience, dominate 
the structure of the boards in SA and Kuwait whilst boards in the UAE tend to be of a 
large size and constitute diverse board members with appropriate experience, 
knowledge. In latter, case women also are represented in the Board which is a rare 
phenomenon.  This analysis in part addressed the research question relating to the CG 




4.2.3 Ensuring Compliance and Transparency  
This section, explores the roles played by the independent external auditor on how they 
contribute or influence the financial reporting process of Islamic companies, and how 
this influence  cross-border M&A. The analysis in this section is heavily drawn from 
the responses to interview questions 7 and 15 (Appendix 4 and question 16 (Appendix 
5). 
  Most of the previous literature has not assessed and identified the key role the external 
auditors play in the Gulf countries. However, the work of Safieddine (2009) emphasised 
that the independence of external auditors play an important role in the disclosure and 
transparency of financial reporting and it is associated with the decrease in financial 
fraud. This study found that there are two different types of independent external 
auditors (Shariah external auditor and conventional external auditor). UAE has both but 
the Shariah independent external auditor does not exist in SA and Kuwait and this has a 
negative impact in term of level of disclosure and transparency. Even in case of UAE, 
the involvement of the independent Shariah external auditors is quite recent and the 
evolution of practice is still to achieve a standard comparable to Malaysia. In SA and 
Kuwait there are shortcomings identified in the conventional external auditing, such as:  
“Poor communication between the audit committee and external auditors, 
moreover, the external auditors are constrained in reporting independently 
and they have to do so in conjunction with internal auditors”. [P7-B-SA]  
  
This highlights a potential conflict of interest between the external and the internal 
auditors in terms of decision-making process, especially in how Zakat is calculated so 
that the company can get away by paying a lower amount of Zakat. It also indicates that 
the internal auditors may be influenced by management in terms of procedures and 
principles of best practices and in turn they influence the external auditors. The 
problem, in many cases, arises from inadequately trained and professionally well 
qualified internal auditors. This has been observed by Al-Shammari et al. (2008), who 
noted that no company among the Gulf countries achieved full compliance with the 
international accounting standards or disclosure requirement due to lack of professional 
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training and unattractive salary for most qualified people, and lack of appropriate 
compliance standards for Islamic companies.   
  
Baydoun et al. (2012) further noted that in Gulf countries, external auditors are 
ineffective because they are poorly informed on companies’ matters as companies will 
say one thing and do another thing. Hussain et al. (2002) emphasised that in Gulf 
countries, some practices do not match with their social-cultural and religion norms in 
respect of the Islamic financial accounting best practices. The situation is further 
compounded by lack of confidence in terms of practices by the conventional external 
audit and lack of competition as reported by one respondent:   
  
“In my view, problem we are facing in SA is that there is a lack of 
confidence in the performance of Saudi Audit firms. In addition, the 
monopoly of audit services by some audit firms is another issue affecting 
the performance of external auditors”. [P8-B-SA]  
  
Similar views were expressed by the Kuwaiti respondents from banking sector, as 
exemplified by one expert:  
    
“Many Shariah Board members and Shariah auditors are not involved in 
financial details, as they believe that they don’t contradict Shariah 
guidelines. This is mainly because of lack of financial, accounting and 
economic background. There are no independent Shariah external 
auditors involved in the financial reporting”. [P6-B-KW]  
  
However, the banking and insurance sectors in the UAE are more organised in terms of 
functioning and independence of external auditors. One expert from the banking sector 




“In the UAE we have the qualified and experienced external auditors and 
rotate them regularly to ensure the required level of disclosure and 
transparency in reporting system. We are in the process of improving our 
decisions relating to the selection of the most appropriate external 
auditors based on the international criteria to attract the investors”. 
[P9B-UAE]  
  
This highlights the higher level of alignment of Islamic business principles with the 
international standards of CG, which gives the Islamic banks and insurance companies a 
better chance to make cross-border M&A with the foreign companies.  
  
The preceding discussion highlights the need for external Shariah audit to ensure better 
compliance with Shariah principles and along with the conventional external audit, 
provide a harmonisation of Shariah principles with the international standards of CG. 
There is need for continuous improvement in implementation of CG in Gulf countries to 
create more favourable business opportunities for merging with and acquiring non-
Islamic companies (Othman & Ameer, 2015). Al-Shammari et al. (2008) noted that 
improvement in international accounting standards in the Gulf region will facilitate the 
process of attracting international investors.   
 This study found the existence of two different types of independent external auditors 
(Shariah external auditor and conventional external auditor) but these do not appear to 
be uniform across the countries.  The analysis of the interviews suggested that many 
respondents thought that UAE   performs better in having both kinds of independent 
external auditors but less so in both the Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and these would have 
negative influence when seeking cross-border M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic 
companies. Factors such inadequate professional training, less availability of qualified 
auditors, lack of organisational incentives for qualified personnel and lack of appropriate 
compliance standards for Islamic companies explain the less robustness of Shariah 
compliance mechanism in these countries. The three issues (disclosure and transparency, 
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board size, and compliance with the Shariah) discussed in this section addressed the 
research objective relating to the CG mechanism and the extent to which firms comply 
with the CG Shariah principles. 
4.4 Incorporating Islamic Principles (Shariah law) in the Business  
  
4.4.1 A scope of International M&A  
The finding of this sub-theme is based on the responses to (question 9, appendix 3), 
(questions 18 and 19, appendix 5). An overwhelming majority of the respondents 
believed that implementation of Shariah informed code of practices does not constrain 
on the cross-border M&A if the salient values of Shariah principles such as fairness, 
social responsibility, honest and promoting ethical businesses are observed. Further, 
some interviewees noted the fact Islamic finance has become a significant player and 
integrated into the international financial system and hence provided scope for M&A 
activities globally.  According to one senior manager, adopting Shariah law code does 
not limit the scope of business only to Muslim countries, as one of the respondents has 
said:   
“Islamic principles of business do not prevent the expansion of business 
beyond the local boundaries. Islam has begun to spread in non-Islamic 
countries; therefore, we have customers outside the country, to which we 
serve the products and services which may not be available in their 
countries”. [P16-Ins-SA]  
  
The above view explains the reason why Islamic companies can be found engaging in 
business with various non-Islamic companies in different countries such as UK or US.   
Similarly, Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) noted that Islamic principles practiced by Islamic 
companies encourage expansion of businesses in a fair and honest manner. Both the 
Islamic and non-Islamic companies have similar view on social responsibility, and they 
both make use of various means to screen unethical practices of companies (Ahmed, 
2010). For example, both Islamic and non-Islamic companies do not promote any 
prohibited goods and services depending on their value systems. Islamic financial 
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institutions in Gulf countries have demonstrated willingness to expand their services to 
non-Islamic companies as long as they are prepared to adjust to their fundamental 
principles such as Riba. Islamic companies have potential to grow, to integrate with or 
have a corresponding memorandum of understanding with non-Islamic companies who 
are looking to invest ethically and adjust to the underpinning of Islamic financial 
practices (Temperal, 2011).  
Furthermore, the international perspective of Islamic finance assumes significant 
relevance as it increasingly becomes integrated with the international financial systems, 
thus forming a financial network chain of intermediaries and provides platform for 
market expansion in various regions, contributing to a better financial resource 
allocation (Kammer et al., 2015). However, there are essential issues that need to be 
resolved in order to promote and encourage business expansion, which includes 
concerns on how to adapt or resolve economic policies differences and the formation of 
trustworthy polices between states and transnational corporations (Sole, 2007; 
Dakhlallah & Miniaoui, 2011).  
  
Therefore, it is important to find ways to enable both the Islamic and non-Islamic 
companies to coexist for the purpose of increasing economic activities and human 
development in more acceptable ways. The foreign companies that deal with companies 
from Islamic countries are deemed to deal with them "in a special way", to 
accommodate the complexities involved in applying the Shariah governance code.   
  
4.4.2 Shariah Screening of Products, Services and Transactions  
The findings in this sub-section attempt to answer the research question relating to what 
extent Shariah law and associated principles are used in business practice and how they 
encouraged the cross-border M&A between the Islamic financial companies from the 
Gulf region and non-Islamic companies from the West. Responses to interview 
questions 13, 14, 18, 19 & 29 provided evidence on this issue (appendix 5) and 
questions 11, 13 and 16 (appendix 4). Many respondents agreed in their views that 
incorporating Shariah principles restricts the extent to which Islamic financial 
companies engage in cross-border M&A with non-Islamic companies. They identified 
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factors such the prevalence of interest charging practices, complexity of Islamic mode of 
financing and risk management as well as limited number of Islamic financial 
instruments to limit the scope for M&A. In addition, they argued that the monitoring of 
regulatory authorities in these countries to ensure the compliance with Shariah law and 
principles and the lack of interest by Shariah scholars also negatively affect the cross-
border M&A issues. In contrast, some respondents made clear the fact that the bulk  of 
M&A deals in the Islamic world are funded by conventional acquisition finance. 
 
It was found that there are regulatory bodies that try to assess and identify transactions, 
services and products or practices that are not Shariah compliance driven. One of the 
respondents in SA stated that company is committed to the Islamic principles, 
regardless of where it makes the deal for cross-border M&A:  
  
“The company is committed to the application of Islamic law in all its 
dealings, even in its dealings outside the country. All of the company’s 
investments are monitored by the Monetary Authority and all of its 
contracts must be compliant with Islamic law. The international 
companies begin to understand our need to apply the Islamic law, thus 
they deal with the Islamic companies in a special way to allow compliance 
with Shariah, and we always stay away from Shariah warnings such as 
interest”. [P12-Ins-SA]  
  
Another respondent in UAE has expressed similar view:  
  
“This is not a hindrance because the investments in the permissible areas 
are many and profitable, and choices are available for Muslims and non-
Muslims. I think that the Gulf investors succeeded in large projects 




This shows that there are regulatory authorities, which oversee the investments of the 
companies in the foreign countries and pass their verdict on the legitimacy of such 
transactions in the context of Islamic CG. This implies that transactions or practices of 
the companies regarding the cross-border M&A may affect the M&A activities if any 
agreement is found to be against the Islamic CG. However, if the M&A are mediated 
with Islamic companies in the non-Islamic countries, then there would be no effect on 
the M&A, as both participating companies in the transaction follow the same or similar 
Islamic business principles. However, the companies may also be monitored by the 
ministry of commerce (Hassan, 2010).   
  
In contrast to the Islamic companies adhering to Shariah compliance, IFR report (2009) 
on Islamic finance and the M&A gap noted that the vast majority of M&A deals in the 
Islamic world are funded using conventional acquisition finance. This suggests that 
there are no global-compliant frameworks in place for Islamic finance and this hinders 
the growth of Islamic financial products. Islamic CG practices may prevent the spread 
of local Islamic companies to cross-border M&A, as they face many challenges in the 
non-Islamic world. Respondents from the banking sector have expressed these views:  
  
“Yes, we participated in M&A, and Shariah law does not encourage 
practicing these deals and this is a barrier that hinders working abroad 
because there are many issues we avoid practicing since they are 
contradicting Islam such as the Riba”. [P3-B-KW]  
  
“Following the Shariah law restricts our business due to the limitation of 
Islamic investments imposed by the level of compliance of Islamic 
principles by the host companies”. [P10-B-SA]  
  
However, some of the respondents from the banking sector raised an interesting point 
during the interview that the Islamic values affect the M&A activities, but the Shariah 
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scholars are not really interested in understanding the activities of non-Islamic countries 
or companies, though they always have the power to over any decision of  M&A. Also 
the Shariah scholars are not interested in creating a means to improve or innovate on 
Islamic products or instruments for non-Islamic companies to support economic 
activities and human development.   
  
4.3.3 Legislative Provisions  
Legislative provision formed one of the sub-themes of incorporating Islamic principles.  
From the interview analysis (based on the interview questions 5, 8, & 16, Appendix 3), 
it was found that in all the three countries, there is no clear well-defined legislation on 
how Islamic companies engage in M&A locally or at overseas locations. Though 
companies could use statutory laws to do business, they need to comply with the Islamic 
principles which are subject to Shariah Scholars’ interpretations which at times vary 
from scholar to scholars. The subjective interpretation, lack of formal legal provisions 
and the consequential attitude and behaviour of senior managers pose major challenges 
in the motivation and process of cross-border M&A. The ways in which Shariah 
scholars to interpret Qur’anic text and Hadith is crucial in determining the motivation 
for companies to merge internally or in other countries.  This said however, the extent 
which legal provision is said developed and used as well as their influence on 
international M&A varied between the countries . 
This section discusses the mechanism that the Islamic company follows to do business 
with non-Islamic to formalise a deal on cross-border M&A. It was found that in all the 
three countries, there is no clear well-defined legislation on how Islamic companies can 
expand or formulate formal agreement to conduct any business interactions with a non-
Islamic company. As one of the respondents said:  
  
“There is no Islamic legislation written for the businesses, which can offer 
some legislative obstacle for M&A deals. The expansion of the business is 
always promoted by the statutory laws of the state. The statutory laws 
state that Islamic companies within the Muslim country cannot do 
business without implementation of the Islamic principles, but there is no 
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law regulating the international M&A of companies in the non-Islamic 
world, which has often failed the deals”.  [P7-B-KW]  
  
  
The lack of legislation may be attributed to a passive approach in (SA)which prefers to 
self-initiative rather than regulator’s direction, or minimalist (UAE) approach, which 
prefers the market to develop its own Shariah governance system rather than a greater 
intervention on the part of regulators (Hassan, 2010).  However, the above view 
suggested that the absence of clear rules and regulations may hinder the transparency of 
conducting business. This can serve as a barrier for the companies in making 
international M&A deals. This account  is similar to Lewis (2005), which affirmed that 
rules and regulations of Islamic CG need to be organised, clear and unified. The lack of 
law causes confusion among the company BOD about what approach they need to 
adopt to make cross-border M&A deals and such confusion can lead to subsequent 
failures.  Lakshamanan (2014), in his article on risk management in Islamic banking in 
relation to mergers and acquisitions,  also suggested that there is a need for regulation in 
order to ensure the success of M&A as there is risk embedded throughout pre and post 
deals stages.   
  
  
However, Hassan (2010) stated that article 2 of the constitution of Kuwait vividly put 
Shariah as a main source of legislation and Islam as the official religion and in spite of 
the minimalist approach they expect the Islamic financial institutions to have proper 
Shariah governance system. However, the conventional business has no such restraints. 
One of the respondents from the banking sector of Kuwait expressed this view like:  
  
“If expansion is inside the Islamic states, it will not affect the M&A deals, 
however, the international M&A deals outside the country with companies 
in non-Muslim world can face some obstacles from Islamic regulatory 
institutions and many other local authorities in Kuwait, for example 
observing the code of conduct of Islamic companies outside Kuwait. If we 
do anything against Islamic principles outside the country, then it risks the 
company reputation within the country, therefore, we have not as many 
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opportunities of making international M&A as the conventional banking 
sector does”. [P6-B-KW]  
  
From the above comments, it seems that Kuwaiti banking sector is more cautious about 
making cross-border M&A deals due to possibilities of subsequent challenges by the 
regulatory authorities. Also, there is a similar view in UAE. A respondent from the 
UAE banking sector:  
“The problem does not arise from the implementation of the Islamic 
principles and way of doing business; it mainly comes from the rigid and 
strict thinking of scholars and policy makers. There are several business 
opportunities such as merger of Islamic banks with non-Islamic banks that 
are willing to merge for providing the financial service to Muslim 
minorities in the European countries. So we need to think about these 
issues seriously”. [P3-B-UAE]  
  
  
This indicates that the problem heavily lies with the Shariah supervisory Board and not 
with the Shariah principles. This is similar to Choudhury &Hoque (2004), which 
affirmed that Islam allows the Shariah scholars to interpret Qur’anic text and Hadith, 
thus leading to confusion and misunderstanding of the principles of Shariah either by 
the Muslim or non-Muslim such that the extremist interpret it to suit their own agenda 
while the moderate would offer different interpretation. Although the Islamic principles 
may have some base-line restrictions in business dealings, the possibility of moderate 
interpretation offers opportunity for the expansion of business. This is similar to one of 
the respondents from the insurance sector of the UAE views:  
  
“There is an Islamic economic jurisprudence which can provide a lot of 
guidelines in terms of guiding the path to make transactions within certain 
boundaries and flexibility by being in the Islamic domain, such as 
financial and economic transactions based on estimated way of being 
Islamic if the guidelines are not clear in their own right. The M&A 
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between Islamic and non-Islamic companies are always judged in the 
context of the Islamic jurisprudence which can provide more flexibility to 




This shows that insurance sector is more optimistic of the innovative aspect of Islamic 
principles and their ability to deal with new issues from emerging business 
opportunities and technological advances. M&A can be improved, based on the above 
views, by taking into consideration the effective management of economic aspects of 
Islamic principles.   
  
  
4.5  Cultural Influences  
The existing literatures suggest variations in culture from country to country would 
result in different business policies, leadership styles and management practices of the 
companies (Licht et al., 2005), and these are likely to affect the decisions about the 
international M&A. The interview analysis (based on the interview questions 19 
(appendix 3), question 25 (appendix 4), and question 31 (Appendix 5) generated three 
sub-themes: Islamic inheritance, women at workplace and business culture and decision 
making and these are discussed below.  
  
4.5.1 Islamic Inheritance Law  
This sub-theme examines the extent to which the differences in culture across Gulf 
countries influence the decision regarding cross-border M&A. In doing so, it attempts 
to address the research question relating to what cultural factors facilitate or constrain 
cross-border M&A. This study found, based on the all respondents’ account, that in the 
context of the three countries issues relating to Islamic inheritance have a strong 
influence on decision-making regarding cross-border M&A and its influence is likely to 
be more of constraining than enabling. Based on Islamic principle of inheritance, as a 
social value and custom embedded in the Shariah, the values of the business is 
transferrable to the closest blood relative of the business owner. Such practice is always 
considered first before anything that has to do with the business. Two respondents from 
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the banking sector in SA, for example, reported that a variation in culture causes 
different issues that influence their decision on certain matters:  
“In our social values and customs, the families own the businesses; the 
management of the companies is taken over by the relatives and sons of 
the main owners. In other words, businesses are transferred to the next 
owner based on the law of Islamic inheritance”. [P17-B-SA]  
  
  
According to Islamic law of inheritance, the ownership of business is 
transferred to the closest blood relatives of the owner, when it comes to 
the selection of members of Board; the priority is given to the relations 
and friends of the owner, which can decrease the possibility of M&A 
especially if they are inexperienced and non-qualified. [P3-B-SA]  
  
  
The above comment suggests that there could be a lack of clarity for non-Muslims on 
the procedure of transferring business ownership. Adhering to Shariah suggests that in 
dealing with cross-border M&A such practices have to be clearly stated and embedded 
into any agreement. Stahl & Voigt (2008) emphasised that the cultural differences 
across countries, including organisational cultures, affect socio-cultural integration, 
synergy realisation and achieving shareholder values in different ways.  Such transfer of 
the business to any blood relative may have some implications in respect to best 
practices on CG, if the person that inherits the business is not competent or 
knowledgeable to carry on with the business management.   
  
  
Zollo & Singh (2004) noted that striking the right balance between the acceptable levels 
of organisational integration and mitigating the level of disruptions of the acquired firm 
resources and competences is a strong challenge in terms of M&A. The family 
ownership suggests that it can be more efficient on running the business for both the 
family and shareholders. Khanna & Palepu (2000) emphasised that in term of 
asymmetric information the transaction cost among family structure of business and 
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close corporate affiliate is lower compare to other structure. However, clear 
understanding of the owner’s family structure is a strong challenge in respect to cross-
border M&A. The qualification and merit of the employment are the secondary 
considerations, which can be problematic. A respondent from insurance sector in 
Kuwait expressed the view:  
  
  
“In Kuwait we witnessed several issues regarding the selection of 
members of Board based on the criteria of how strongly the candidates are 
related to the owners of the firms. In Gulf countries, we still have long 
way to go to select a competent BOD for making the absolute and non-
partial decisions of the expansion of business within local market and 
international arena”. [P8-Ins-KW]  
  
  
These comments shed light on the overall practices of firms in Gulf countries in general 
and of Kuwait insurance companies in specific, regarding the appointment of BOD. 
Stronger BOD can play an important role in making the decisions of M&A with 
minimal risk to the integrity of business. This is similar to the work of Sabi (2015), 
which affirmed that lack of organisational structure, legal structure, and effective CG 
structure of family business in Gulf countries are strong barriers for smooth transition, 




However, in the UAE, the situation is much better than SA and Kuwait. They take more 
liberal approach towards the management of the firm. The respondents from the 
insurance sector of the UAE commented:  
  
“The companies in the UAE value the merit, experience and qualification 
of the candidates applying for the posts of the managerial positions, rather 
than giving priority to the blood relations or friends of the owners of the 
companies. I am in favour of such policies because it prevents the 
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management from taking immature decisions regarding M&A and putting 
the business at great risk”. [P4-Ins-UAE]  
  
  
The above comment still shows the practice of family style of ownership and 
management. Despite being more flexible, the family style of running a business is not 
efficient and breadth of knowledge and experience when it comes to cross-border 
M&A. Braun & Sharma (2007) emphasised that the family ownership of business suffer 
drastically from agency problems and severe managerial entrenchment.  Also the work 
of Safieddine (2009) emphasised that in any business there is issue of conflict of 
interest between the strong shareholders and weak shareholders and stated that for 
greater control over the business a greater concentration of shareholding is required. 
Therefore, the proportion of family own businesses in Gulf countries is very high, 
which creates a strong cultural barrier when it comes to cross-border M&A as this will 
entail complete restructuring of the whole business, compromises to ensure compliance 
with the legal framework and have a well-defined memorandum of understanding.  
  
  
4.5.2 Women at Workplace  
This section explains the main challenges of women to be represented in the BOD and 
work in mixed workplace in the selected Gulf countries and how these can affect or 
influence cross-border M&A. It was found that there are variations among Gulf 
countries in woman participation in the management and in BOD. For example, in SA, 
from the insurance and banking sectors it was found that mixed workplace is not 
allowed and that women are only allowed to work in places where there are only 
women, while in UAE and Kuwait mixed workplace is allowed so women are allowed 
to work with men in the same environment. This is comparable to the European 
companies, which value the diversity at workplace including equal rights for men and 
women at workplace. The lack of working rights to women in insurance companies and 
banks in SA can be an obstacle in dealing with non-Islamic companies across 
international M&A. This point has been raised by some of the respondents from the 




“Yes, there are cultural barriers to women working in the mixed 
environment. Due to variations in the cultural environment between the 
two merging companies, this factor can be one of the main causes of the 
failure of M&A deals. This is not religious, but a cultural constraint. For 
example, Prophet Muhammad (s.a.a.w) allowed women to work side by 
side with men during periods of war and enjoyed similar status in other 
fields like business ownership”. [P12-Ins-SA]  
  
  
However, another respondent from the insurance sector commented on the changing 
nature of culture:  
  
“The Saudi Government adopted the policy of sending the Saudi nationals 
to foreign countries to get assimilated with the foreign culture; this will 
make them open-minded and increase their tolerance level toward 
accepting women at work places”. [P1-Ins-SA]  
  
  
The above comments do highlight the fact that Government in SA is willing to change 
its stance for women to work in workplace with men. However, it is not clear when 
such instance will come into law or pass legislation for allowing women to work in a 
mixed environment. Recently, the Government have started introducing some initiative 
to educate their people on the right to allow women to work in a mixed environment. 
First, providing educational platform to provide exposure to the younger generation, 
especially students, to foreign world and this will automatically have positive influence 
on the attitude of the young generation. However, not having a clear policy yet is still a 
dilemma for women in Saudi Islamic companies. As it is clear that there are regulation 
that does not allow mixed work places, for example Alhabdan (2015, p.3) stated that 
“Saudi Labour Code indicates that an employee has to comply with the provision of 
Islamic Shariah which has been understood to prevent gender mixing …the Labour 
Force Counsel issued Decree number 111/8 to illustrate the conditions for women 
working. The decree states that “for women to work, a woman must first obtain 
permission from her guardian, the work has to be appropriate to her nature, the work 
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must not have any risk of physical or social damage, and finally, a woman must be 
separated from men in the workplace” .Also Al-Ahmadi (2011) emphasised that even 
when women work in the same place with their fellow women, they are faced with 
many challenges that hinder them from being an effective leader due to lack of 
resources and lack of empowerment.  
  
  
In contrast, to rigidity and conservative practices of SA for not permitting women to 
work in mixed environment, both Kuwait and the UAE have more liberal stance. Some 
of the respondents from the banking sector in the UAE stated, for example:  
  
“The Emeriti women are more liberal and Government policies are more 
oriented to the exposure of the women in the UAE to a variety of the 
business culture, allow them to work in mixed environment so that they 
can learn better organisational skills by working side by side with men at 
work places. The companies send the women along with men as delegates 
to foreign conferences to meet the leadership of foreign companies. This 
makes them better prepared for any cultural change in future through 
international M&A deals”. [P1-B-UAE]  
  
  
Also in Kuwait, some of the respondents stated that:  
  
“Women in Kuwait want to serve in insurance sector and they are seen as 
being socially better adept at making good contacts and they are good 
planners and managers. The success of the business is ensured in Kuwait 
by giving equal opportunity to men and women at work places. They can 
rise to the position of power and influence. The formal law regarding 
protection of women from harassment at workplaces are designed in 
Kuwait”. [P2-Ins-KW]  
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“The banks management are more careful in recruiting women for 
managerial positions due to stranger attitude of men toward women at 
workplaces. By law, it is not prohibited to allow women to work with men, 
but the management is more interested to keep the working environment 
free of any troubles”. [P10-B-KW]  
  
  
These comments show that both Kuwait and UAE allow women to work in mixed 
workplaces, but there are still some cultural barriers. Broadly, they perceive women as 
an important aspect of CG and view their contribution as significant to the success of 
their company. Such analysis ties in with the observation of Al-Yousef (2009) in that 
the status of women in Gulf countries varies but has evolved significantly to the scale 
where their contribution to achieving organisational goals being recognised.  
Hawkamah (2013) also emphasised that the Gulf countries are shifting towards 
providing women with market oriented education to increase the women labour force as 
they are seen to be more in touch with staff, customers and stakeholders.  Women also 
characterised by their transformational leadership style and better team spirit as well as 
a greater diversity leading to better decision making as men and women might interpret 
their experiences differently and bring alternative perspectives, which are a significant 
contribution of the multi-cultural workforce (Omair, 2010). Despite the banking sector 
in Kuwait being more cautious  in recruiting women as discussed earlier, this is not the 
legal position and women are encouraged to work with men and the selection process is 
free of prejudice.   
  
  
Though there are variations in women working in various Gulf countries, even in SA 
that does not allow mixed workplace, there is a beginning of realisation that women too 
can contribute in managing organisations and that they feel optimistic future changes 
towards  a mixed workplace. This observation on the ground aligns with Ellis et al.’s 
(2015) finding that 85% of the women in the Gulf countries want to take up leadership 




4.5.3 Business Culture and Decision-Making  
This section reports on the respondents’ views on how business culture and decision-
making process affect the cross-border M&A in particular when applying Islamic 
principle of CG to non-Islamic companies in non-Islamic countries. It was found that 
there are different approaches to business dealings between Islamic companies and non-
Islamic companies, which could be attributed to differences in culture. The respondents 
from the banking sector were of the view that Western companies have different 
approach in terms of setting up and running a business. Firms in Western countries 
context can take up interest payable loans  to expand their businesses, while in Islamic 
companies, the loan with interest is considered unethical and hence prohibited. This 
may limit the capability of investors to expand their businesses through M&A activities. 
The investors in SA have no investment culture; they have only financial resources 
pooled up from their relations and families. These financial resources are normally 
derived from trust based and interest free loans. However, there may be less limitation 
on how much they are willing to provide compared to a financial institution that will 
base their decision on the capability of the business to repay such loan. These practices 
may have a negative impact on cross-border M&A. For example, one of the respondents 
from SA said:  
  
“There is no investment culture in SA in the stock companies. There is 
more speculation and uncertainty in the business environment of Saudi 
due to weak understanding of the investors about the business 
opportunities. The local investors do not take the long-term investment 
opportunities”. [P12-B-SA]  
  
  
The above comment suggests that this lack of investment culture may be caused by their 
cultural belief and values, which create the differences between the Western and the 
Islamic culture. This view is similar to Stulz & Williamso (2003), which affirmed that 
the business practices vary with culture; the people have different approach to the 
business based on their regional customs, norms and values. David & Singh (1994) 
noted that cultural differences are one of the key challenges that represent the source of 
acquisition cultural risk, which has a potential obstacle for achieving integration 
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benefits. This is also consistent with cultural distance hypothesis which suggests that 
cost, risk and difficulties associated with cross cultural contact increases with cultural 
variations among organisation, groups and individuals (Hofstede, 1980). Also, work has 
been carried out to strike the balance as a result of the variation of culture but 
emphasises have been in achieving the necessary level of how to minimise any 
disruption and bolster integration with available resources and competencies is the 
fundamental challenge that affects the success of cross-border M&A deals (Zollo & 
Singh, 2004). The “poor understanding” and lack of “investment culture” may be the 
key challenges that may affect the capability of Saudi companies to participate in cross-
border M&A activities. However, the insurance companies in SA are more optimistic to 
engage with foreign companies. The insurance companies are more dependent on the 
foreign insurance companies for the stabilisation of their business. For example, one of 
the respondents from the insurance companies said:  
  
“The investors in insurance sector are likely to engage in real 
entrepreneurship when it comes to collaboration with foreign companies. 
After all, conglomerations run the insurance business in insurance sector.  




This indicates that the culture and values may still be influenced by the interest in the 
nature of the business that the investors want to engage. Therefore, insurance sector is 
more likely to invest outside SA, deal with foreign companies and enter into the M&A 
deals with them, as the investors are willing to take risks.  
  
  
Furthermore, there are indications that the Arab nation are always show sign of 
unwillingness to implement new strategies and unwillingness to work through 
challenges in forming new companies (Deloittes, 2009). For example, respondents from 
both banking sector and the insurance sector also emphasised that lack of understanding 
of the business concepts used by Western country companies and vice versa may 
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influence their decision making capability. Kuwaiti insurance and banking sector 
respondents said:   
  
“Applying home CG to other countries is difficult and it is seriously 
hindered by the lack of negotiation process, which mainly stems from the 
lack of understanding of behaviour of people, set of beliefs, interactions 
and relationships and timeliness of the business operations. These factors 
can reduce the possibility of M&A deals between the Western-based 
companies and Islamic companies”. [P8-Ins-KW, P6-B-KW]  
  
The above expressions indicate that cultural differences between the Western and 
Islamic world may give rise to many problems and issues which may affect their 
decision-making processes. The factors, which are important for the West, may not be 
important for the Arab point of view. For instance, time is very critically important in 
daily life of European people, while in Arabic world is always taken for granted. Also 
Arabic lawyers only have much knowledge of the legal system in Arabic countries 
based on Shariah principle and they don’t have better understanding of the Western 
legal system, which may slow the decision making process. This view is supported by 
Deloitte (2009) that different decision-making styles can lead to slow decision-making 
and it may lead to failure to implement decisions. These differences in cultural 
traditions and norms may affect cross-border M&A deals.  
  
  
Finally, the culture of Islamic world is perceived as a threat to the Western world and 
businesses, which make the expansion of Islamic businesses difficult. One of the 
respondents from banking sector expressed his view that:  
  
“Some business communities outside the Arab world consider Arab 
culture and people as a threat to their stability, especially after 9/11 
attacks. Media played a role in distorting the image of Arabs and Muslims 
as whole by labelling them terrorists. These conditions make the cross-





This view demonstrates that the factors, which can prevent the expansion of business 
into the Western world, include the perverted view in the host community, about 
Muslims and Islam, makes the expansion more difficult for some businesses. This is 
consistent with Islamic threat perception which emphasises that Islamic revivalism has 
often been seen and experienced as direct threat to liberal beliefs, interests of elite 
secular ideas as well as multinational corporations and Western Governments (Esposito, 
1999). Also, in recent years, the social, political, global and regional developments have 
affected the relationship between the Islamic countries and Western countries 
throughout the world. People are witnessing an evolution in the perception of Islamic 
religion based on the notion of terror activities and violence faced by Islamic and non-
Islamic countries especially from people pretending to act “in the name of Islam” thus 
leading to increase in prejudice and misunderstanding of both sides (Mesic, 2004).  
  
  
Therefore, from the comments and the discussion, it has shown there are variations of 
culture between the Islamic and non-Islamic countries companies, which may slow 
decision-making process. Also, this discussion has shown that there is an increasing 
tension between the non-Islamic and Islamic countries due to the terror activities and 
violence, which may affect cross-border M&A dealing.  
  
 In summary, the interview analyses provided evidence which suggests cultural 
differences between the West and the Muslim countries influence the ways in which 
businesses get managed and decision is made.  The data showed under developed 
business acumen and lack of investment culture, difference in decision making style and 
the recent unhealthy perception about the Islamic religion combined would likely to 
hamper the cross-border M&A activities between Islamic and non-Islamic financial 
companies. Sector-wise, the study found that the insurance companies are more likely to 
engage with foreign companies than banks due to their heavy reliance on foreign firms 





4.6 Need for Shariah Compliance  
  
4.6.1 Effect of Shariah Scholars’ Interpretations  
The presentation in this section addresses the research question and objectives relating 
to the influence of Shariah principles interpretation and compliance in view of   cross-
border M&A with non-Islamic companies. The analysis heavily relied on the responses 
provided by respondents to interview questions 7 and 18 (appendix 4) and 20 & 25 
(appendix 5). It was found that the M&A activities involved greater complexity due to 
differing interpretation of Shariah by Islamic scholars based on their liberal or 
conservative outlook and understanding of business issues. This can be a major factor, 
which can either restrict or promote the cross-border M&A with non-Islamic companies 
in the Western countries.   
 The analysis of the many respondents indicated that companies in these three countries 
had to make subtle, delicate, business dealings: simultaneously managing the competing 
view of meeting customers’ needs with complying with the Shariah-based business 
principles.  The task becomes much more difficult and onerous given potentially 
conflicting interpretation of Shariah law and principles by Shariah scholars when these 
being applied to businesses as cross-border M&A involves complex processes and 
outcomes.   In nutshell, the more conservative the Shariah scholars’ interpretations of 
the Shariah principles, according to the respondent’s analyses, the more difficult it 
would be to undertake effective cross-border M&A. The monopolisation of the market 
by a few Shariah scholars is likely to lead to principal and agency problem due to the 
conflict of interest.  
 
  
One of the respondents from the insurance sector has reported that anything, which is 
seen as going against Shariah (for example dealing with undefined or uncertainty), can 
prevent the business deals with other companies:  
  
“A customer came to us and wanted us to insure the big tower he built in 
the city. His deal was to insure the tower building against any kind of 
danger or hazards. This meant that in the event of any disaster, the 
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insurance company is required to pay off all the damage to the tower and 
this is unlawful in the sight of God. This was against the Shariah principle 
as it is kind of playing with chances and it is considered as gambling by  




This showed that Islamic insurance business in SA is heavily subject to Shariah 
interpretations and insurance companies which are conservative in interpreting the 
Islamic principles will find it very difficult to carry out any M&A with a conventional 
insurance company. This is similar to Khalid (2013), who noted that different Gulf 
companies have different Takaful (Islamic insurance) guidelines and rules which create 
difficulties in any M&A and emphasised that the task can take longer to negotiate, 
structure and execute. Such practices also create difficulty in developing a uniform 
regulatory framework across the Gulf region. Hassan, (2011) carried out a survey on 
Shariah governance practices, which found that there were diverse Shariah governance 
practices among Gulf countries, leading to shortcomings and weaknesses and there is 
need for uniform regulatory framework.   
  
Also the society is widely aware of the Shariah principles and adheres to it, frequently 
acting as a watchdog in Gulf countries and insisting on Shariah compliant products. For 
example, one of the respondents from Saudi insurance company corroborated this:  
  
“We exclude everything that opposes Shariah, because our first goal is to 
satisfy the customers, almost all of whom adhere to Shariah and search for 
products that are in compliance with the Shariah principles. The success 
of the insurance company depends on the customer satisfaction and 
obviously we are working within an Islamic environment”. [P13-Ins-SA]  
 
The above comment shows that the general principles of business are applied but 
once there is a contradiction or variance with the principles of Islam, such practice 
will not be used. This applies to even globally accepted ways of doing business. 
This is similar to Chapra & Ahmed (2002), who noted that large percentage of 
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capital providers, shareholders and investors to Islamic financial institutions are 
very concerned that their stake is fully in compliance with the Shariah.   
  
  
Agency problems arise in conventional companies when managers deviate from their 
task and responsibility to maximise shareholders wealth and their own return. In Islamic 
companies, there may be further agency problems arising from those who oversee the 
Shariah compliance (Safieddine, 2009). One respondent said that:  
    
“Shariah scholars who have monopolized the market serve on multiple 
SSB and earn fees may lead to rigorous challenge. This may raise a 
conflict of interest and affect confidentiality of the business. There may be 
risk of leaking of information that can impact the competition in the 
market and the development of Islamic finance …However, some Shariah 
scholars search for clever ways to circumvent some fundamental 
principles, which leads to the disappearance of any credibility to applying 
Shariah in companies”.[P5-Ins-UAE]  
  
Such agency problem arises from the flexibility allowed by Islam to take cognisance 
of the context within which an appropriate principle can be applied, provided it does 
not violate the clearly stated prohibitions. One respondent commented on that:  
  
“Different interpretations of Shariah are considered as a kind of flexibility 
and mercy in Islam. The non-Muslims think that this is a disagreement on 
the Qur’an because they don’t understand that this is called Jurisprudence 
according to the circumstance. Difference is normal and this exists in 
Shariah. And if there is no difference, we would doubt the actions as 
extracting the law differs from one member to another. However, we get 
worried about the difference in the fundamental Islamic principles, in its 





Though it would be permissible in terms of Shariah, effect of these variations needs to 
be examined in the context of increasingly globalised world. Also there is a potential 
danger of very conservative scholars with an insular mind set creating unnecessary 
complexities just to avoid any engagement with non-Islamic companies.  
  
  
“Shariah scholars can be biased and take rigid decision which is entirely 
negative to the development of the organization, and managers can’t do 
anything about it”. [P8-B-UAE]  
  
  
   
4.6.2 Special Way of Dealing by Non-Islamic Companies  
Majority of respondents agree to the view that Western companies are willing to work 
with Islamic companies in the Gulf countries with great care and that they have an 
adequate understanding of the need to comply with the Shariah principles. Further, the 
interview analysis showed reinsurance practices in these countries are at nascent stage 
of development and that many Islamic insurance companies deal with reinsurance cases 
with the principle of donation to help them manage risk in collaboration with non-
Islamic insurance companies. This practice signified an understanding of the need for 
trade-off when working with non-Islamic insurance companies. 
 
It was found that Western companies treat Islamic companies in the Gulf countries with 
great care, as they are aware of the need of Shariah compliance by the Islamic 
companies and therefore develop an appreciation of the Shariah principles to ensure 
that these are complied with or identify an acceptable work-around for the purpose of 
the transaction. For example, a respondent from insurance company in Kuwait said:  
  
“The international companies have begun to understand our need for 
Shariah compliance. Thus they deal with Islamic companies in a special 
way to incorporate the principles of Shariah, as they are aware that we 
always stay away from business operations, which have been prohibited 





For example, financial instruments such as bonds, swaps, futures and forwards are not 
allowed by Shariah in their conventional form and would need restructuring, where 
possible, to comply with the Shariah principles, for example, Sukuk (Islamic bonds), 
where the bond is backed by real asset and the return being a fixed share of profit, is 
always Halal rather than the return being in the form of interest, which is Haram 
(Derigs & Marzban, 2008). As Maswadeh (2014) noted, not everything is explicitly 
prohibited by the Shariah and there is scope for interpretation to enable such 
restructuring. The respect for  Shariah laws and principles reflects the willingness   of 
foreign companies to do business with Islamic companies. One of the respondents said:  
  
“Mostly, there is no problem in complying with Shariah governance code 
except the difficulty faced by the Islamic insurance companies in the 
reinsurance sector. The Islamic companies have no readily available 




The practices of reinsurance in the Gulf countries are relatively new (Mulhim & 
Sabbagh, 2007) and they lack the human and infrastructural capability in dealing with 
the Shariah compliant reinsurance capacity to help manage excess risk (Vizcaino, 
2015). There are no reinsurance companies in SA, forcing its Takaful insurance sector 
to deal with non-Islamic companies for reinsurance, which is not ideal from Islamic 
insurance point of view. The UAE Takaful insurance sector has, however, developed a 
workaround:  
  
“We are dealing with reinsurance companies on the principle of donation 
to cover accidents. When we deal with non-Islamic reinsurance 
companies, we work against Shariah principles and one way to avoid this 
is for the Takaful insurance company to normally hold 40% share based 
on the interest free dealings while the 60% is held by the non-Islamic 
company, which can invest on interest based transactions. Takaful 
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insurance company does not share any profit through 40% ownership but 
requests a lower level of donation in the next period contract. So there is 




The above comment suggests that the non-Islamic companies are agreeable to necessary 
practical adjustments as long as the Islamic companies have identified the required 
restructuring of the business, instruments or products to ensure Shariah compliance.  
  
4.6.3 Complexities of Merging Islamic and Non-Islamic Practices  
In quite contrast to the above finding, majority of the respondents believed that it is 
hugely complex, costly, and problematic to restructure products and services in order to 
make them comply with Shariah principles when working with foreign companies. 
Factors such as lack of appropriate infrastructure and,  the discretionary power of the 
Shariah court and Shariah scholar subjective interpretations exacerbate the problem 
when considering the integration of Islamic and non-Islamic practices.   
Even conventional M&A involves considerable complexity; however, compliance with 
Shariah introduces even greater degree of complexity when dealing with non-Islamic 
companies. A respondent from insurance sector in UAE has pointed out some of the 
limitations arising from Shariah compliance:  
  
“Although doing business by following Islamic principles is good and low 
risk, it causes difficulties in the cases of restructuring the products to 
comply with Shariah. If the company did not have to worry about this 
compliance, it would be more flexible in business and would also find 
more investment opportunities”. [P5-Ins-UAE]  
  
  





“M&A activities may face some challenges due to non-compliance of 
international companies with Shariah laws, but we use only those 
restructuring transactions, which comply with Shariah, even though we 




The above comments indicate that Shariah compliance may be a barrier in dealing with 
non-Islamic companies. This is similar to IFR (2009), which noted that structuring 
Islamic company to accommodate capital structure of the target company could be 
cumbersome, time consuming and costly. In many cases such restructuring might fail 
leading to breakdown or excessive delays in the M&A process. As it is, the process of 
cross-border M&A is complex and requires evaluation of a range of business, legal, 
operational, accounting and tax issues as well as consideration of risks associated with 
cross-border deals -Shariah compliance adds to the complexity and introduces further 
costs and delays (Rezaee, 2011; Lakshmanan, 2014).   
  
  
Carrying out the legal due diligence can be problematic as the Shariah court has broad 
discretionary powers in reviewing and interpreting any business documents (Kortbawi, 
2014). It also highlights the potential problems that could arise from subjectivity 
involved in interpretation of the Shariah business laws and absence of any objective 
rules and standards.  
  
  
4.7  Islamic Corporate Legal Structure  
One of the research questions of this thesis sought to examine the difference in the legal 
structure of the Islamic companies and its influence on decision making. 
Corporate legal structure of company manifests the principles and codes that the 
company is bound to follow in the conduct of its business operations. This structure is 
influenced by the national legal system, which in case of Gulf countries is quite 
complicated as it is embedded in history, religion and traditions of each country 
(Angell, 2006). CG is based on the legal structure of a company and in case of Islamic 
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companies Shariah plays a critical role in shaping the legal structure of the company 
(Ararat & Ugur, 2003). An important constituent of the Islamic corporate legal structure 
is the Shariah Supervisory Board.  The analysis below addressed the interview 




4.7.1 Shariah Supervisory Board   
Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) can be defined as a body made up of a number of 
scholars who are knowledgeable about Islamic commercial jurisprudence (Fiqh 
AlMuamalat), which issues binding guidelines and supervise their enforcement to 
ensure Shariah compliance (Alkhamees, 2013). Alman (2012) suggested that the SSB 
should comprise of at least three members, who have understanding of the modern trend 
in business, finance and economics in addition to the knowledge of the Shariah 
business principles.   
  
  
The SSB can comprise of either internally employed scholars or externally appointed 
scholars on a retainer fee basis. In terms of its importance, the respondents from the SA 
observed:  
  
“SA does not have any regulatory framework for Shariah supervisory 
practices. The IFIs voluntarily deploy their initiatives like other Gulf 
countries and the SSB is as influential and powerful as BOD. The BOD 
has no authority on the functions of SSB. The SSB gives an Islamic 
advisory opinion called “Fatwa” on every process of the bank or 
company, and monitors the process and product and matches them with 
principles of Shariah. Finally it issues the annual report to the 
shareholder in general assembly regarding following and implementing 





Lahsasna (2011) affirmed that the SSB always ensure the full compliance and 
implementation of Shuratic decision-making. Grassa (2013) and Grassa & Matoussi 
(2014) have noted that Bahrain has developed a comprehensive regulatory framework, 
which may encourage other countries to do so. In terms of the relationship between SSB 
and BOD, the SSB may be seen in terms of providing guidance and stewardship. Bhatti 
& Bhatti (2010) emphasised that stewards are more inclined to perform their duties in 
the spirit of partnership. Similarly, Turnball (2000) pointed out that experts and 
specialist are employed by organisation for better results.  
  
  
4.7.2 Selection Criteria and Number of Shariah Supervisory Board  
It was found that Gulf countries follow different mechanisms and rules in selecting the 
members of the SSB, thus creating differences in the legal structures among the Gulf 
countries. For example, in SA, the company’s leadership such as BOD makes the rules 
and regulations, and are responsible for the formation and selection of the SSB 
members. One of the respondents from the banking sector of SA reported that:  
  
“Some companies assign the SSB members through voting in the general 
assembly. This is the typical situation in assigning according to AAOIFI 
standards. These standards are adopted in some countries and used as a 
reference in others. However, in Saudi they are not used either as 
compulsory or as a reference standard. In some countries, the selection of 
SSB members is mediated by CEO or by the BOD”. [P3-B-SA]  
  
  
Another respondent noted:  
  
“The role of SSB is only legislative and their meetings with the BOD are 
held once or twice monthly based on the necessity such as new deals or 
new contracts. Their authority is equal to the BOD in exercising the 
decisions in the legislative domains of the company. The reputation, 
knowledge of jurisprudence and the experience of the SSB members are 
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also included as an essential criterion for selection of the members of 
SSB”. [P3-B-KW]  
  
  
The above comment suggests that there are variations in legal structure and 
responsibility among Gulf countries. The AAOIFI standard states that BOD members 
are responsible for the appointment of the SSB members and the appointment requires 
approvals from the shareholders in the General Meeting, however, not all Gulf countries 
follow this standard. As Farook & Farooq (2013) pointed out there is economic gain in 
having Shariah scholars on the BOD to benefit from their expertise and experience and 
thus reduce the times required in ensuring Shariah compliance process. This would also 
benefit the Shariah scholars in terms of obtaining greater business understanding. 
Archer &Karim (2007) noted that there are many Shariah scholars who have published 
on commercial jurisprudence without the day-to-day practical experience on modern 
banking and financial markets.  
  
  
Since the composition and appointment of SSB members vary from institution to 
another, the credibility of the decisions made by the SSB is affected. The majority of 
the respondents believed that increase in the number of the SSB members could 
strengthen the legal structure of the company in terms of forming transparent and lucid 
regulations to control the development of financial instruments of the companies. For 
instance, one of the respondents from the insurance sector quoted that:   
  
“More members can increase the quality of decisions; this is because of 
the fact that it will eliminate the chance of collusion between the members 
to compromise the Shariah and the business interests. The more members 
will increase the degree of differences in opinions between members, and 
ultimately result in better quality of decision than having fewer members 




Hasan & Laws (2007) and Alman (2012) noted that the concept of having more than 
one member on the SSB is very important to eliminate unilateral decisions and ensures 
adequate discussion of issues for reaching a collective decision.   
  
Therefore, there is a need to establish clear rules and regulations defining the 
composition and detailed selection criteria for SSB that is better understood by all 
stakeholders. With the very important role of SSB in directing and reviewing activities 
of Islamic companies, there might be negative effect on the company’s performance if 
the SSB members are not well versed in the modern business and economic practices, 
besides any problems that might arise in harmonisation with non-Islamic companies.  
  
 As  a summary of the above  two sub-sections, it could be stated that almost all 
respondents agreed in their views that Shariah Supervisory Board to be influential and 
powerful constituent  of the Islamic corporate legal structure with mandate of  providing 
Islamic advisory opinion called “Fatwa” on processes, products and service to ensure 
they comply with the  principles of Shariah. The data analysis however, showed the 
three countries differed in the processes of selecting the members of the SSB and that 
not all the three countries follow the AAOIFI standards when appointing the SSB. Thus, 
the respondents argued for establishing transparent rules and regulations defining the 
composition of, and selection criteria for SSB.  
 
4.7. 3 Adoption of (AAOIFI) Guidelines  
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
provides guiding standards that the Islamic companies can follow in ensuring that they 
are in compliance with Shariah (AAOIFI, 2004).Some organisations fully follow these 
standards while others use them as a reference when making particular decisions. These 
comments are supported from the banking sector in the UAE and Kuwait. One of the 
respondents from the UAE commented like that:  
  
“AAOIFI works to formulate the different rules and regulations, which 
may be obeyed by the financial institutions to develop and regulate the 
products in the market. The SSB members use these rules as guidelines for 
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approving the Islamic products in banks. However, they are not 
compulsory”. [P7-B-UAE]  
  
  
Since the adoption of the AAOIFI standards is not universal, it leads to a range of 
Islamic organisational structures, for example, some organisations have only a single 
tier comprising of SSB and at the other extreme other companies have three tiers 
consisting of SSB, internal Shariah audit and external Shariah audit for ensuring 
Shariah compliance.  A respondent from the banking sector in the UAE explained the 
current state of play as:  
  
“In some banks and companies in UAE, there is Shariah Board and 
internal Shariah audit. Nowadays external Shariah auditing has also been 
implemented. Internal auditing on the SSB to supervise the functions of 
SSB has also started in Kuwait and Bahrain”. [P11-B-UAE]  
  
  
The forgoing comments have revealed the important aspects of the regulatory 
mechanism in the Islamic banks and insurance companies in the UAE and Kuwait. The 
three tier structure comprising of SSB, internal and external audit provides additional 
supervision on the activities of SSB as well as compliance to SSB decisions by the 
management. This makes it a robust structure for compliance of business operations 
with the injunctions of Shariah. Such architecture of ensuring Shariah compliance has 
not been implemented in the banks and insurance companies in SA.  
  
  
4.7.4 Conflict of Interest  
The AAOIFI guideline requires that the SSB appointed members should not hold any 
shares within the company for which they work, as it creates conflict of interest. By 
owning shares in Islamic companies, they might be tempted to engage in 
misinterpreting the Shariah principles for the company’s benefit rather than ensuring 
interest-free and Halal principles in the backdrop of socio-economic justice in line with 




“If shares have been allocated to the members of the SSB, it will give rise 
to the conflict of interest. For example, The SSB member with share will 
work only for his own interest regardless of whether it is within the spirit 
of Shariah or not. This can affect their interpretation and application of 
the Shariah principles and also the overall compliance of the company 
with the Islamic framework”. [P10-B-SA]  
  
Malkawi (2014) affirmed that an SSB member involved in running the business may 
result in issues related to confidentiality of information and favourable disposition 
towards managers with whom they work more closely. Bakr (2002) also noted that the 
SSB members should not engage in any activity other than their assigned functions or 
roles in an organisation due to conflict of interest that may arise and it is hard to express 
an independent opinion when engaged with other jobs or owning shares. Similarly, 
Qattan (2003) recommended that SSB members should not be assigned any executive 
position in any of the institution they are involved, as it will impair their independence.   
  
Members of Shariah board were asked about the possible conflict of interest when 
using an external Shariah scholar (see questions 7, Appendix 4). Potential conflict of 
interest may arise when Islamic companies do not have SSB constituted by internal 
employees but depend on external experts on a retainer basis. Garas (2012)highlighted 
the problem of external members sitting on different companies’ SSB having access to a 
lot of confidential information which might could lead to potential losses for some 
companies and gains to other companies in which they might have interest.  
  
One respondent also highlighted the conflict of interest in case of scholars working as 
external SSB members and suggested that the scholars on the payroll of the 
Government, serving as the Fatwa Council members should issue an impartial, free, 
advice to Islamic companies.  
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“The Government is so fair, equitable, and clear, and this is what the 
Islamic religion urges, but unfortunately, the principles are applied 
outside more than inside the country. I don't think that the SSB have any 
role; they are just committees depending on robbery of money as they do 
not make decisions until they take money because this money affects their 
judgments, why they do not just sit at the Government’s Fatwa Council 
and issue free advice? Why they are working in companies? Why they take 
money for Fatwa granted from heaven? Money plays a crucial role in the 
Fatwa council decisions”. [P11-Ins-SA]   
  
Therefore, it is important to have clear and well-defined rules and regulations on the 
composition and functioning of SSB and the rights, responsibilities and obligations of 
its members in Islamic companies in the Gulf. The above accounts, in part, provided an 
insight into the questions which asked about managers’ perception on the role and 
impact of SSB in their companies (questions 22, 23 and 26, Appendix 5). 
  
  
4.7.5 Variation in Structure of Shariah Compliance  
It was found that the SSB members in different Islamic companies had different 
perspectives on Maqasid Al-Shariah, leading to differing interpretation besides the 
conflict of interest discussed above. The respondents were also of view that there was 
scope for differing interpretations, for example, a respondent from a UAE bank said:  
“It is quite normal in Shariah to promote the difference of opinions in 
constructive way. Difference of opinions is considered a mercy. However, 
the difference in already established and well-practised principles of 
Shariah is considered a departure from the compliance with the Shariah 
laws”. [P12-B-UAE]  
  
Another respondent from insurance sector in SA supports this view:  
“The SSB members are not always clear in interpreting the Shariah 
principles for any business deals. Any misinterpretation of the SSB 
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members can be seen by the wider public, who have their own 
understanding of Islamic principles and what is lawful and what is 
unlawful. It is not good practice for SSB members to give their own 
interpretations, as this can cast doubts on the legality of any business 
deals”. [P7-B-SA]  
  
Hamza (2013) noted that various scholars interpret Shariah differently and in some 
cases there is no definitive answer about the status of Shariah business principles, 
which may lead to uncertainty about what will be acceptable and what will not, 
complicating inter business activities among companies. Obid & Naysary (2014) 
supported this view by emphasising that different background and school of 
jurisdictions of SSB members as well as the national regulatory environment and 
regional context can create inconsistency in the Shariah interpretation and may prevent 
the harmonisation of products and services. In support of this view are also Dusuki & 
Abozaid (2007), who noted that the misunderstanding of Shariah principles can hinder 
the implementation process or success of business deals. For example, Beck et al. 
(2013) explained that it is unclear whether the products and services follow the 
principles of Islam in terms of form or in terms of spirit (Maqasid Al-Shariah).  
  
  
Therefore, unifying the interpretation of the Shariah business principles may aid in the 
success of cross-border M&A by removing uncertainty about position taken by 
individual scholars on various issues. The adherence to well defined CG codes and 
mutual agreement between the companies merging into each other can guarantee the 
success of the M&A activities and will stabilise the M&A contracts between the Islamic 
companies in Gulf and other non-Islamic countries.  
  
  
4.8 Islamic Financial Instruments  
 This section presents the findings relating the research question/ objective regarding the 
main Islamic financial instruments used by Islamic financial companies.  One key 
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question managers were asked was ‘Which Islamic instrument do you use to formalise 
businesses that comply with Shariah across international boundaries? 
 Islamic financial instruments are the main funding tools offered by the banks to the 
investors and other companies to finance their businesses. These are the Islamic 
alternatives for the investors to either expand their businesses through the M&A or to 
start new business. The Islamic instruments (based on fundamental Shariah principles), 
which are used to finance the investors include: the profit and loss sharing instruments 
Mudarabah; Musharakah; Murabahah (cost-plus financing); and Ijara (leasing). These 
basic instruments are then utilised to formulate more complex instruments such as the 
Islamic Bond or Sukuk. While the conventional financial companies engage in interest-
based transactions, Islamic companies need to structure financial instruments offering 
similar capability without incorporating any element of interest.  
  
  
4.8.1 Sukuk  
Among all the financing methods available, it was found that Sukuk is the most popular 
and is considered to be fully compliant to Shariah business principles. One of the 
respondents said:  
  
“The utility of the financial instruments is that they are being used by 
investors to acquire the funds for the international M&A activities. There 
are many companies in the Gulf countries, which expanded their 
businesses through the use of Sukuk which can be either Murabahah or 
Ijara based. The most popular and successfully used financial instrument 
is still Sukuk for international M&A deals as it is non-controversial and 
fully compliant with Shariah”. [P14-B-SA]  
  
  
The statement above shows  the popularity of Sukuk for M&A as it is widely accepted  
as non-controversial and the most Shariah compliant instrument as it has inherent 
flexibility of being structured using any of the underlying Shariah concepts, for 
example, Murabahah.  Sukuk is quite similar to the conventional bond products such 
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that the sale of debt is negotiable and where payment can be made by periodic 
instalment or can be deferred to maturity (Saeed & Salah, 2014). Wilson (2008) noted 
that Islamic securities are becoming popular lately such that the Government use them 
to raise Government finance and companies use them to raise fund. Sukuk has the 
advantage over conventional bonds as Sukuk is always backed up by real asset such as 
building, equipment and land.  
  
  
On fund raising by Shariah compliant companies through common stock vs. Sukuk, 
Abaza (2011) observed that Sukuk had the disadvantage of widening of credit spreads 
which makes it less cost effective and the cost of structuring Sukuk was still relatively 
high compared to the conventional bonds and bank loans in most parts of the World. An 
alternative position, arising from Sukuk becoming mainstream and the demand from 
cash-rich institutional investors often exceeding supply, was in Islamic countries such 
as the Gulf countries, where the issuance of conventional bonds can be more expensive 
for corporate than Sukuk, however, this was seen as an exception rather than the rule 
(Al-Amine, 2008; Al-Thani, 2013).  
  
  
4.8.2 Tawarruq  
Another Islamic financial instrument that is sometimes used for M&A is the Tawarruq, 
which involves cash sales of goods purchased on instalments or deferred payment basis 
(Ahmad et al., 2009). It was found that some organisations do not recognise Tawarruq 
as a valid Islamic instrument and even among the Shariah scholars the status of the 
Tawarruq as a financial instrument is controversial. Some of the respondents 
commented on Tawarruq as follows:  
  
“Tawarruq involves an individual or company buying a commodity that is 
not belonging to precious metals category, from a bank on a deferred 
payment or instalment purchase basis then, reselling it for the purpose of 
generating cash. The price paid to the bank includes an inbuilt profit 





The same respondent mentioned that:  
  
“Some financial institutions rejects this concept and hence do not approve 
the use of Tawarruq as financial instrument, for example, Dubai Bank 
rejected the Tawarruq as a Shariah compliant structure. However, 
AAOIFI permits the use of Tawarruq under certain conditions; for 
example, the client should not delegate the institution or its agent to sell 
on his behalf a commodity that he purchased from the same institution. 
However, such approach is not subscribed by some of the financial 





Another respondent from the insurance sector in SA recorded similar thoughts 
regarding the use of the Tawarruq as a last resort rather than using it as a standard 
financial instrument:  
  
“Tawarruq by many Shariah scholars is considered as a necessary evil 
rather than an important pillar of the Islamic financial services. Both 
financiers and lawyers believe that there is a gradual movement in Gulf 
countries demanding the up grading the standards of the Islamic finance. 
The scholars are increasingly encouraging the Islamic financial 
institutions to look for alternatives to the Tawarruq, which suggest the 
stricter standards to which the industry is heading for”. [P6Ins-SA]  
  
  
The advantage of Tawarruq is that it is flexible and a quicker way of acquiring liquidity 
(Msatfa, 2011). However, there are issues with Tawarruq that have been discussed by 
various authors due to the different ways in which Tawarruqis used by banks. Some 
scholars argued that if the only objective of the customer is to generate cash and is 
personally involved in the whole process then it is not prohibited while others argue that 
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the customer does not really have to be involved in all the business transactions (Ahmad 
et al., 2009).  In the circumstances where the commodity is resold at very low price, 




The discussion thus far shows that Tawarruq is used by the financial institutions in Gulf 
region with great caution. The practice may vary from country to country based on the 
interpretation of Shariah. In Malaysia, for example, Tawarruq is recommended and 
approved by the Shariah scholars while it is not encouraged in the Gulf countries 
(Khnifer, 2010). The analysis by one of the respondents from the UAE banking sector 
provides evidence:  
  
“Malaysia and Gulf countries are different in terms of approving the 
Tawarruq structure, therefore the latter is more dependent on the 
alternative forms of financing rather than Tawarruq. Also, in Malaysia, 
there are a handful of the other structures, which can be employed to help 
facilitate Shariah complaint M&A finance”. [P11-B-UAE]  
  
  
Focussing on the cross-border M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic companies, there 
may be plenty of obstacles. For example, one of respondent from the banking sector in 
SA commented on these difficulties:  
  
“M&A activities with the non-Islamic financial instruments is complicated 
for us because we need to convert them into Islamic ones by changing all 
of their non-Islamic (interest-based) transactions into the Islamic 
transactions by applying the principle of Tawarruq which means that we 
need to give all prohibited money (interest-based income) earned by the 
host bank to the charity. In this case we lose money rather than making the 
money. Therefore, the use of financial instruments by the host company 





The respondent from UAE reported similar issue in dealing with non-Islamic banks 
either in the Gulf regions or in the Western countries.  
  
“In the case of M&A, Muslim customers who deals with non-Islamic banks 
are wishing to move their transactions to the Halal transactions (interest-
free transactions); we convert debts to the legitimate ones through the use 
of Tawarruq. The amount of risk is high in such conversion transactions, 
because the bank acquiring the non-Islamic bank has to pay the amount of 
debt and extra amount for the final settlement. In order to compensate 
this; the Islamic banks will have to increase the operating cost up to 20-
30%. This will ultimately affect the competitiveness of the Islamic bank in 
the region.  Therefore, it is very less likely that Islamic banks will sign any 
M&A deals with the non-banks”. [P9-B-UAE]  
  
  
This finding  is similar to Lakshmana’s (2015), who reported that although the rationale 
for the conversion might seems acceptable, there is no guarantee that the conversion 
process will be issue free or runs smoothly. Therefore, the main issues pointed out by 
the above statements are debt creation and the excessive cost of implementation of 
Islamic financial instruments involved in removing the non-Islamic financing 
instruments used by the conventional banks.  
  
  
The bottom line is that Islamic financial instruments play a key role in facilitating the 
M&A activities. However, there are some controversies about the legality and validity 
of some of these instruments due to the challenges in the way of making financial 
instruments fully Shariah compliant and in creating a consensus among the Shariah 
scholars across the Gulf countries to formulate a uniform  Shariah standard for widely 
used instruments. The financial industry in the region also needs to innovate and 
develop further financial products in addition to those already existing, to facilitate 
cross-border M&A activities.  It can be concluded that the use of Islamic financial 
instrument in the process of cross-border M&A is challenging,  and at times, costly, due 
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to  the ways in which the  non-Islamic  financial companies operate  using financial 
instruments with interest as key profit making instruments, and this situation requires 
balancing the trade-offs by both parties. 
  
  
4.9 Chapter Summary  
The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of Shariah CG on cross-
border M&A in three Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE) and to contribute 
to the literature by enriching the existing literature on CG and exploring the differences 
in the Shariah CG practices and mechanisms within three Gulf countries.  This chapter 
presented results and analysis of the data collected from interview with 40 respondents 
from 15 financial institutions in three Gulf countries. Three categories of informants 
(lawyers, Shariah board members/Shariah scholars and managers) with hands-on 
knowledge, experience, and expertise on the topic of the study were interviewed. The 
key findings indicated the emergent nature of Islamic CG principles; how the required 
compliance to Shariah laws and principles, and differences in interpretation of the 
Shariah principles by Shariah scholars could be both enabler and constraining, the 
underdevelopment of Islamic legal structure and the problematic nature of use of 
Islamic financial instruments during the cross-border M&A between Islamic and non-
Islamic financial companies.  
  
Perceptions of interviewees are consistent with three management theories i.e. 
Stakeholders’ theory, Stewardship theory and Agency theory that impact CG 
mechanisms including BOD members, SSB members and auditors who play a 
significant role in facilitating cross-border M&A. However, respondents revealed key 
obstacles to the success of cross-border M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic 
companies such as the need for Shariah compliance (prohibition of Riba, obligation of 
Zakat and Islamic inheritance law), weak system of disclosure, lack of independence, 
corruption in compliance, existence of family members in the Board, weakened 
communication with external auditors, different interpretations of Shariah by different 
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scholars, Islamic inheritance law and lack of alternative Islamic financial instruments. 






















CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
  
 
5.1 Chapter Overview  
This chapter presents summary of key findings, conclusions, contributions and 
implications of the study. It is organised as follows. Following this Introduction, 
summary of key findings is presented followed by the main conclusions of the study. 
Barriers to effective Islamic CG, and Islamic CG are the focus of the conclusions. The 
study’s theoretical contributions are discussed in section four followed by the 
implications and recommendations in section five. Given the focus of the study, the 
study implications and recommendations relate to the regulatory bodies, Shariah 
supervisory board, management and investors.  Section six identifies and discusses the 
research limitations and ideas for future studies. The last section presents ‘final note on 
the initial research objectives   
 
5.2 Key Findings 
 
 
This thesis examined the influence of Shariah-based CG on cross-border M&A 
involving Islamic financial companies in three Gulf countries and non-Islamic financial 
companies from the Western countries. Overall, seven key findings emerged from the 
analysis of semi-structured interviews with 40 respondents who were purposively 
selected from 15 financial companies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE and the relevant 
empirical literatures and theories. These findings were: 
1. In terms of corporate governance, there were variations among the three 
countries regarding the extent to which Islamic CG model is adopted and 
employees are aware of the CG principles, and how the conventional CG model 
is practised.  Whilst Saudi Arabia adopts Anglo-Saxon model with Shariah 
184  
  
enshrined in it, both Kuwait and UAE are keen in embracing any CG models in 
modified form to conform to the Shariah principles.  In both Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, employees were found to be less aware of the CG principles whilst 
growing awareness by employees was evident in case of the UAE.  Islamic 
companies found difficulties to applying conventional CG model in Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait but such companies were likely to apply the conventional CG model 
provided that they conform to business practices allowed by Shariah principles. 
All the three countries do not have written code of practice but the compliance 
with the Shariah principles is a must. 
 
2. In terms of CG mechanisms, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait tended to have weak 
system of disclosure (in particular Zakat), and small board dominated by family 
and less qualified members. In contrast, high level of disclosure and larger, 
diversified and competent board exist in the UAE.  In addition, whilst companies 
in UAE use three layers of compliance through SSB, internal and external 
Shariah auditors, SSB and Internal auditors in Kuwait and only SSB in Saudi 
Arabia are used as mechanism to ensure compliance to Shariah principles and 
transparency.   
 
3. Incorporating Islamic principles in business practices such as screening provision 
of products and service in these three countries is primarily determined by the 
interpretation of Shariah by internal Shariah Board or external Shariah audit or 
by both. However, the study found the importance of having in place appropriate  
legislative provision for effective application of Shariah laws as the three 
countries adopted different stances from passive (market-driven in Saudi Arabia) 
,  minimalist intervention  of law ( Kuwait), to ensuring compliance with external 
Shariah audits in UAE. However, this study found that all the three countries’ 





4. The taken-for-granted views regarding the family inheritance, women and 
business, the study found, are likely to influence negatively the extent to which 
some aspects of the Islamic CG is to be practised and become effective.  For 
example, gender differentiation and the dominance of family members in board 
were likely to lead to lack of diversity in Board composition and experience and 
hence negatively affected the effective use of CG principles.  The reported poor 
understanding of the Western business concepts, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 
particular, is likely to influence how successfully the initiatives seeking cross-
border M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic financial companies could be 
undertaken. Women in the SA faced work place segregation when compared 
women in Kuwait and UAE.  
 
 
5. The three countries differed in the ways in which companies could be impacted 
because of the ways in which Shariah scholars interpret sharia law in reference to 
business practices. The findings of this study showed that Saudi Arabia is 
typified by most conservative interpretations whilst Kuwait and UAE tend to 
have more liberal and most liberal, respectively, interpretation of the Shariah 
principles.  Furthermore, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait companies had to go 
through complex procedure as compared to complex but flexible approach in 
UAE, when dealing with M&A issues with non-Islamic companies. Though this 
study documented evidences which suggest an increasing number of non-Islamic 
financial companies are cognizant of the need for compliance to Shariah 
principles, they need to understand how the countries’ context affects the Islamic 
financial companies’ ability and latitude when seeking cross-border M&A 
activities with non-Islamic companies.  
 
6. Islamic corporate legal structures in the three countries are characterised by 
similarities and differences in Shariah supervisory board composition and 
selection, adoption of AAOIFI guidelines and issues relating to conflict of 
interest. In SA and Kuwait most Islamic financial companies have SSB made up 
of external scholars whereas internal SSB made up of scholars features in UAE 
186  
  
companies. Boards tend to have no fixed size and being appointed by BOD or 
CEOs in both SA and Kuwait whilst shareholders select SSB in UAE. In all the 
three countries, AAOIFI standards are not considered mandatory for adoption 
but serve as a reference when dealing Shariah compliance issues. 
 
 
7. In terms of Islamic financial instruments, Sukuk is the most widely used but 
costly financial instrument in cross-border M&A activities as it fully complies 







Table5-1: Table of Findings  
SN  Theme/Sub-Themes   Saudi Arabia  Kuwait  UAE  
  Corporate Governance (CG)  
1  Adoption of Islamic CG 
model  
Mainly follow Anglo-Saxon model 
with Shariah enshrined in it.  
Willing to adopt any CG model that can be modified to comply with 
Shariah principles.  
2   Code of practice  
  
No written code of practice but compliance to Shariah principles is based on the interpretations of Shariah 
scholars.  
3  The degree of awareness 
of CG principles  
Most employees are not fully 
aware of Islamic CG and there is 
no effort by the Government to 
increase the awareness.  
Most of the employees are not fully 
aware of Islamic CG as the concept 
is seen as quite recent and new.  
There is a growing awareness of 
Islamic CG in the UAE and many 
companies actively undertake 
periodic appraisal to improve it.  
4  Applicability of 
conventional CG model  
  
Cannot be applied directly to the Islamic companies due to strong 
religious and cultural beliefs.  
Can be applied but with 
modification of areas that clearly 
violate requirements of Shariah.  
  Corporate Governance Mechanisms  




Weak system of disclosure, especially Zakat, which can be improved by 
better qualified and experienced SSB.  
Payment of Zakat is compulsory.  
Higher level of disclosure due to 
involvement in international 
environment.   
Disclosure and payment of Zakat  




SN  Theme/Sub-Themes  Saudi Arabia  Kuwait  UAE  
6  Board size and 
characteristic   
Board are small (usually family members), members might not be 
suitably qualified and rarely women can be included based only on 
ownership.  
Bigger and better  
Qualified Board with members 
from diverse backgrounds, 
including women and foreigners.  
7  Ensuring  




Compliance only through SSB. No 
Shariah internal or independent 
external audit leads to poor 
transparency.   
Compliance through SSB and 
Shariah internal auditors, however 
they might lack financial and 
economic knowledge. Also, no 
independent external Shariah audit 
leads to inadequate transparency.  
Three layers of Shariah 
compliance through SSB, internal 
Shariah auditors and independent 
external Shariah auditors with 
better qualifications and 
experience ensures greater 
transparency.   
Incorporating Islamic Principles (Shariah law) in the Business  
8   Scope  of  International  
M&A  
Adoption of Islamic products is not limited to Islamic countries as there are potential customers even in non-
Islamic countries.  
9  Shariah screening of 
products, services and 
transactions  
Compliance based on the interpretation of Shariah by internal Shariah 
Board or external consultants.  
As in case of SA and Kuwait, but 
increasing subject to external 
Shariah audit.  
10  Legislative provision  No legislation. Passive approach,  Minimal intervention but law  Ensure Shariah compliance  
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Letting market develop its own 
Shariah governance system.  
requires Islamic companies to 
comply with Shariah.  
through external Shariah audit.  
  
SN  Them/Sub-Themes  Saudi Arabia  Kuwait  UAE  
  Cultural Influences  
11  Islamic inheritance law  
  
Shariah clearly defines the law of inheritance based on composition and gender of family members. Family 
size tends to be larger with an average of 7 to 8 children which compounds the number of owners through 
inheritance.  
12  Women at workplace  
  
  
Women are not allowed to work in 
the same places with men.  
Women work in the same places 
but at lower levels and there is 
legislation to protect women from 
harassment.  
Women work in the same places 
and at all levels with men.  
13   Business culture and  
decision making  
  
Lack of investment culture. Poor understanding of Western business 
concepts. However, in insurance sector there is better engagement with 
non-Islamic companies.  
Better business culture and 
understanding but threat of  
increasingly negative perception of 
Islam post 9/11 and European 
refugee crisis.  
  Need for Shariah Compliance in M&A  
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14  Effect of Shariah 





Most conservative in adherence to 
Shariah principles and have poor 
understanding of non-Islamic 
business concepts.  
  
More liberal than SA in the 
interpretation of Shariah principles 
but have poor understanding of 
non-Islamic business concepts.  
Most liberal in the interpretation of 
Shariah principles and provide 
training in modern business 
concepts to their Shariah scholars.  
  
  
SN  Theme/Sub-Themes  Saudi Arabia  Kuwait  UAE  
15  Special way of dealing by 
non- Islamic companies  
Non-Islamic companies are becoming aware of the need for Shariah compliance by Islamic companies and are 
developing better appreciation of the principles to help compliance or identify acceptable work-around.  
16  Complexities of merging 
Islamic and non-Islamic 
practices  
Have complex procedures in dealings between Islamic and non-Islamic 
companies in respect to M&A, compounded by the subjectivity in 
Shariah interpretation.  
Have complex procedures but these 
are more flexible and adopt more 
liberal approach.  
  Islamic Corporate Legal Structure  
17  Shariah Supervisory  
Board (SSB)  
Most Islamic companies have SSB made up of external scholars.  UAE mostly has internal SSB 
made up of scholars employed by 
company.  
18  Selection criteria and 
number of Shariah  
Supervisory Board  
No fixed size. BODs select the 
SSB members.  
No fixed size. BODs or  
CEOs select the SSB members.  
SSB members elected by 





19  Adoption of AAOIFI 
guidelines  
AAOIFI standards are not mandatory for adoption by Islamic financial institution but serve as useful 
guidelines in case of all Shariah compliance issues.  
20  Conflict of interest  Shariah Board members are expected not to have shares or display traces of their own interest. However, this 
cannot be ruled out in case of external SSB members due to monetary remuneration.  
21   Variation in structure of  
Shariah compliance  
Different interpretations as a result of Shariah scholars’ views, 
especially in the context of poor understanding of business issues.  
Different interpretations can exist 
but process of agreement across 
the three layers of compliance 
ensures more standard decisions.  
SN  Theme/Sub-Themes  Saudi Arabia  Kuwait  UAE  
  Islamic Financial Instruments  
22  Sukuk  
  
Sukuk is the most popular financial instrument and it was structured based on Shariah principles with regard 
to cross-border M&A, as it is non-controversial and fully compliant with Shariah.  
23  Tawarruq  
  
The concept of Tawarruq is considered suspect in terms of Shariah compliance and is frequently rejected by 
scholars who are increasingly encouraging Islamic financial institutions to look for alternatives to the 
Tawarruq structure.  
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5.3 Conclusion  
  
5.3.1 Main Barriers to Cross-Border M&A  
Focusing on the findings summarised in the table, the following are the key obstacles to the 
success of cross-border M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic companies:  
 
The first barrier is the need for Shariah compliance. Since the conventional CG model does 
not lend itself readily to Islamic companies use, it needs to be modified. The main challenge 
to overcome is the elimination of all transactions involving interest payables and receivables. 
As Riba or interest is prohibited in Islam, all interest-bearing transactions have to be replaced 
by a Shariah acceptable alternative.  There is a multiplicity of practices and even some 
tolerance of interest when this is replaced by donation of the same amount to charitable 
causes. The process is costly as it consumes a lot of time and effort. Both the Islamic and 
non-Islamic companies are required to know what is allowed and not in order avoid 
confusion and delays. However, this is proving difficult as there is no commonly accepted 
code of practice for Shariah CG and as interpretations of the sharia principles by Shariah 
scholars vary across the countries, with UAE being most liberal and SA being most 
conservative.   
  
The second barrier related to the weak system of disclosure, found in SA and Kuwait due to 
low level qualification, experience and insular business practices while UAE has high level of 
disclosure due to involvement in an international environment. One area of deficiency is the 
information on Zakat. Even for the conventional cross-border M&A, dual taxation is a 
problem (Di Giovanni, 2005), which manifests in the form of Zakat and corporate tax or even 
dual-Zakat in the Islamic context. In SA and Kuwait, Zakat is compulsory and collected by 
the Government. In UAE, however, payment and disclosure of Zakat is optional and hence 
this barrier does not exist.  
  
A third  barrier common to all the countries arises from the Islamic inheritance law, under 
which the business is transferable to the closest blood relations of the business owner, in a 
quite complex manner based on the composition and gender of the family members (See 
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Appendix 1).  Compounded with the relatively larger family size in Gulf countries (Hamadeh 
et al., 2008), this can create fragmentation of ownership, allow members with insufficient 
knowledge and experience on the BOD and create uncertainty of future ownership structure 
for non-Islamic companies.  
  
Fourth, a strict gender-segregated working environment is also a significant barrier in case of 
Islamic companies in a conservative environment as M&A with non-Islamic companies will 
have to contend with the values of equality and diversity in the workplace and even female 
executives in senior roles. Also, implementing Shariah principles on non-Muslim employees 
may create resistance, for example, when there is condition to cover their head.  
  
The fifth constraint is the lack of alternative Islamic financial instruments to fund M&A as 
the most popular Shariah compliant instrument is Sukuk, which involves a much higher cost 
compared to the conventional bond and bank loan. Islamic companies incur substantial costs 
in converting an interest-bearing loan to Sukuk. Also, because Sukuk is asset backed in terms 
of the value of the asset as well as revenues generated by the asset, the Sukuk holder faces a 
potential risk of sharing a loss if the asset generates a loss. The alternative sometimes used is 
Tawarruq, which is controversial and has been rejected by many Shariah scholars. There is a 
need for innovative and more cost effective Shariah compliant financial instruments.  
  
Finally, absence of uniform, standardised, interpretation of Shariah laws/principles is also 
found to be very problematic.  As it stands currently, different scholars could provide 
different interpretations. On one hand, there is flexibility of interpreting Shariah to suit 
different circumstances in different countries, which may be misused as a manifestation of 
agency behaviour. On the other hand, this could create challenges in an increasingly global 
world, requiring more uniform and predictable approach. Relatedly,  in case of SA and 
Kuwait, SSB members have insufficient knowledge about and in some cases even lack any 
motivation to understand conventional business practices and hence not able to question the 
validity of the interpretations. In extreme cases, scholars with an insular outlook might even 
introduce unnecessary complexities just to prevent an Islamic company not to successfully 





5.3.2 Corporate Governance Model for an Islamic Company   
Based on the above discussion, it would be useful to consider a CG model for an Islamic 
company to fully appreciate the possible behavioural issues that may arise out of the need and 
mechanism for Shariah compliance on cross-border M&A. This is particularly important as 
most of the existing literature on Islamic finance or Islamic way of conducting business is 
found to be uncritical and promotional in nature, readily identifying potential good systemic 
practices but not evaluating the role of human actors in sufficient depth to identify possible 
behavioural problems arising from the compliance mechanism.  
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The model above links three management theories offering two opposing perspectives on the 
possible behaviour of the stakeholders in terms of CG within Islamic company generally and 
especially in the context of cross-border M&A. Stewardship theory is an idealistic theory 
based on the view that the business executives are stewards of the business and therefore have 
a behaviour that transcends individual gain or self-interest through self-discipline. In the 
context of an Islamic company, those who are entrusted to ensure Shariah compliance are 
presumed to act objectively at the highest level of ethical values as emphasised by Maqasid 
Al-Shariah and implement the compliance fully in terms of both the letter and spirit. Parallel 
to the BOD is the SSB, composed of one or more Islamic scholars, who may be externally or 
internally appointed to carry out assessment of all existing and newly proposed products, 
services and operations of the Islamic company.  
  
The implementation of Shariah compliance is supported by Shariah internal auditors in some 
companies to ensure that the SSB decisions are appropriately carried out. In UAE, we also 
see the introduction of external Shariah auditors to independently confirm Shariah 
compliance. Since the decisions may have to be made in the context of novel products and 
situations, the different layers provide an opportunity of interaction and dialogue. Such a 
Shuratic process of consensual decision making is allowed and indeed encouraged as stated 
in Qur’an in Al-Shura (42:38). In case of externally appointed SSB members who serve on 
the SSB of multiple companies, there is an opportunity to interact with diversity of opinions 
solving a broad range of problems in different commercial backgrounds and differing 
circumstances in an ongoing Shuratic process. This can ensure more uniform Shariah 
compliance and help in development of new and better Islamic financial instruments to 
replace controversial instruments like Tawarruq which might superficially comply with 
Shariah in terms of letter but not in terms of spirit.  
  
Even from a stewardship perspective, those involved in ensuring Shariah compliance might 
not be able to take optimal decisions in the interest of all the stakeholders or benefit fully 
from the Shuratic process, if they do not have sufficient commercial knowledge to fully 
understand the constraints and opportunities offered by commercial context of their decisions.   
In case of the demise of an owner, there could be a number of successors based on different 
situations as explained in Appendix 1. However, under the stewardship perspective, the 
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successors are presumed to act in the best interest of the business and are not likely to pose 
any challenge other than the fragmentation of ownership and the possible costs and delays 
involved in decision making.  
  
A potential problem that could arise from the complex Islamic inheritance law relates to the 
BOD of non-Islamic company, who in their role of the steward for their stakeholders might 
find it difficult to contend with the uncertainty of succession in case of the demise an Islamic 
company owner.   
  
However, Agency theory is an opposing perspective to Stewardship theory, where the nature 
of human behaviour is taken into account, especially when managers as agent of the owner 
act to maximise their own individual gains even at the expense of the owner and other 
stakeholders. In the context of an Islamic company, in addition to BOD, the SSB also manage 
the affair of the company and share in the full authority to implement all business strategies, 
plans, compliance and decisions. The SSB provide Shariah advisory and consultancy to BOD 
in all aspects relating to product, services and business transactions to be Shariah compliant.  
  
The SSB members issue Fatawa on a particular commercial issue and the advice can be 
different based on different interpretation of relevant Shariah principles. However, they may 
have insufficient commercial knowledge and experience, which might affect their decisions. 
The BOD can influence the SSB members to be favourably inclined towards the BOD’s 
decisions because they determine the consultation fee or the remuneration.  Since the 
remunerations of the SSB members  and the Fatawa issued by them are not made public, 
unlike the BOD, it is difficult to make the SSB members accountable by ascertaining the 
originators of the decisions and identifying who could have influenced the decision.  This is a 
weakness in Shariah CG in terms of disclosure and transparency.   
  
The SSB members might be working with many companies due to limited number of 
qualified Shariah scholars (Ali & Al-Aali, 2015). The effect of the memberships on multiple 
SSB might lead to inadequate time to allow for proper analysis and consideration of all 
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relevant issues. This also could lead to rush decisions, which might not be optimal. Another 
drawback is the risk of leakage of a company’s confidential information to another company 
by the SSB members, either inadvertently or deliberately for personal gain. Membership of 
multiple SSB might also lead to ‘group think’ behaviour creating a barrier in independently 
judging situations. There is no regulatory body that provides a code of practice on privacy 
and sharing of information to inform, govern and penalise the behaviour of the Shariah 
scholars serving on multiple SSB (Bakr, 2001).   
  
Similarly, the possibility that the external or internal Shariah auditors, who ensure 
implementation of Shariah compliance, might co-operate to protect each other’s interest 
cannot be ruled out. There are few recognised Shariah scholars in the market (Farook & 
Farooq, 2011; McBain ,2013), who are bound to be familiar with each other and there may 
also be a pecking order based on reputation, making it difficult to be critical of other scholar’s 
opinions.  This can contribute to agency behaviour and weaken the Shariah CG model.  
  
When new issues or situations arise in business that are not well defined in the primary 
sources of Islam Qur’an and Sunnah, the SSB members can adopt a secondary source of 
Islam known as Qiyas. Qiyas is a deductive analogy, in which the new issue or situation is 
compared to an existing issue or situation for which there is a ruling based on primary 
sources and in case of close similarity, the same ruling is applied. However, the SSB might 
not be able to fully provide an optimal solution due to their lack of understanding of the 
complexity of the business issues involved.   
  
Also, in case of well experienced SSB members, they may be able to use this lack of 
knowledge to justify any agency behaviour and offer it as a defence when they are 
questioned. For example, Zakat is a religious tax that is payable on growing capital as well as 
real assets. The payment of Zakat is compulsory in some countries such as SA and Kuwait, 
while in some countries it is voluntary such as in UAE.  The SSB is entrusted with the task of 
determining the Zakat payable. However, the BOD might provide inaccurate financial data to 
reduce the Zakat and the SSB members, not having business knowledge, may not be able to 
challenge it. Alternatively, the Shariah scholars may collude with BOD in order to disclose 
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lesser amount of Zakat, especially if the organisation is financially unstable or to reduce the 
financial burden on the company. In this case, the SSB members can still offer the lack of 
business knowledge as a defence. Underpayment of Zakat may be as prevalent as 
underpayment of taxes in conventional businesses.  
  
Also, in case of the demise of an owner, there could be a number of successors depending on 
different situations (see Appendix 1), fragmenting the ownership. These successors may not 
work in the best interest of the business and may demonstrate agency behaviour by trying to 
maximise their own gain.  
  
Whilst on the surface, an Islamic company would appear to be more and better regulated due 
to an additional Board level managerial control through SSB and the Shariah auditors, who 
are guided by religious conviction in theory. This would indeed be the case if all the 
concerned parties acted as stewards of the business in the interest of the stakeholders and in 
the wider societal interest as required by Islam. However, behaviour aspects of human beings 
cannot be discounted and the presumption of stewardship needs to be carefully examined. In 
reality, an Islamic company may offer greater opportunities for agency behaviour compared 
to a conventional company and the literature on Islamic Governance may have to be more 
critical than currently available to capture some of these complexities.  
 
5.4 Original Contributions 
  
This study makes five significant theoretical contributions. These are: 
 
1. The first contribution of this thesis that it is the first of its kind that sought to study the 
influence of the Islamic CG principles on cross-border M&A between Islamic and 
non-Islamic financial companies. In doing so, this study contributed in furthering 
scholarly understanding of:1) what constitutes Islamic CG and how it differs from the 
conventional CG models; 2) how and to what extent Islamic CG is practised and its 
limitations; 3) compatibility and challenges in accommodating various stakeholders’ 
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interest in enforcing Shariah compliance; and 4) issues needed to be considered for 
successful cross-border M&A between the Islamic and non-Islamic companies. 
 
2. The second contribution of this thesis is the development of the CG model which helps 
to further our understanding of the complex issues involved in the process of cross-
border M&A between Islamic and non-Islamic companies.  As far as this researcher’s 
knowledge, this CG model is the first of its kind in the study context. This CG model 
can be used by scholars to examine not only cross-border M&A activities across 
different industries but also more broadly the ways in which the Islamic CG principles, 
enforcement mechanisms, transparency and disclosure, and accountability are shaped 
by larger contextual factors such as culture & religion. Better scholarly understanding 
of the above issues could inform timely and appropriate policy and business practices 
in the study area and thus may improve the GCC countries firms’ experience in 
globalised business environment.  
 
3. The third contribution of the study to extend agency, stewardship and stakeholder 
theories in view of the development of behavioural Shariah CG model in critical 
manner.  Whilst the stakeholder approach is likely to provide holistic perspectives in 
informing the expectations, behaviour and actions of different stakeholders, the agency 
and stewardship by different interest groups could also play an important role in 
enabling or constraining the firms’ motivation and ability to expand internationally or 
nationally. The existence of additional layer of the Islamic CG consisting Shariah 
scholars, the SSB, internal and externalSshariah auditors, as agent and stakeholders, 
could complicate the Islamic CG as they tend to have more latitude and opportunities 
for agency behaviour compared that is possible within a conventional CG framework.  
In relation to stewardship theory also the inheritance practices of these countries are 
less likely to promote the interest of owners in case of cross-border M&A context. 
This suggests the Islamic CG to be more critical in its stance. Thus, this study 
provided critiques on the existing literature on Islamic finance or Islamic way of 
conducting business by identifying both positive and negative practices as well as 
elucidating the behaviours and actions of different stakeholders. The implication is 
that use of multiple lenses along the contextual factors is important if we want to 
understand the companies’ (stakeholders’) behaviours and the potential consequence 
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of their behaviours.    The study result can be useful and applicable to contexts where 
Islamic Shariah principles have significant influence on business activities.  
 
4. Fourthly, the study identified gaps in the existing Islamic CG model, in particular the 
difficulties of knowing deficiency of the advice provided regarding Shariah 
compliance, underdevelopment of relevant infrastructure, inadequate or limited  
business knowledge by management, BOD, SSB and Shariah scholars of the Western 
business context and under defined or emergent legal provisions in support of Shariah 
principles, low level awareness of the conventional CG  and its code of conduct and 
possible cause of variations in Shariah compliance which highlighted the difference 
between the presumed stewardship behaviour and the reality of agency behaviour . 
Such identification of the limitations of the current Islamic CG models helped to draw 
relevant implications for various stakeholders (see section below). 
 
5. The fifth theoretical contribution is what might explain the gap between rhetoric and 
reality of stewardship and agency problems in the study context. This study identified 
malpractice as source of lack of integrity of agents (e.g., corrupt or selfish Shariah 
scholars or collusion between the BOD and SSB members to gain unfair advantages) 
and such situation heightens the expectation gap between what is presumed and what 
can reasonably be presumed for a human being (see figure 5.2 below). The below 
figure shows a range of different individual behaviours to represent an integrity gap, 
where the outcomes will depend on individual or a group’s collective integrity. 








While this theoretical construct has been derived for the Islamic CG, it is equally valid 
for the conventional CG, where respect for professional or social status may cloud 
judgement about the expected stewardship behaviour of individuals in position of 
authority and the varying levels of integrity demonstrated by such persons individually 
or collectively. This study thus contributed in identifying ways of mitigating such 
agency behaviour by: 1) having a larger size board; 2) practising consultative, 
participative, consensual decision making in line with Shariah guidance, Shura 
(stakeholder consultative participation) process justified by the epistemology of 
Tawhid, meaning oneness of God and hence unity of knowledge (Choudhury & 
Hoque, 2006). 
 
The analysis of the different theories such as agency, stakeholders and stewardship theories in 
relation to cultural and religious perspectives examined in the study help to show how these 
theories can help us in grasping the possible behavioural variations between the ideal and the 
reality of Islamic CG. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to examine any additional 
theories that may help in understanding the unique features and practices of Islamic 
  MALPRACTICE   
Presumed Stewardship  
Behaviour  
Reality of Agency  
Behaviour  





companies and contribution these can make to the wider management, organisational and 




5.5 Implications and Recommendation  
  
5.5.1 For Regulatory Bodies   
Firstly, the results of this study and existing literature showed: 1) the non-existence of 
universal standards which help to harmonise conventional business practices with the Islamic 
CG principles and, 2) diversity of culture across Muslim countries make it difficult to 
construct universal standards applicable to all Muslim countries.  The study recommends 
IFSB and AAOIFI to continue with their efforts of constructing a common standard that will 
be acceptable to all the Islamic financial institutions and provide a uniform basis for Shariah 
scholars’ interpretation to mitigate subjective and multiple interpretations by Shariah 
scholars.  
To overcome such challenges, the various bodies might need to adopt a multilateral approach 
in working together to develop an Islamic CG model that is in harmony with the modern 
times and promoting practices that are beneficial to wider society as enshrined in Islam. 
Though it may have flexibility to incorporate diverse socio-cultural practices, there may be a 
need to move away from too much reliance on individual Fatawa. This would ensure clear 
processes of business dealings that would be easier to understand by non-Islamic businesses.  
  
5.5.2 Shariah Scholars’ roles, accountability and competence  
This study provided insight into the role of SSB members and, internal and external Shariah 
auditors who are responsible for ensuring all business dealings - products, services and 
transactions- are in line with the principles of Shariah. It is observed that Islamic companies 
in the three selected countries trust Shariah scholars and expect high degree of 
responsibilities and professionalism in accomplishing duties required. Although their 
accountability is to the only and one God, there could be a conflict of interest among Shariah 
scholars leading to agency behaviour. Therefore, there is need for independence for Shariah 
scholars and one possible way of addressing this, would be for the Government regulatory 
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body such as Market Authority or Monetary Authority to appoint Shariah scholars to work on 
the SSB for different companies and pay them the remuneration, while charging the 
companies for the service.  Such arrangement is likely to mitigate principal- agent problem, 
conflict of interest and enables provision of quality and competent service. In addition, it is 
reported that there are some companies with a single scholar on the SSB, so there is a need to 
increase the number of SSB members in line with AAOIFI guidelines in order to ensure a 
Shuratic process, as provided by Islam, to deal with novel situations rather than rely on 
idiosyncratic decisions of an individual.   
  
  
Overall, there is a shortage of Shariah scholars, which has led in past to some inadequacies in 
ensuring Shariah compliance, therefore there is a need for many qualified and trained 
Shariah scholars who specialise in “Fiqh-al-Muamalat” or knowledge of Shariah and finance 
to be able to serve in the commercial sector. While there are Islamic universities running 
Master’s and Doctoral programmes in Shariah, these would cover different Shariah laws 
affecting all aspects of life and many of the scholars trained on these programmes work in the 
legal profession or in advisory capacity in Government appointments.   
  
  
Also, as a very few Shariah scholars have knowledge of both the Islamic and the 
conventional business practices, it is important for the Islamic companies or Government 
authorities to arrange for systematic training in contemporary business practices under 
experienced mentors to encourage better informed decisions and even suggestions for 




5.5.3 Implication and Recommendation for Management  
There are many CG related issues such as nepotism, small size BOD, lack of accountability, 
lack of independence due to family ties and lack of business competence. To improve the CG, 
it is necessary to have a clear and well-defined CG code of practice to be followed by all 
companies. Also, there should be management and contemporary business training for those 
joining the  BOD on the basis of being family members or through inheritance. It must be 
noted that this may not apply wholly to UAE, where professional appointments are made on 
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BOD and the Government is proactive in ensuring better CG through supporting mechanism 
like ‘Hawkamah’ institution. In fact, UAE is also at forefront of applying Shariah CG in the 
Gulf region.  
  
  
Moreover, there can be conflict of interest as the SSB members, the internal and external 
Shariah auditors are appointed by BOD. Transparency and disclosure for such appointments   
would crucial to make sure the various stakeholders’ interests are served.  
  
  
In case of Zakat, any M&A will create a dual-taxation situation. This can happen even within 
two Islamic countries such as SA and Kuwait, both requiring payment of Zakat, thus 
duplicating the payment. While the low rate of Zakat at 2.5% may not create much problem, 
it could become significant when companies are not doing too well due to competitive 
pressure. The issue of dual-taxation, therefore, needs to be tackled as a matter of principle.  
  
  
5.5.4 Implication and Recommendation for Investors  
The research findings showed some challenges facing Islamic companies in M&A. The study 
also found that the owners of Gulf businesses have poor investment culture and lack relevant 
knowledge to evaluate the opportunities and risks to expand their businesses. Since the 
financial resources are pooled up from their friends and relations based on trust and loyalty, 
they do not know how or have experience to attract investments for large-scale growth, either 
organic or through M&A. Therefore, potential investors are advised to acquire skills and 
competence through training, business support, consultancy  and participation in trade fairs.   
Investors are also needed to be cognizant of attracting foreign  businesses  with good business 
ethics and social responsibility. 
  
Shariah principles ensure greater social justice and protection of the weak from exploitation 
by, for example, prohibition of interest, obligation to use Zakat for social welfare, prohibition 
of investments in alcohol, gambling etc. businesses which are considered social ills. The 
Islamic companies’ products and services would, therefore, not only be of interests to the 
Muslim population throughout the world but also appeal to many ethical investors. However, 
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leaving Shariah compliance to individual idiosyncratic Fatawa is confusing and gives rise to 
uncertainty in the minds of non-Islamic investors. Therefore, there is a need for 
standardisation of Islamic products to avoid any confusion, as controversial interpretation of 
Shariah principles and contradicting Fatawa by different scholars on products such as 
Tawarruq will discourage non-Islamic investors.  
  
Also, the lack of clarity and consensus amongst the scholars can lead to malpractice. When 
there has to be some margin of acceptance for prohibited practices, for example, when 
dealing with conventional business partners or in conventional markets some amount of 
interest related transactions may be unavoidable if the Islamic companies have to interact 
with global business. Ahmad (2009) pointed out that an Islamic company may be allowed to 
charge or pay interest at simple rates between 4% and 8%. However, as some scholars point 
out, such liberal interpretations can gradually lead more exceptions and further relaxations to 
ultimately allow the interest based systems to get well entrenched rather than being 
eliminated. It is therefore important to develop a widely-accepted consensus by scholars 
through a process of Shura about acceptable practices, develop an appropriate Islamic CG 
code and adopt it within the commercial law of the various countries.  
   
 
5.6 Limitations  and Suggestions for Future Research 
  
5.6.1 Limitations of the Study  
The research has answered all the research questions; however, there are some limitations, 
which are presented below:  
  
First, in the Gulf countries, it is difficult for a woman researcher to get an agreement for 
interview. Particularly in the case of Shariah scholars, some scholars consider it a bad 
practice to interact with an unrelated female. A further complexity in Saudi Arabia is that, 
even when an agreement for an interview is obtained, the woman researcher needs to be 
chaperoned by the husband or a guardian which makes it difficult to arrange such meeting 
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depending on availability of all the three parties. In some cases, the concerned parties only 
agreed to skype or phone interviews and refused to meet in person.  
  
Second, the researcher initially selected Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE due to their high 
profile in investing abroad. However, due to the political tension between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar at that time, it was difficult to find willing participants though efforts were made over a 
period of three months. In the circumstances, the choice of Qatar had been replaced with 
Kuwait as it is comparable to Qatar in banking and insurance sector.   
Third, the theoretical framework was limited to three theories that have mostly been applied 
in conventional context of CG by researchers in previous studies. In order to provide a better 
explanation of some of the restrictive or conservative decisions by Shariah scholars, which 
might prima-facie be seen as based on subjective bias, alternative theories such as Legitimacy 
theory might have been useful.  However, this would seek an explanation for conservative 
and literal approach, when Islam allows alternative decisions based on the current context. 
This would involve a separate discussion on the tension between a decision-making process 
based on knowledge and that based on wisdom.   
  
Fourth, the research concentrated on the Islamic companies in the banking and insurance 
sectors in the Gulf countries by focusing on the key stakeholders such as the members of SSB 
and BOD, managers and lawyers; which was adequate for the purpose. Perhaps, a richer 
picture could have emerged if there was a dialogue with the family-member owners who are 
not active in managing the business, minority shareholders, managers of non-Islamic 
companies and the Shariah auditors. However, it is very difficult to get access to the non-
managing owners, individual minority shareholders or the key managers of non-Islamic 
companies as they would be based abroad. Since internal auditors are only concerned with the 
implementation the SSB decisions, they may throw some light on the practical 
implementation problems but cannot explain the strategic decision–making process. The 
external Shariah auditor is a relatively new practice only adopted in UAE and is in a nascent 




Fifth, the sample size was sufficient to draw the main conclusions and the sample was 
representative as the overall findings confirmed the initial findings from the pilot study. A 
greater number of participants at various levels in the organisation could have contributed a 
possibly greater range of opinions. However, this would have involved much greater cost and 
time-delays as it was very difficult to obtain access to these individuals and get their 
agreement. Also, some of the Shariah scholars might have been less forthcoming in the 
interviews due to sensitivity of the topic and they might not want to be critical of either the 
fellow scholars or the management.   
  
Sixth, the research was undertaken in three out of the six Gulf countries. While this approach 
may have given a good range of divergent practice based on differing levels of orthodoxy and 
is likely to cover the practices in the remaining three countries, there might be some 
variations based on local culture. Similarly, there might be diversity of practices if the 
findings of this study are to be projected to Islamic companies in other parts of the world, for 
example, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh or Pakistan.   
  
Seventh, Islamic CG is still in a development stage and mainly focussed on the Islamic 
financial instruments. While Shariah compliance is achieved mainly by avoiding the 
prohibited practices, some tolerance and compromises are being proposed, accepted, tested 
and refined with experience.  Some of the findings will be based on the current state of 
Shariah CG and the relatively low volume of M&A between the Islamic and non-Islamic 
companies. This might change over time.  
  
Finally, due to the religion connection, any critical observation on an ethical issue may be 
misconstrued as criticism of a religious belief or practice by some ultra-conservative 
followers, which could pose potential danger especially if the findings of the study are 
presented in an Islamic society. The researcher would like to emphasise that the researcher 
believes the Shariah principles to be just and socially beneficial. Following these principles 
can ensure greater social welfare in the capitalist business practices. Any critical discussion is 
directed at shortcomings of the human behaviour and individual failures on the part of those 
involved in the Shariah compliance.    
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5.6.2   Suggestions for Future Research  
First, cross-border M&A have been used by large organisations to strategically expand their 
business across the globe. Many researchers have studied cross-border M&A within the 
developed countries, where though there are cultural variations; there is a commonality in 
terms of acceptance of the Western business model (for example, Rossi &Volpin, 2004; 
Hennart& Reddy, 1997). There is hardly any literature on companies in the developing 
countries where the culture integrates strong religious beliefs which do not only address 
spiritual matters but the whole way of life. While this study has looked three Gulf countries, 
future research can look at Shariah compliance in other parts of the world.   
  
Second, this study is based on the Stakeholder theory, Stewardship theory and Agency theory. 
However, there can be other theoretical perspectives; for example, Legitimacy theory which 
can help us better understand the unique features and practices of Islamic companies and 
contribution these can make to the wider management, organisational and even corporate 
social responsibility literature.   
  
Third, although many researchers have emphasised the complexity involved in any cross 
border M&A, there is little research on the cross-border M&A involving Islamic companies. 
This study has identified the main barriers of such M&A involving Islamic banks and 
insurance companies in three Gulf countries. There is considerable scope of identifying the 
barriers in other industries, such as Tourism, Travel as the demand for Shariah compliant 
business grows and there is increasing diversification away from Oil based economy.  
  
Four, there is hardly any research on the rate and causes of failure of cross-border M&A 
between Islamic and non-Islamic companies. Learning from such failures will assist the 
future M&A in avoiding failures as well as saving a lot of costs and time-delays. Such 
literature will also inform the emerging institutions like AAOIFI, IFSB etc. concerned with 
Shariah governance, in formulating commonly accepted Islamic standards.   
  
Six, many researchers have pointed out the problem of dual-taxation arising in cross-border  
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M&A and agreements between countries to avoid this. Similarly, there is an issue of dual 
Zakat in case of M&A between two Islamic companies in countries where Zakat is 
compulsory. Generally, companies may not consider this as a big issue as Zakat is only 
payable at 2.5%, however, in future when the Islamic companies engage in competitive 
industries, even this low rate of Zakat may unfavourably impact the profitability. There is 
scope for research on what the right approach to determine the Zakat payable is and how to 
avoid the situation of dual-Zakat payments.   




5.7 A Final Note on the Initial Research Objectives 
 
 
 In the Introduction of this thesis, the researcher stated the purpose of the thesis was to 
examine the influence of Shariah CG on the cross- border M&A between Islamic and non-
Islamic financial companies and set seven research objectives. The first research objective 
sought to identify how the Islamic corporate governance is constituted and its difference from 
the conventional corporate governance model, while the second was to examine to what 
extent the Islamic CG is adopted by the companies. Both the research objectives have been 
sufficiently addressed.  In chapter four the researcher, using thematic analysis, found 
similarity in main CG principles of the two CG models but companies in these three countries 
could not adopt any conventional code of practice without evaluating it on the Islamic Shariah 
principles and culture.  However, the finding of the study also showed that Western 
companies are willing to work with Islamic companies in the Gulf countries with great care 
and that they have an adequate understanding of the need to comply with the Shariah 
principles (4.6.2). In terms of second research objective the findings of this study showed 
variations among the three countries regarding the extent to which Islamic CG model is 
adopted and the level of awareness of employees of the CG principles. 
 The third objective of the thesis sought to examine how the current Islamic CG mechanism 
practised in the three countries enable or constrain   the process of cross-border M&A and 
which cultural factors influence the Islamic CG mechanisms. The analysis of interviews 
showed that whilst the financial reporting and disclosure could be quite similar between 
conventional and Islamic principles, there were differences in the degree of implementation 
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across the sectors and the countries (see section, 4.3.1), and the non-existence of clear code of 
conduct. The study further showed that composition and the size of board, the ownership 
structure, the level of disclosure and transparency and gender segregation combined enable 
and/or constrain the effectiveness of the Islamic corporate mechanisms (sections 4.3.2 & 4.3.3 
& 4.5.1 & 5.2 key finding 2).  The fourth research objective sought to explore to what extent 
Shariah principles were used in business practices of Islamic financial companies and to 
identify active players in interpretation and enforcement of these principles.  The study found 
that though such principles were adhered to and applied, there were inconsistencies and lack 
of uniform application across the cases or countries. Furthermore, the findings showed 
Shariah scholars and Shariah Supervisory Board to be influential actors in enforcing the 
incorporation of Islamic principles in business practices such as screening provision of 
products and service in these three countries (see sections, 4.4.1 & 4.4.2 & 4.6.1) and strict 
application could be restrictive in the process of cross- border M&A (4.3.2 & 4.61) 
The fifth objective set to identify the main barriers for effective implementation of the 
Shariah- based Islamic CG principles in business and in the context of cross-border M&A. 
This research objective was addressed in various sections of the data analysis. The main 
findings included difficulties of knowing deficiency of the advice provided regarding Shariah 
compliance, underdevelopment of relevant infrastructure, inadequate or limited  business 
knowledge by management, BOD, SSB members of the Wester business context, under 
defined or emergent legal provisions in support of Shariah principles, low level awareness of 
the conventional CG, its code of conduct and possible cause of variations in Shariah 
compliance which highlighted the difference between the presumed stewardship behaviour 
and the reality of agency behaviour. 
Research objective six sought to examine the nature and influence of the Islamic legal 
corporate structure on the decision- making process in Islamic companies. The finding of this 
study showed: a) in all the three countries, there is no clear well-defined legislation on how 
Islamic companies engage in M&A locally or at overseas locations; b) the three countries 
adopted different stances from passive (market-driven in Saudi Arabia), minimalist 
intervention of law ( Kuwait), to ensuring compliance with external Sharia audits in UAE ( 
see, 4.4.3).  
Final research objective was to identify the M&A financing instruments used in the context of 
cross-border M&A.  It was found that Sukuk was the most widely used but costly financial 
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instrument in cross-border M&A activities as it fully complies with Shariah principles 
whereas Tawarruq is considered questionable in terms of Shariah. 
In summary, all the research objectives were addressed with rigour and helped to achieve the 
research purpose. All the research objectives were supported with sufficient empirical 
evidence, corroborated with previous extant work and thus provided relevant contributions for 
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Appendix 1: Inheritance according to Islamic Shariah Law  
  
Mawarith- An Islamic Inheritance Calculation Program   
Qur’an 4:11 Allah commands you as regards your children (inheritance),   
To the MALE, a portion equal to that of TWO FEMALES;   
If (there are) only DAUGHTERS, two or more, their share is TWO-THIRDS of the 
inheritance;   
If only one, her share is HALF.   
For PARENTS, a SIXTH share of inheritance to EACH if the deceased left CHILDREN;   
If NO CHILDREN, and the PARENTS are the (ONLY) heirs, the MOTHER has a 
THIRD;   
If the deceased left BROTHERS or (SISTERS), the MOTHER has a SIXTH.   
(The distribution in all cases is) after the payment of legacies he may have bequeathed or 
debts. You know not which of them, whether your parents or your children are nearest to you 
in benefit. (these fixed shares) are ordained by Allah. And Allah is Ever All-Knower, 
AllWise.   
Qur’an 4:12 In that which your WIVES leave, your share is a HALF if they have NO 
CHILD;   
But if they leave a CHILD you get a FOURTH of that which they leave after payment of 
legacies that they may have bequeathed or debts.   
In that which YOU leave, their (YOUR WIVES) share is a FOURTH if you have NO 
CHILD;   
But if you leave a CHILD they get an EIGHTH of that which you leave after payment of 
legacies that you may have bequeathed or debts.   
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If the MAN or WOMAN whose inheritance is in question has left NEITHER 
ASCENDANTS NOR DESCENDANTS (Al-Khalala), but has left a BROTHER or a 
SISTER, EACH ONE of the two gets a SIXTH; but if MORE THAN TWO, they share in 
a THIRD; after payment of legacies he (or she) may have bequeathed or debts, so that no 
loss is caused (to anyone).   
THIS IS A COMMANDMENT FROM ALLAH; And Allah is Ever All-Knowing, Most- 
Forebearing.   
Qur’an 4:176 They ask you for a legal verdict, Say, “Allah directs (thus) about Al-Khalala 
(those who leave neither ascendants nor descendants as heirs).   
If it is a MAN that dies, leaving A SISTER but NO CHILD, SHE shall have HALF the 
inheritance.   
If (such a deceased was) a woman, who left NO CHILD, her BROTHER takes her 
INHERITANCE.   
If there are TWO SISTERS, they shall have TWO-THIRDS of the inheritance;   
If there are BROTHERS and SISTERS, the male will have TWICE the share of the female.   
(Thus) does Allah make clear to you (His Law) lest you go astray. And Allah is the 
AllKnower of everything.   
LEVEL I - PRIMARY (Immediate) HEIRS   
The primary (or immediate) heirs classified as Level I are:-   
1. The SPOUSE (Husband or a maximum of four Wives)   
2. The CHILDREN (Sons and Daughters)   
3. The PARENTS (Father & Mother)   
4. The GRANDCHILDREN (Sons’s SON or Son’s DAUGHTER only)   
(applicable only when the SON is already deceased only and has offspring)   
LEVEL II - SECONDARY HEIRS   
The secondary heirs classified as Level II are:-   
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1. The GRANDPARENTS (Paternal and Maternal)   
2. The BROTHERS and/or SISTERS (In the absence of Father and Son ONLY)   
3. The UNCLES and/or AUNTS (In the absence of Grandparents ONLY)   
4. The NEPHEWS and/or NIECES (In the absence of Brothers and Sisters ONLY)   
Note: It is not practical to go beyond Grandparents as the chances of Greatgrandparents 
surviving before you is not very high. However, the logic is that in the absence of a particular 
heir, the next level becomes eligible for inheritance. Eg; IF the Grandparents are dead THEN 
the Great Grandparents are entitled (if living only) and so on. It is better, for practicality and 
convenience to limit the inheritance level up to The GrandParents and the Grandchildren. If 
we attempt to go beyond these levels there will be no limit to the program logic validation.   
Under Islamic Law, the primary beneficiaries of a deceased person are his/her IMMEDIATE 
(Level I) Heirs. ie; Spouse(s), Children, Parents and Grandchildren (if children are deceased 
only). The Grandchildren that are entitled are only the Son’s Son or the Son’s Daughter. 
Daughters children are not entitled even if the Daughter is deceased.   
In the absence of some or all of these heirs the secondary beneficiaries (Level II) become 
Heirs under various conditions. In the absence of a particular Heir (eg; Uncle) if and when 
he/she is entitled the children of that Heir become eligible.   
LEVEL I - Inheritance Logic:  
1. SHARE OF HUSBAND   
IF NO ENTITLED DESCENDANTS EXIST (ie; Children/Grandchildren)   
THEN   
HUSBAND = 1/2   
IF ENTITLED DESCENDANTS EXIST (ie; Children/Grandchildren)   
THEN   
HUSBAND = 1/4   
Note: ENTITLED DESCENDANTS = Sons, Daughters, Son’s Son, Son’s Daughter.  
Daughter’s children are NOT entitled.   
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2. SHARE OF WIFE   
IF NO ENTITLED DESCENDANTS EXIST (ie; Children/Grandchildren)   
THEN   
WIFE = 1/4   
IF ENTITLED DESCENDANTS EXIST (ie; Children/Grandchildren)   
THEN   
WIFE = 1/8   
Note: ENTITLED DESCENDANTS = Sons, Daughters, Son’s Son, Son’s Daughter.  
Daughter’s children are NOT entitled.   
3. SHARE OF DAUGHTER’(s)   
IF ONLY ONE DAUGHTER (and NO Sons)   
THEN   
DAUGHTER = 1/2   
IF TWO OR MORE DAUGHTERS ONLY (and NO Sons)   
THEN   
DAUGHTERS = 2/3   
(to be shared equally between all of them)   
IF both SON’s & DAUGHTERS EXIST,   
THEN   
SON:DAUGHTER = 2:1   
4. SHARE OF FATHER   
IF ENTITLED DESCENDANTS EXIST   
(Sons, Daughters, Son’s Sons, Son’s Daughters)   
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THEN   
FATHER = 1/6   
IF NO MALE DESCENDANTS EXIST (Sons, Son’s Sons)   
THEN   
FATHER = 1/6 plus Residue   
(residue = remainder after all legal shares are distributed)   
IF NO ENTITLED DESCENDANTS EXIST   
THEN   
FATHER = Residue  5. SHARE OF MOTHER   
IF ENTITLED DESCENDANTS or BROTHERS/SISTERS EXIST   
THEN   
MOTHER = 1/6   
IF NO ENTITLED DESCENDANTS EXIST   
THEN   
IF NO BROTHERS/SISTERS, NO FATHER, NO SPOUSE EXIST   
THEN   
MOTHER = 1/3   
IF BROTHERS/SISTERS, FATHER, or SPOUSE EXIST   
THEN   
MOTHER = 1/3 of Residue  6. UTERINE BROTHER/SISTER ( from same Mother, 
different father)   
IF ONE UTERINE BROTHER/SISTER EXIST   
THEN   
IF NO ENTITLED DESCENDANTS and NO MALE ASCENDANTS   
293  
  
(Father/Father’s Father etc)   
THEN   
UTERINE BROTHER = 1/6 or UTERINE SISTER = 1/6   
IF TWO OR MORE UTERINE BROTHERS/SISTERS EXIST   
THEN   
IF NO ENTITLED DESCENDANTS .AND.NO MALE ASCENDANTS   
(Father/Father’s Father etc.)   
THEN   
ALL UTERINE BROTHERS & SISTERS = 1/3  
Note: If there are UTERINE Brothers/Sisters IN ADDITION to FULL Brothers/Sisters 
(same father/mother), then they share in the residue.   
7. SHARE OF SON’S DAUGHTER   
IF ONE SON’S DAUGHTER EXIST   
THEN   
IF NO DAUGHTERS EXIST   
THEN   
IF NO SON’S SON EXIST   
THEN   
SON’S DAUGHTER = 1/2   
IF SON’S SON EXIST   
THEN   
SON’S DAUGHTER = HALF SHARE OF SON’S SON   
(ie Son’s SON share: Son’s DAUGHTER share = 2:1)   
IF TWO OR MORE SON’S DAUGHTERS EXIST   
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THEN   
IF NO DAUGHTERS EXIST   
THEN   
IF NO SON’S SONs EXIST   
THEN   
SON’S DAUGHTERS = 2/3 (equally between them)   
IF SON’s SON EXISTS   
THEN   
SON’S DAUGHTER = HALF SHARE OF SON’S SON   
(ie Son’s SON share: Son’s DAUGHTER share = 2:1)   
8. SHARE OF FULL BROTHER/SISTER   
(Full Brother/Sisters are brothers/sisters from the same FATHER & MOTHER)   
Brothers & Sisters inherit ONLY when there are NO Descendants (Son/Sons, Son’s son  
etc.) andNO Ascendants (Father/Grandfather etc.)   
The arabic word “AL-KHALALA” is used in the Qur’an, Chapter 4 - Al-Nisa, Verses 12 & 
176, which is translated by almost all the translators of the Qur’an to mean “Ascendants & 
Descendants” thus giving rise to the interpretation that they include “Parents and Children”.  
However, many scholars have preferred to classify the word as meaning “Father or Son” thus 
excluding the female components of both Ascendants and Descendants (mother & daughters).   
IF NO FULL BROTHER and NO FEMALE ENTITLED DESCENDANT EXIST   
(daughter, Son’s daughter etc.)   
THEN   
IF deceased was MALE,   
THEN   
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FULL SISTER = 1/2 (if only ONE)   
IF NO FULL SISTER and NO FEMALE ENTITLED DESCENDANT EXIST   
THEN   
IF deceased was FEMALE,   
THEN   
FULL BROTHER = 1 (if only ONE)   
IF TWO OR MORE BROTHERS & SISTERS   
THEN   
FULL SISTERs = 2/3 (shared equally between them)   
FULL BROTHER’s & SISTER’s (combination) = 2:1   
IF NO FULL BROTHER EXIST but FEMALE ENTITLED DESCENDANT EXIST   
(daughter, Son’s daughter etc.)   
THEN   
FULL SISTER = 1/6 (if only one)   
IF NO FULL SISTER EXIST but FEMALE ENTITLED DESCENDANT EXIST   
THEN   
FULL BROTHER = 1/6 (if only one)   
IF FEMALE ENTITLED DESCENDANT EXIST   
THEN   
FULL SISTERS & BROTHERS = 1/3 (share equally)  9. CONSANGUINE SISTER 
(Sister from same Father but different Mother)   
Consanguine Sisters inherit ONLY when there are NO SON’s or Son’s SON(s) AND NO 
FATHER AND NO FULL BROTHER.   
IF ONLY ONE FULL SISTER AND NO CONSANGUINE BROTHER   
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THEN   
CONSANGUINE SISTER (if only one) = 1/2  CONSANGUINE SISTER(s) (if two or 
more) = 2/3   
IF ONE FULL SISTER AND CONSANGUINE BROTHER(s)   
THEN   
(CONSANGUINE) BROTHER:SISTER = 2:1 10. TRUE GRANDMOTHER   
True Grandmother is defined as the one whose line of connection with the deceased is 
NOT interrupted by a MALE between two FEMALES. They are entitled ONLY if the 
FATHER or MOTHER do not exist.   
Eg; Mother’s MOTHER, Father’s MOTHER   
Father’s Father’s MOTHER, Mother’s Mother’s MOTHER   
TRUE GRANDMOTHER = 1/6  11. TRUE GRANDFATHER   
True Grandfather is the one whose line of connection with the deceased is NOT 
interrupted by a FEMALE between two MALES. They are entitled ONLY if the Father 
or Mother do not exist.  Eg; Father’s FATHER   
Father’s Father’s FATHER   
Mother’s FATHER   
Mother’s Father’s FATHER   
TRUE GRANDFATHER = 1/6 IF MALE DESCENDANTS EXIST (Son, etc)   
TRUE GRANDFATHER = 1/6 + Residue IF FEMALE descendants exist   
TRUE GRANDFATHER = Residue IF NO Male/Female descendants exist   
12. UNCLES & AUNTS (Father’s/Mother’s Brothers & Sisters)   
Uncles and Aunts are ONLY entitled in the absence of GRANDPARENTS. This means that 
they will receive shares ONLY if there are NO Parents AND Grandparents because 
Grandparents do not inherit when the Parents are living. They will also NOT inherit if the 
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children (or children’s children) of the deceased are living. Proportions here are also in the 
ratio of 2:1 for Male:Female.   
13. NEPHEWS & NIECES (Children of Brothers/Sisters)   
Nephews and Nieces are ONLY entitled in the absence of Brothers and Sisters. This means 
that they take the shares of the Brothers/Sisters of the deceased in their absence. Hence a 
Nepew/Niece will receive what his/her parent (Brother/Siuster of the deceased) would have 
received if he/she was alive. They will also NOT inherit if the children (or children’s 
children) of the deceased are living. Proportions here are also 2:1 for Male:Female.  
  
  
    
Appendix 2: Request for Interview  
  
My name is Wardah Bindabel. I am a PhD student in the UK; I am presently working on a 
study to investigated impact of Shariah on cross-border M&A in gulf countries (Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and UAE), between Islamic and non-Islamic companies. I have been able to 
identify some cooperate governance implications of Cross-border M&A with companies in 
Islamic countries which are crucial for my research due to Shariah-compliance issues.  
Despite the economic growth in Gulf countries, enquiry into corporate governance practices 
has focused mainly on the conventional corporation with very limited attention given to 
Islamic corporations. Corporate governance is a vital element of any corporation and presents 
even greater challenges to Islamic corporations, taking into account the additional risks that 
characterize Islamic corporations.  
I believe doing interview (with you) will go a long way to provide me with important 
information/data that would help this study. I would like to assure you that no transfer of data 
or information will take place without prior consultation, all information is required solely for 
this research and any data collected will comply with data protection law.   
Please accept the assurance my highest regards. Please do contact me if you need more 
information about the research and interview.  
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Thank you very much for your time and consideration.  
Yours faithfully,  
    
Appendix 3: Interview Questions for Lawyers  
  
1. What sector of the market are you specialized in?  
2. How long have you been practicing in this area?  
3. Have you been ever involved in cross-border M&A deals?  
4. What were the reasons behind M&A transactions?  
5. What are the legal issues would be able to consider beforehand to ensure that your 
business is in perfect alignment for M&A deals?  
6. From your experience what is likely to go wrong when formulating the deals with 
non-Islamic companies?  
7. What is the role of internal and external audit during M&A?  
8. During due diligence, what is the potential risk, or control or regulatory issues that 
would cause failure of M&A?  
9. Are there any obstacles/ restrictions of growth particularly with the cross-border deals 
in respect to Shariah law?  
10. What are the risks related to the variations in the Shariah based systems across Gulf 
countries?  
11. What are the main differences in the CG practices between the Gulf and Western 
countries?  
12. In the event of cross-border M&A, what are the mechanisms of the company that 
allow all stakeholders to express the opinion?   
13. How can you describe the Muslims’ investors understanding of M&A?  
14. How would you describe the role of tax regime in the Gulf region in M&A?  
15. What is your perception on the impact of Islamic principles on M&A? for example:  
• Principle of  Zakat  
• Impact of prohibited deals such as Riba  
• Limited Islamic financial products  
16. Are there be written Islamic corporate governance that might make or cut short 
M&A?    
17. What would be your assessment of the level of corporate disclosure in the region?  
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18. Since each company has the right to choose the SSB members, does this rise the issue 
of conflict of interest?  
19. ARE there any cultural issues (such as women in workplace, business culture and 
decision making process) that might affect M&A?     
  
Appendix 4: Interview Questions for Shariah Supervisory Board  
  
1. What is your job description? How long you have been practicing in this area?  
2. What is the ultimate goal of Shariah Board in an Islamic company?  
3. What is the required qualification or expereice for Shariah board member’s position?    
4. Concidering the rapid growth of Islamic finance, is there a suffecint number of 
scholars who combine the qualifications and experience needed?  
5. Who assign or appoint SSB members of the company’s Board?   
6. What are the criteria you use for such appointment SSB and are they externally or 
internally appointed?  
7. Is conflict of intrest applicable to external Shariah scholars when reviewing Shariah 
documents and issuing a fatwa?  
  
8. Are young Shariah scholars given the chance to serve on Sharia boards? If no why?  
9. How jurisprudential decision members should be issued?  
10. Are multiple positions in more than one company negatively affects Shariah 
compliance?   
11. How would you describe the role of Shariah Board members and how would Shariah 
scholars operate effectively in an Islamic company?  
12. What are the challeges that Shariah Board members face in an Islamic company?  
13. What are the benefits of Sharia compliance?   
14. How do you describe the relationship between Board members and Shariah Board 
members and how their roles differ from in the company?   
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15. Do you think the formation of other committees of Shariah compliance such as 
external Shariah Auditing will enhance the process of accountability?   
• If no, why?  
• If yes, how?  
16. Do you think the establishment of a committee in charge of Shariah compliance 
which would ensure compliance across the Gulf countries has an impact on the 
performance of Islamic companies?   
17. In your opinion, what would you consider to be the main risk of the financial reward 
given to SSB members? do you think this will impact the ethics of their role?  
18. To what extent would you argue that differences in the interpretation of Shariah 
across different companies and across Gulf countries with respect to M&A?   
  
19. What is the role of Shariah board members in the formation of M&A at an 
international level?  
20. Which authority is responsible to agree the Fatawa?  
21. What is the impact of irresponsible fatwas on the expansion of Islamic companies?  
22. How can we avoid possible differences in the application of Shariah law with respect 
to M&A whether in the same country or across Gulf countries?   
23. In your perspective, how important is the inventing of products to fund international 
M&A with non-Islamic companies? What products do Islamic companies use to fund 
such deals?  
24. Does the Shariah Board composition include women?  
• If yes, what is their rule  
• If no, why?  
25. What are the religious and cultural issues that could prevent/limit M&A?  
26. Are there any alternatives for Islamic firms to compete with conventional companies 




    
Appendix 5: Interview Questions for Managers  
  
1. What is your job description? And how long you have been practicing in this area?  
2. How old is your establishment?   
3. What is the ultimate goal of Shariah governance? Are there any written rules and 
regulations?  
4. What CG model does your company adopt? Are there any differences between 
Shariah CG and conventional CG?  
5. What factors do you consider when adopting any conventional CG code?  
6. How would you describe the awareness of your employees about CG?  What efforts 
have you undertaken to improve quality awareness within your organisation?  
7. What is the ownership structure of your company?   
8. What is the Board size of your company and is there any negative impact of family 
members being presented in the Board?   
9. What is the impact of external investor on the company?  
10. Does your company comply fully with the Shariah law?  
  
• A_ If the answer is No, does your company partly comply with the Shariah? In 
which area does your company comply with Shariah law and why?  
  
11. How would you ensure Shariah compliance in your company?  
12. How would you evaluate the level of disclouser of Zakat of your company?  
13. How does Shariah law affect the firm’s management?  
14. What are the challenges of complying with the Shariah law?  
15. Who assign or appoint SSB members of the company?   
16. What are the criteria you use for such appointment, are they externally or internally 
appointed?  
17. Does the Government pressure affect the belief altruism (devotion or selfless 
concern) of your company?   
18. Does Shariah law encourage or limit practicing in M&A deals?   
19. What would you consider as the key drivers that drive your company to engage in 
cross-border M&A?   
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20. What are the complex procesures of Shariah compliance in terms of M&A?  
  
21. How does your company assess its performance under the Shariah law, what are your 
anticipated benefits from investing in Islamic companies?  
22. How would you describe the role of SSB of your company and what are the 
challenges you face with SSB?  
23. What impact do SSB members have in your company’s investment decisions?  
24. In your opinion, what would you consider to be the main risk of the financial reward 
given to SSB members?  
25. How different fatawa given by different Shariah scholars impact on Islamic 
companies’ performance and expansion?  
26. How would you describe SSB members’ understanding and appreciation of the key 
operation, management and strategic issues of your company?  
27. In the event of cross-border M&A, what are the mechanisms of the company that 
allow all stakeholders express their opinion?  
28. What efforts have been made to ensure adequate mix of skills and experience among 
BOD members and SSB of your company to overcome the challenges of Islamic 
companies?  
  
• By way of training and retraining  
• Increasing BOD knowledge about Islamic law in relation to your company 
operations and increasing SSB knowledge about business operations.   
29. What are the challenges you might face with non-Islamic comppanies when following 
strict Shariah compliance?  
30. How would you describe non-Islamic companies’ understanding of the need of 
Shariah compliance?  
31. What is the position of Islamic inheritance law? Does it affect M&A?  
32. Which Islamic instrument do you use to formalise businesses that comply with 
Shariah across international boundaries?  
33. Are there any religious and cultural factors affect M&A?  
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